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Abstract
Interactions and Complexity in Multi-Agent Justification Logic
by
Antonis Achilleos
Advisor: Distinguished Professor Sergei Artemov
Justification Logic is the logic which introduces justifications to the epis-
temic setting. In contrast to Modal Logic, when an agent believes (or knows)
a certain claim, in Justification Logic we assume the agent believes the claim
because of a certain justification. Therefore, instead of having formulas that
represent the belief of a claim (ex. 2φ or Kφ), we have formulas that rep-
resent that the belief of a claim follows from a provided justification (ex.
t : φ). The original Justification Logic is LP, the Logic of Proofs, and was
introduced by Artemov in 1995 as a link between Intuitionistic Truth and
Gödel proofs in Peano Arithmetic.
The complexity of Justification Logic was first studied by Kuznets in 2000.
He demonstrated that for many justification logics, their derivability problem
(and thus their satisfiability problem) is in the second level of the Polynomial
iv
Hierarchy, a result which was shown to be tight and which was later extended
to more justification logics. In fact, so far, given reasonable assumptions,
every single-agent justification logic whose complexity has been settled has
its satisfiability problem in the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy.
This result is nicely contrasted to Modal Logic, as the corresponding modal
systems are PSPACE-complete.
We investigate the complexity of Justification Logic and Modal Logic
when we allow multiple agents whose justifications affect each other – by
including some combination of the axioms t :iφ→ t :j φ and t :iφ→!t :j t :iφ
(modal cases: 2iφ→ 2jφ). We discover complexity jumps new for the field
of Justification Logic: in addition to logics with their satisfiability problem
in the second level of the polynomial hierarchy (as is the usual case until
now), there are logics that have PSPACE-complete, EXP-complete and even
NEXP-complete satisfiability problems.
It is notable how the behavior of several of these justification logics mir-
rors the behavior of the corresponding multi-modal logics when we restrict
modal formulas (in negation normal form) to use no diamonds. Thus we first
study the complexity of such diamond-free modal logics and then we deduce
complexity properties for the justification logic systems. On the other hand,
it is similarly notable how certain lower complexity bounds – the NEXP-
v
hardness bound and the general Σp2-hardness bound we present – are more
dependent on the behavior of the justifications. The complexity results are
interesting for Modal Logic as well, as we give hardness results that hold
even for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragments of these multi-modal logics
and then we determine the complexity of these logics in a general case.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Justification Logic is a relatively new field, which complements Modal Logic,
introducing justifications to modal epistemology. It is a family of logics which
models the way justifications interact with statements and can be viewed as
an explicit counterpart of Epistemic Modal Logic. It is often the case that we
want to express statements of the form “agent A knows/believes φ because of
justification t” and Justification Logic offers the means to formalize situation
where either the distinction between different justifications is important, or
a given claim is provided together with an appropriate justification for it.
This allows for a finer analysis than the one provided by Modal Logic.
The first justification logic was LP, the Logic of Proofs, introduced by
Artemov in 1995 [Art01]. LP is an explicit version of S4, using what are called
justification terms instead of modal boxes – thus making the assertion that a
statement is known/provable explicit by providing a valid justification/proof.
1
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Its purpose was to link Intuitionistic Logic and Peano Arithmetic, explaining
the relationship between the intuitionistic view of truth as something proven
and classical proofs in PA. Thus, in LP, a justification represented an actual
proof in PA.
Since then Justification Logic has grown into a broad system of explicit
versions of Modal Logic, where “proofs” are generalized to “justifications”,
allowing for a more relaxed and inclusive interpretation of justification terms
as justifications for statements an agent believes. This allows us to have
explicit versions of many epistemic modal logics, such as K, D, T, K4, D4,
S4, KD45, S5, which correspond to J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP, JD45, and JD45
respectively [Art01, Bre00, Pac05, Rub06a, Rub06b, Rub06d, Rub06c]. It is
known that all theorems of one of those justification logics can be translated
to theorems of the corresponding modal logic by replacing each term by a box
(2). On the other hand, for every modal theorem we can find a theorem of
the corresponding justification logic by replacing each box by an appropriate
term. This was already proven in the original paper by Artemov for LP and
S4, as part of the main result [Art01]. By now Justification Logic has its
own versions of logics with Public Announcement, actions, and probability
[BKS11, Ren11, Mil14, KMOS] and its own type system [AB07, PP14].
Justification formulas are formed using propositional connectives and jus-
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tification terms: if φ is a formula and t a term, t :φ is a formula.
The need for Multi-Agent Justification Logic. Yavorskaya in [Yav08]
presents two-agent versions of LP with interactions between the agents (agent
1 and agent 2). To describe the interactions, she introduced new operators
on terms. In LP2 the two agents do not interact with each other at all.
In LP2↑ one of the agents (agent 2) is more knowledgeable than the other:
a justification of φ for agent 1 can be converted to a justification of φ for
agent 2. In LP2! , agent 2 is aware of the knowledge of agent 1: if agent 1
has justification t of a formula φ, then agent 2 has justification of the fact
that agent 1 has justification t of a formula φ. LP2↑↑ and LP
2
!! respectively
extend these logics by also incorporating the converse of these interactions
(swapping 1 and 2). We claim this is an important approach that will further
illuminate the role of justification in epistemological situations.
We extend Yavorskaya’s system to allow multiple (more than two) agents,
so that each agent can be based on a different justification logic. Our main
goal is to develop and study the complexity of a family of mutli-agent jus-
tification logics with interactions among the agents. Here, interactions are
not really actions, but interdependencies among the justifications of different
agents, as characterized by the Conversion axiom (t :i φ → t :j φ) and the
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Verification axiom (t :i φ →!t :j t :i φ). The Conversion axiom indicates that
some agent’s (say i’s) justifications are also justifications accepted by some
other agent (in this case j). The Verification axiom indicates that if agent i
has justification t for a certain statement (we can call it belief), then agent
j is aware of this and j’s justification for this fact is just the ability to check
i’s justification. In other words, j can verify i’s justifications. An analog
is that when someone presents us with a proof of a fact, that proof is the
justification of that fact, while the justification of the fact that the proof is a
valid proof of the fact is checking (verifying) the actual proof. The resulting
system is thus particularly flexible and can model several diverse epistemo-
logical situations. The Conversion interaction is symbolized by ⊃ and the
Verification interaction by ; thus if i ⊃ j, then t :iφ→ t :j φ is an axiom
and if i j, then t :iφ→!t :j t :iφ is an axiom.
Example: Knowledge and Belief. An agent has somehow obtained
two pieces of evidence, the first being evidence for φ and the second for
¬φ. After an additional inquiry the agent discovers that the second piece
of evidence has been compromised whereas the first was confirmed. On this
basis, the agent attains the knowledge of φ. Lets attempt to model this
situation in Bi-modal and Two-agent Justification logic. Bi-modal logic is
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insufficient to model this situation: we need to distinguish between two types
of belief: B and K, where K indicates knowledge and B some kind of belief.
Then, initially the agent would have the beliefs Bφ, B¬φ, while the fact
that the agent determines the first evidence as confirmed can be formalized
as K(Bχ → χ). We can already see that Modal logic’s language presents
difficulties in expressing the desired distinction between the two pieces of
evidence. From Bφ we can derive KBφ (we assume that the agent has at
least knowledge of the evidence they have obtained) and from K(Bφ → φ)
we can derive KBφ→ Kφ; from the two we derive Kφ and then φ. Similarly
we can derive ¬φ and we reach an inconsistency.
We can formalize the scenario in a natural and intrinsically faithful way
using a two-agent justification logic, where s :1X stands for ‘s is an evidence
for X’ and t :2X denotes ‘t is a conclusive/knowledge producing evidence for
X’, equipped with Verification: 1 2. The situation can be formalized by
the set {u :1φ, v :1¬φ, c :2 (u :1X → X)}. This set is consistent, which can
easily be satisfied in a model (defined later on). We can derive knowledge of
φ in the following way: u :1 φ →!u :2 u :1 φ is an instance of the Verification
axiom and together with u :1 φ yields !u :2 u :1 φ and this in turn together
with c :2 (u :1φ→ φ) and the application axiom (which is the counterpart of
the K axiom of Modal Logic and which we present later; an instance of it is
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c :2 (u :1φ→ φ)→!u :2 u :1φ→ [c·!u] :2φ) yield [c·!u] :2φ. Then, φ is known
with justification [c·!u].
The above scenario can also be reformulated as a situation of two agents,
where the second has more reliable sources than the first (enough to accept
only evidence that yield knowledge) and the first one reports to the second
one the two pieces of evidence for φ and ¬φ; the second agent would then
have obtained information about the reliability of the evidence that the first
agent provides, i.e. that the second piece of evidence is compromised, while
the first one is confirmed. The analysis would then be the same.1
Example: Common Awareness through Interactions. Another
interesting situation arises when there are several agents who accept different
views from each other, but each agent is aware of the other’s views. For
example, there may be three agents from three respective religions, based
on three respective holy books. Each agent may be completely aware of the
contents of all three books, so each agent is completely aware of every agent’s
beliefs, but does not necessarily embrace them. Then, the underlying logic
would have three agents, a, b, c, such that a b c a. Furthermore,
1Of course, we could also handle the situation in Modal Logic by using more modalities.
This treatment would not appropriately reflect the nature of the issue, though, and it would
be hard to apply the analysis in other similar situations.
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distinguishing between justifications makes sense, for example, when two (or
all) of the agents accept a certain prophet’s teachings.
Similarly: During a trial, two lawyers, A and B, present evidence to
support their case. A presents witness a who claims A’s client is right, while
B presents witness b who claims B’s client is right (and lets assume they
both believe their respective witnesses’ claims). Furthermore, A also presents
document d that strongly support that whoever is right is entitled to receive
the sum of $10 from the other. Both lawyers accept the document and their
respective witness’ claims as valid evidence, while they are aware of (and
reject) each other’s beliefs on the case. Similarly to the above, this scenario
can be formalized by a two-agent logic where both agents are equipped with
Consistency and 1 2 1.
The complexity of Justification Logic and Modal Logic. Determin-
ing the complexity of the satisfiability problem of a logic is an important goal.
It is important from a logical point of view because we feel that one only re-
ally knows a logic and what its formulas represent after we have determined
its complexity. It is important from a computational perspective, because
having an algorithm for a logic’s satisfiability (or derivability, or model check-
ing. . . ) means that you have a general method to solve any problem you can
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 8
formalize in that logic.
Justification Logic has intriguing complexity properties, especially when
contrasted to the complexity properties of Modal Logic. For Modal Logic,
Ladner has shown that satisfiability (and thus, provability) for K, D, T, K4,
D4, S4 is PSPACE-complete [Lad77]. On the other hand, provability for the
corresponding justification logics is in the second level of the Polynomial Hi-
erarchy and specifically in Πp2 ([Kuz00, Kuz08a, Ach14b]), while Krupski has
shown that LP-provability for formulas of the form t :φ is in coNP ([Kru06]).
Furthermore, there is an easily recognizable class of terms T so that if a
formula φ is provable then t :φ is provable for some t ∈ T and for t ∈ T , the
provability of t :φ is in P ([AK13]). Of course, this does not simplify theorem-
hood of S4 or of any of the other modal logics (which is PSPACE-complete),
but it demonstrates the complexity-theoretic difference between determining
the provability of a modal statement and determining the provability of a
modal statement when given appropriate evidence. It further demonstrates
that Justification Logic internalizes not only formal, Hilbert-style proofs of
its theorems, but also proofs in a computationally significant sense: justifica-
tion terms in T can act as witnesses for a polynomial-time algorithm which
verifies theoremhood of justified formulas.
We study the complexity of the derivability (equivalently, the satisfia-
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bility) problem for Justification Logic in a multi-agent setting. We thus
introduce and study multi-agent logics which are combinations of two or
more different justification logics. During this process we discover several
unexpected complexity jumps. This is a different situation from what is the
case for all (pure) justification logics whose complexity has been studied.
Specifically, we discover PSPACE-complete, EXP-complete, and even NEXP-
complete justification logics. This latter result is perhaps the most surprising,
as it gives us the first justification logic with known complexity higher than
its corresponding modal logic (given standard complexity-theoretic assump-
tions).
Justification Logic is naturally connected to Modal Logic. This is also
true with respect to its complexity properties. Although at first glance, the
techniques and results concerning the complexity of Justification Logic seem
completely foreign to their counterparts for Modal Logic, when we work
with agents with consistent beliefs and especially in a multi-agent setting,
this view changes. In fact, we can see that Justification Logic when tested
for satisfiability tends to behave, at least in part, a lot like Modal Logic if
there were no diamonds. Therefore, we have great interest in studying the
complexity of diamond-free fragments of Modal Logic (in negation normal
form), which we do.
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Overview: We first give the basics by introducing Justification Logic and
Modal Logic and providing a very brief overview of the complexity-theoretic
classes and tools we will use. Following this we present old and new results
and techniques relative to the complexity of single-agent Justification Logic.
We proceed to define a multi-agent family of justification logics with the
interactions described above by generalizing the two-agent versions of LP
by Yavorskaya and we give basic facts and definitions for Multi-modal Logic.
Afterwards, we examine the complexity of the satisfiability problem for these
logics. We first give some immediate results: a general NEXP upper bound
based on a small-model theorem; and an immediate Σp2 upper bound for
logics without agents of consistent beliefs, using Kuznets’ techniques from
[Kuz00]. Then we examine the complexity of Diamond-free Modal Logic and
Justification Logic with just the Conversion interaction; we manage to give a
complete picture for this situation. Following this we cover the cases of only
two agents and, again, we are able to provide the whole picture with respect
to the complexity of each logic. Afterwards we determine a wide class of
logics for which the satisfiability problem remains in the second level of the
polynomial hierarchy; we also prove tightness for the general upper bound:
we provide a NEXP-complete Justification Logic. We conclude with general
remarks, open problems, and possible future directions.
Chapter 2
Definitions
In this chapter we give background from fields that are necessary for the
study of the complexity of Multi-Agent Justification Logic and Modal Logic.
Not surprisingly, these include Complexity Theory, Justification Logic, and
Modal Logic. We go through these topics in reverse order.
2.1 Modal Logic
Modal Logic is the logic of necessity and possibility, of knowledge and belief,
of obligation and permission, or the logic of temporal reasoning. Having
its roots back in Aristotle, who examined the rules of necessary truth and
possible truth, Modal Logic was reintroduced through the work of Lewis
(ex. [Lewa, Lewb]) and became widespread after the introduction of Kripke
semantics [Kri63]. For an overview of Modal Epistemic Logic, the reader can
see [FHMV95, PBV].
11
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Syntax
To construct the formulas of Modal Logic we first need propositional vari-
ables, of which we assume there is a (countably) infinite amount: p1, p2, . . ..
We call the set of propositional variables Prop. Then, we construct modal
formulas using propositional connectives (∧,∨,→,¬), modal operators (2,3),
and the constant ⊥; that is, if φ, ψ are formulas, then so are φ ∧ ψ, φ ∨ ψ,
φ → ψ, ¬φ, 2φ, 3φ. The set of modal formulas is LM (= L1M in a multi-
modal context). For a formula φ (modal like here or otherwise), let sub(φ) be
the set of all its subformulas. It is a simple observation that |sub(φ)| ≤ |φ|,1
as each subformula uniquely corresponds either to a propositional variable
or to an instance of a connective.
There are several ways to save on symbols, and depending on convenience,
we may assume a more restricted language and that certain symbols are
defined from others (i.e. ⊥ := p ∧ ¬p, or ¬φ := φ→ ⊥, or 3 := ¬2¬, etc).
Axiomatizations
To present the family of (Uni)Modal Logic, we follow an axiomatic approach.
Usually when one presents a modal logic (or several) in order to study the
1Throughout this thesis, we assume some reasonable definition for |φ|; to make this
more precise, it makes sense to define |φ| as the number of symbols in φ (with or without
parentheses).
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complexity of its (their) satisfiability problem, they do this by presenting the
semantics first and the restrictions that correspond to each of these logics.
This makes sense, as it is easier to present Modal Logic this way and we
usually work on the models of Modal Logic anyway when we are interested
in complexity issues. As we want to draw parallels to Justification Logic,
though, and Justification Logic is better presented using an axiomatic ap-
proach, it seems more appropriate to present Modal Logic in an axiomatic
way as well.
Normal modal logics use a sufficient amount of propositional tautological
schemes (we can take all tautologies, or a finite axiomatization of Proposi-
tional Logic) and the axiom
K: 2φ ∧2(φ→ ψ)→ 2ψ.




which claims that all provable formulas are provably necessary (or known,
believed, etc).2
The logic which has exactly these axioms and rules is the smallest normal
2When we derive from assumptions, we need to specify that 2φ is derivable from φ
only when φ can be derived independently (without assumptions). That is, we would state
the rule above as `φΓ`2φ .
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modal logic, K. We can extend K with more axioms and thus introduce more
normal modal logics. The axioms are:
D: ¬2⊥;
T : 2φ→ φ;
4: 2φ→ 22φ;
5: ¬2φ→ 2¬2φ.
Modal logic D is K extended by the axiom D, T is K extended by T , K4
is K extended by 4, D4 is K extended by both D and 4 (so it is D extended
by 4), S4 is K extended by both T and 4, KD45 is D4 extended by 5, and S5
is S4 extended by 5. It is probably safe to claim as a general rule that if the
name of a modal logic is a sequence of letters, these letters correspond to the
axioms by which this logic extends K – with S4, S5 as obvious exceptions.
For example, KT45 is S5.
Observation 1. All these modal logics are consistent. Simply notice that we
can map all modal formulas to propositional formulas by removing all boxes.
Then, modal axioms are mapped to propositional tautologies and the rules
preserve theoremhood. Therefore, if ⊥ can be derived in a modal logic, then
it can be derived in the propositional calculus, which is obviously not true.
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D4 K D 4
S4 K T 4
S5 K T 4 5
KD45 K D 4 5
Table 2.1: A table of normal modal logics
This argument can be repeated for all logics we present in this thesis and
thus will be omitted.
Semantics
Modal Logic comes with many kinds of semantics, but the most prevalent
ones are Kripke semantics. A Kripke model is a set of worlds or states, an
accessibility relation and a truth valuation for every state. There, 2φ is inter-
preted as “φ is true in all accessible worlds” and 3φ is interpreted as “φ is true
in at least one accessible world.” In other words, knowledge/belief/necessity
is the same as truth in all situations one can imagine/considers possible.
A Kripke model is a triple M = (W,R,V), where R ⊆ W ×W and for
every propositional variable p, V(p) ⊆ W . Then, (W,R) is called a frame and
R is called an accessibility relation. We define the truth relation |= between
models, worlds and formulas in the following recursive way:
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M, a 6|= ⊥;
M, a |= p iff a ∈ V(p);
M, a |= ¬φ iff M, a 6|= φ;
M, a |= φ ∧ ψ iff both M, a |= φ and M, a |= ψ;
M, a |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, a |= φ or M, a |= ψ;
M, a |= 3φ iff there is some b ∈ W such that aRb and M, b |= φ;
M, a |= 2φ iff for all b ∈ W such that aRb it is the case thatM, b |= φ.
Each modal logic is associated with a specific class of frames. That is,
there are certain restrictions (or closure conditions) we impose on the kinds
of frames we can use for the models of a modal logic.
• K is associated with the class of all frames – there are no restrictions
on K-models.
• D is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility re-
lation is serial (for each world a there is a world b s.t. aRb).
• T is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility re-
lation is reflexive (for each world a, aRa).
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• K4 is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility
relation is transitive (for every a, b, c worlds, aRb and bRc imply that
aRc).
• D4 is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility
relation is both serial and transitive.
• S4 is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility
relation is reflexive and transitive.
• S5 is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility re-
lation is reflexive, transitive and euclidean (if aRb, c, then bRc); equiv-
alently, it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive: it is an equivalence
relation.
• KD45 is associated with the class of frames for which the accessibility
relation is serial, transitive, and euclidean.
In fact, for any logic that results from a combination of these axioms,
we can straightforwardly give frame conditions, as each axiom gives its own
condition for the accessibility relation: D gives seriality; T gives reflexivity;
4 gives transitivity; 5 gives euclidean relations.
Let M be one of the modal logics above. A modal formula φ is called
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M -satisfiable (or just satisfiable if M is clear from the context) if there is a
M -model M and a state a of that model, such that M, a |= φ. In that case
we say that φ is true/satisfied at a, or that M satisfies φ at a. φ is M -valid
if it is true at all worlds of all M -models; it is called valid for model M if it
is true at all worlds of M.
Theorem 2.1.1 (Completeness). Each modal logic introduced above is sound
and complete with respect to its corresponding Kripke models.
Proof. To prove soundness, it suffices to demonstrate that for every instance
A of an axiom of modal logic M , model M = (W,R,V) for M , and u ∈ W ,
M, u |= A: if M, u |= φ and M, u |= φ → ψ, then it must also be the
case that M, u |= ψ; furthermore, if φ is true in all worlds, then so is 2φ;
therefore, the derivation rules preserve validity in a model. We do not need to
concern ourselves with propositional axioms: each of those is a substitution
instance of a propositional tautology, so they always hold at u. We examine
the remaining axioms:
K: If M, u |= 2φ ∧2(φ→ ψ), then for every uRv, M, v |= φ and M, v |=
φ→ ψ, so for every uRv, M, v |= ψ, concluding that M, u |= 2φ.
D: M, u |= 2⊥ exactly when there are no accessible worlds from u; since
R is serial, there is at least one v ∈ W , such that uRv.
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T : Since uRu, if M, u |= 2φ, M, u |= φ.
4: If M, u |= 2φ, for every uRv, if for some w ∈ W , vRw, then uRw
(since R is transitive), so M, w |= φ; therefore, M, v |= 2φ; therefore
M, u |= 22φ.
5: IfM, u |= ¬2φ, then there is some w ∈ W so that uRw andM, w |= ¬φ;
if uRv, then vRw (since R is euclidean), so M, v |= ¬2φ; therefore,
M, u |= 2¬2φ.
Completeness will be proven using a canonical model construction. Let
W be the set of all maximal consistent subsets of LM – that is, maximal
subsets S of LM so that S 6`M ⊥. We know that W is not empty, because
M is consistent. For every Γ ∈ W , let Γ# = {φ ∈ LM |2φ ∈ Γ}. R is
a binary relation on W , such that ΓR∆ if and only if Γ# ⊆ ∆. Finally,
V : Prop −→ 2W is such that V(p) = {Γ ∈ W |p ∈ Γ}. The canonical model
is M = (W,R,V).
Define the relation between worlds of the canonical models and formulas
of LM , |=, as in the definition of models.
Lemma 2.1.2 (Truth Lemma). For all Γ ∈ W , φ ∈ LM , M,Γ |= φ if and
only if φ ∈ Γ.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of φ. The cases for φ = p, a proposi-
tional variable, ⊥, or ψ1 → ψ2, are immediate from the definition of V and
|=. We examine the case when φ = 2ψ. If 2ψ /∈ Γ, then ¬2ψ ∈ Γ; if
M,Γ |= 2ψ, then for every ΓR∆, ψ ∈ ∆. Therefore, Γ# ∪ {¬ψ} is incon-
sistent – meaning that there is a finite Φ ⊆ Γ# so that ¬ψ ∧
∧
Φ ` ⊥, so
` ψ ∨ ¬
∧
Φ, resulting in ` 2(ψ ∨ ¬
∧
Φ), i.e. ` 2(
∧
Φ → ψ); this gives
` 2
∧
Φ → 2ψ. In other words, Γ ` 2ψ, so Γ ∪ {¬2ψ} is inconsistent,
therefore 2ψ ∈ Γ.
For the other direction, if 2ψ ∈ Γ, then for every ∆ ∈ W such that
ΓR∆, ψ ∈ ∆, so ∆ |= ψ – which means that M,Γ |= 2ψ and completes the
proof.
The canonical model is, indeed, a model for M : The canonical model
is, of course, a Kripke model. To establish that it is also a model for M (an
M -model), we must show that the conditions expected from R in an M -model
are satisfied in the canonical model.
If M has axiom T , then R is reflexive. For this, we just need that if Γ ∈ W ,
then Γ# ⊆ Γ. If φ ∈ Γ#, then 2φ ∈ Γ. Because of the Factivity axiom,
¬φ 6∈ Γ, since {t : φ,¬φ} is inconsistent. Therefore, as Γ is maximal
consistent, φ ∈ Γ.
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If M has axiom D, then R is serial. To establish this, we just need
to show that Γ# is consistent. If it is not, then there are formulas
φ1, . . . , φk ∈ Γ# s.t. φ1, . . . , φk ` ⊥. This means that 2φ1, . . .2φk ∈ Γ,
and 2φ1, . . .2φk ` 2⊥ (by induction on the derivation, using axiom
K), which is a contradiction.
If M has axiom 4 and ΓR∆RE, then ΓRE. If 2φ ∈ Γ, then 22φ ∈ Γ.
Therefore, 2φ ∈ Γ#. So, if ΓR∆, then 2φ ∈ ∆. So, Γ# ⊆ ∆# and if
∆RE, then ΓRE.
If M has axiom 5 and ΓR∆, E, then ∆RE. If φ /∈ Γ#, then 2φ /∈ Γ,
so ¬2φ ∈ Γ, so by axiom 5, 2¬2φ ∈ Γ, meaning that ¬2φ ∈ Γ#.
Therefore, if ΓR∆, ¬2φ ∈ ∆, so 2φ /∈ ∆, meaning φ /∈ ∆#. This
concludes that ∆# ⊆ Γ#, which means that if ΓRE, then ∆RE.
Thus, if `M φ, then φ is valid, while if 6`M φ, then {¬φ} is consistent, so it
can be expanded to a maximally consistent set; therefore, ¬φ is satisfiable in
the canonical model.
Tableaux Rules for Modal Logic
There are several proof systems for Modal Logic. We already presented
Hilbert-style axiomatizations and proofs, while there are several others, in-
cluding sequent calculi and tableaux. We consider prefixed tableaux to be
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ideal candidates to use in order to produce decision procedures for Modal
Logic (and Justification Logic as well). They are natural and directly cor-
respond to frame conditions, while the upper bounds we extract are often
evident from the tableau we give for a logic. In fact, we prove most upper
bounds using some kind of a tableau. Thus, we present Tableau procedures
for Modal Logic; the origin of the prefixed tableaux we present here can be
found in [Fit72] and [Mas94]. For more on tableaux see [DGHP99].
A tableau operates on formulas that have been prefixed using two kinds
of prefixes (also called a prefix and a sign). One is a truth prefix and the
other is a state prefix. Specifically, such a prefixed formula is of the form
σ S φ, where φ a modal formula, σ ∈ N∗ is a world- (state-)prefix, and
S ∈ {T, F} is a truth-prefix. In the rules, | denotes a nondeterministic
choice. A tableau branch for φ is a set of formulas which can be generated by
successive applications of the tableau rules for some set of non-deterministic
choices. A branch is propositionally closed (or rejecting) if for some state-
prefix σ and formula ψ, both σ T ψ and σ F ψ are in the branch. A branch
is accepting if it is complete (closed under the rules) and not rejecting. The
tableau procedure accepts φ if there is an accepting branch for φ.
A tableau procedure can be viewed either as a satisfiability-testing pro-
cedure – which is the way we view and use tableaux – or as a proof system –
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by starting from 0 F φ in this case and requiring that the procedure rejects
by our definitions. The latter is probably the usual way to view a tableau,
but for the logics we handle in this thesis, satisfiability and provability are
dual and therefore computationally equivalent: φ is provable iff ¬φ is not




describes the following action: from A, produce formulas B, C and insert
both to the tableau branch. A rule of the form
A
B | C
describes the following action: from A, nondeterministically choose between
formulas B and C and produce one of the two and insert it to the branch
– equivalently, produce formulas B, C, and split the current branch to two
branches each containing one of the formulas.
Table 2.2 gives some of the tableau rules. These are the rules that apply
to propositional cases (to prefixed formulas for which the formula part is of
the form ¬φ or φ ◦ ψ, where ◦ is a propositional connective). Of course,
depending on whether we consider certain connectives as built from others,
we may not need all of these. Table 2.3 gives the remaining tableau rules,
depending on the axioms of each modal logic.
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σ T φ ∧ ψ
σ T φ
σ T ψ
σ F φ ∨ ψ
σ F φ
σ F ψ
σ F φ→ ψ
σ T φ
σ F ψ
σ T φ ∨ ψ
σ T φ | σ T ψ
σ F φ ∧ ψ
σ F φ | σ F ψ
σ T φ→ ψ





Table 2.2: Propositional Tableau rules.
The rules from Table 2.2 give a sound and complete system for propo-
sitional logic, if we ignore the state-prefixes (or not, as they do not affect
anything):
Theorem 2.1.3. The rules from Table 2.2 give a sound and complete proof
system for propositional logic.
Proof. Let b be an accepting branch for φ. We define truth-valuation
V : Prop −→ {true, false}
such that V (p) = true if and only if T p ∈ b. Then, by induction on ψ it
is not hard to see that for every subformula ψ of φ, ψ is true under V if
T ψ ∈ b and ψ is false under V if F ψ ∈ b: if ψ is a propositional variable,
by definition of V ; if not, it is clear from the tableau rules. We just look at
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the case of ψ = ψ1 → ψ2. If T ψ ∈ b, then by the rules, either F ψ1 ∈ b,
or T ψ2 ∈ b (depending on the nondeterministic choice that was made to
construct b). Therefore, either ψ1 is false or ψ2 is true under V (by inductive
hypothesis), so ψ must be true under V . On the other hand, if F ψ ∈ b, then
by the rules, both T ψ1, F ψ2 ∈ b. Therefore, ψ1 is true and ψ2 is false under
V (by inductive hypothesis), so ψ must be false under V .
On the other hand, if there is a satisfying truth-assignment V for φ, we can
construct a complete branch b for φ, by making appropriate nondeterministic
choices that ensure that for every subformula ψ of φ, if T ψ ∈ b, then φ is
true under V and if F ψ ∈ b, then φ is false under V . Therefore, b cannot
have both T ψ and F ψ, as there is no truth-valuation V that makes the
same formula both true and false.
Theorem 2.1.4. The tableau systems as described by Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are
sound and complete w.r.t. their corresponding modal logics.
Proof. Let b be an accepting branch for φ, given the tableau system for a
certain fixed modal logic ML. We construct a model (for the fixed modal
logic)M = (W,R,V) that satisfies φ. For axiom A, we use ML(A) to denote
that the logic has A as an axiom.
• W is the set of all world-prefixes in b;
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Axioms: Corresponding Tableau Rules:
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Table 2.3: Modal Tableau rules
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• R is the closure under the closure conditions of the accessibility rela-
tions in the frames that are associated to our fixed logic (if R must
be serial, then for every a for which there is no aRb, we can introduce
(a, a) into R) of R0 = {(σ, σ.n) ∈ W ×W};
• for every propositional variable p, V(p) = {a ∈ W | a T p ∈ b}.
Then, by induction on ψ we can see that for every subformula ψ of φ and state
σ,M, σ |= ψ if σ T ψ ∈ b andM, σ 6|= ψ if σ F ψ ∈ b: if ψ is a propositional
variable, by definition of V ; propositional cases are similar to the proof of
2.1.3. For the cases of σ T 3χ and σ F 2χ, it suffices to verify that there
is some σ′ ∈ W , such that σRσ′ and σ′ T χ ∈ b or σ′ F χ ∈ b, respectively.
But this is easy to see by the corresponding rules and for σ′ = σ.n. Finally,
the remaining cases are σ T 2χ and σ F 3χ, which are equivalent – so we
only examine the first one. It suffices to prove that if σ T 2χ ∈ b and σRσ′,
then σ′ T χ ∈ b.
Let R0 ⊆ R1 ⊆ R2 ⊆ · · · be defined in the following way: as we defined
above, R0 = {(σ, σ.n) ∈ W ×W}; for i > 0,
Ri = Ri−1 ∪ {(a, a) ∈ W ×W |ML(T )} ∪
∪ {(a, a) ∈ W ×W |ML(D), 6 ∃(a, b) ∈ Ri−1}
∪ {(a, b) ∈ W ×W |ML(4),∃(a, c), (c, b) ∈ Ri−1}
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∪ {(a, b) ∈ W ×W |ML(5),∃(c, a), (c, b) ∈ Ri−1}.
Then,
⋃
i∈NRi = R. We actually prove by induction on i that for every
i ∈ N,
1. if σ T 2χ ∈ b and σRiσ′, then σ′ T χ ∈ b;
2. if ML(4), σ T 2χ ∈ b and σRiσ′, then σ′ T 2χ ∈ b;
3. if ML(5), σ T 2χ ∈ b and σ′Riσ, then σ′ T 2χ ∈ b.
For i = 0, 1, 2, and 3 are easy to verify by the tableau rules. For i > 0, we
take cases, depending on how a new pair of Ri was introduced and whether
we prove 1, 2, or 3 for i:
• if σ = σ′ and ML(T ), then 1 is easy to confirm by the corresponding
tableau rule;
• if σ = σ′, ML(D), and there is no (σ, σ′′) ∈ Ri−1, then by the corre-
sponding tableau rule, σ T 2χ /∈ b;
• if ML(4) and ∃(σ, c), (c, σ′) ∈ Ri−1, then we get 1 by the inductive
hypothesis for 2;
• if ML(5) and ∃(a, σ), (a, σ′) ∈ Ri−1, then we get 1 by the inductive
hypothesis for 3;
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• if σ = σ′, then we immediately have both 2 and 3;
• if ML(4) and ∃(σ, c), (c, σ′) ∈ Ri−1, then if σ T 2χ ∈ b, then c T 2χ ∈ b
(by I.H., 2), so σ′ T 2χ ∈ b (again, by I.H., 2), while if ML(5), then
by I.H., 2, if σ′ T 2χ ∈ b, then c T 2χ ∈ b, and σ T 2χ ∈ b;
• if ML(5),ML(4) and ∃(a, σ), (a, σ′) ∈ Ri−1, then if σ T 2χ ∈ b, then
a T 2χ ∈ b (by I.H., 3), so σ′ T 2χ ∈ b (by I.H., 2), while by I.H., 3,
and then 2, if σ′ T 2χ ∈ b, then a T 2χ ∈ b, and σ T 2χ ∈ b.
On the other hand, if there is a model and a stateM, a |= φ, then we can
construct a complete branch b for φ, by making appropriate nondeterministic
choices that preserve the mapping condition: we map each state-prefix σ to
a state b, such that 0 is mapped to a and for every subformula ψ of φ,
if σ T ψ ∈ b, then M, b |= ψ and if σ F ψ ∈ b, then M, b 6|= ψ, for
some b that is mapped to σ. Therefore, b cannot have both σ T ψ and
σ F ψ. The part of the nondeterministic choices is similar to the proof of
the propositional version of this theorem. To preserve a mapping as new
sate-prefixes are introduced from rule σ T 3ψ
σ.n T ψ
, notice that since σ is mapped
to some b, b |= 3ψ, so there is some c accessible from b, such that c |= ψ.
We map σ.n to c. Now it just remains to check that the remaining tableau
rules give formulas that preserve the mapping condition.
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Notice in the proof above that we needed to assume that if ML(5), then
it must also be the case that ML(4). Indeed, the subset of modal logics we
presented is not as extensive as it could be: we do not take all combinations
of the axioms, but instead we assume that if the logic has 5, then it also has
4.3 This choice has been made mostly for clarity; the tableau rules of Table
2.3 are not completely modular, so they do not work, for example, for logic
K5 (the reader can confirm that 32p → 22p is derivable in K5, but not
in the corresponding tableau). There are tableau rules to address this, but
we do not use them. When we deal with modal satisfiability for logics with
negative introspection, we use different methods.
A note on tableau termination and the order of application for the
rules. We have defined a complete branch as a branch closed under the
tableau rules. This definition is general enough to include infinite branches,
which definitely exist – consider running the D4-tableau on 2p. However, if
we want to use the tableau as an actual procedure to decide satisfiability, we
need it to actually terminate at some point. For the K-tableau (or for any
other logic without axiom 4), we can see that the maximum modal depth
of the formulas prefixed by σ is greater than the maximum modal depth
3We also assume that ML(D) and ML(T ) are mutually exclusive, but this makes sense,
since axiom D is a special case of T .
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of the formulas prefixed by σ.n, therefore it always terminates. When the
logic has axiom 4, then we can see that boxed formulas (of the form 2φ or
3φ) “accumulate” as the prefixes grow. For other cases (including ones that
appear in following chapters), we will argue that we do not need to examine
all the prefixes, but we can cut off the procedure after a certain length of
prefixes has been reached. Furthermore, we often need to run the tableau
using a restricted amount of space, thus keeping in memory a certain number
of prefixes at a time. In that case it makes sense to give lower priority to
rules that produce new prefixes and highest to the ones that move formulas
from one prefix to the other (for example the box rules from Table 2.3); this
way we keep all necessary information for a specific prefix at a time, even if
we delete certain prefixes.
2.2 Justification Logic
In this section we present the (single-agent) justification logics JCS , JDCS ,
J4CS , JD4CS , JTCS , LPCS – CS is a parameter of each logic called a constant
specification, to be explained later. Other justification logics have also been
defined, but we focus on these because they are the single-agent logics with
known complexity and they are the ones we need to present the full multi-
agent systems in the following chapters.
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2.2.1 Syntax
The syntax of Justification Logic is similar to the one of Modal Logic, only
instead of using 2, we use justification terms. These are constructed from
justification variables (x1, x2, . . .), justification constants (c1, c2, . . .), and jus-
tification operators !, ·,+: justification constants and variables are justifica-
tion terms and if t, s are terms, then so are [t+ s], [t · s], !t. In short,
t ::= x | c | [t+ t] | [t · t] | !t.
The set of justification terms is called Tm and in fact is the set of terms we
will use for all the justification logics we present in this thesis. The common
language LJ of the justification logics J, JD, J4, JD4, JT, LP has propositional
variables (p1, p2, . . .) like LM and formulas are defined:
φ ::= ⊥ | p | ¬φ | (φ→ φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | t :φ,
but depending on convenience we will treat some connectives as constructed
from others, while we often omit parentheses. If we omit parentheses, : and
¬ bind more strongly than ∧, which binds more strongly than ∨, which in
turn binds more strongly than →.
Intuitively, · applies a justification for a statement φ→ ψ to a justification
for φ and gives a justification for ψ. Using + we can combine two justifications
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and have a justification for anything that can be justified by any of the two
initial terms – much like the concatenation of two proofs. Finally, ! is a unary
operator called the proof checker. Given a justification t for φ, !t justifies the
fact that t is a justification for φ.
2.2.2 Axiomatizations
Lets assume a complete axiomatization of classical propositional logic which
uses finitely many axiomatic schemes. We expand on these axioms. All
justification logics have Modus Ponens and they come with the following
axioms:
Finitely many axiomatic schemes of classical propositional logic;
Application Axiom: s : (φ→ ψ)→ (t :φ→ [s · t] :ψ);
Concatenation Axiom: s :φ→ [s+ t] :φ and s :φ→ [t+ s] :φ,
where in the above, φ, ψ are formulas in LJ , t, s justification terms.
We also include a set of axioms from the following ones; which particular
combination we use depends upon the logic. Specifically, if the logic is JTCS
or LPCS , we include Factivity; if the logic is J4CS or LPCS , we include Positive
Introspection; if the logic is JDCS or JD4CS , we include the Consistency axiom.
Factivity Axiom: t :φ→ φ;
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Positive introspection: t :φ→!t : t :φ;
Consistency Axiom: t :⊥ → ⊥ (or just ¬t :⊥),
where in the above, φ is a formula in LJ , t a justification term.
To complete the description of a justification logic, a constant specification
CS is needed: a constant specification for a justification logic is a set of
formulas of the form c :A, where c a justification constant and A an axiom of
the logic from the ones above. We say that axiom A is justified by a constant
c when c :A ∈ CS. Then we can introduce our final axiom,
Axiom Necessitation: t :φ, where either t :φ ∈ CS or φ = s :ψ an instance
of Axiom Necessitation and t =!s.
Axiom Necessitation will be called AN for short. Therefore, JCS is the version
of logic J equipped with constant specification CS.
A constant specification is:
• axiomatically appropriate if each axiom is justified by at least one con-
stant;
• schematic if every constant justifies a certain number of the axiom
schemes of the logic except for AN (0 or more) – in this case, a constant
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may justify only a finite number of schemes, but either 0 or infinite
axioms ;
• schematically injective if it is schematic and every constant justifies at
most one scheme;
• finite if it is a finite set.
J∅, JD∅, J4∅, JD4∅, JT∅, LP∅ are the respective justification logics under
the empty constant specification, ∅. J, JD, J4, JD4, JTand LP are JTCSJ ,
JDTCSJD , J4TCSJ4 , JD4TCSJD4 , JTTCSJT and LPTCSLP respectively, where for
some justification logic J , TCSJ is the total constant specification,
TCSJ = {c :A | c is a constant, A an axiom of J except for AN}.
The total constant specification is schematic and axiomatically appropriate,
but not schematically injective.
Proposition 2.2.1 is a very characteristic property of Justification Logic.
It is the counterpart of the Necessitation Rule from Modal Logic, only for
Justification Logic it is a derived property and not a rule. It shows that
Justification Logic can internalize the proofs of its own theorems – as long
as we have an axiomatically appropriate constant specification.
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Proposition 2.2.1. For an axiomatically appropriate constant specification,
if φ1, . . . , φk ` φ, then for terms t1, . . . , tk, there is some term t such that
t1 :φ1, . . . , tk :φk ` t :φ.
Proof. By induction on the proof of φ: If φ is an axiom, then by AN, the
theorem holds and it obviously holds for any φi. This covers the base cases.
Using the application axiom, if φ is the result of ψ, χ and modus ponens,
since the theorem holds for some r : (ψ → φ) and s : ψ, the theorem holds
for φ and t = [r · s].
2.2.3 Semantics
We present Fitting-models (often called F-models), which were first intro-
duced by Fitting in [Fit05] and later for more logics in [Pac05, Kuz08b]
and Mkrtychev-models (often called M-models), introduced by Mkrtychev in
[Mkr97], but later given for more logics in [Kuz00]. Traditionally ([Kuz00,
Kuz09, Kuz08a]), Mkrtychev models were used to prove complexity upper
bounds for Justification Logic, but in more recent work ([Ach14b, Ach14c,
Ach15b]), there was a need to work with Fitting models – especially when
the Consistency axiom is present.
Fitting models are essentially Kripke-models, but with an additional
mechanism to handle justification terms, which we call an admissible evi-
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dence function. On the other hand, Mkrtychev models can mostly (but not
entirely) be thought of as Fitting models but of only one state. Thus we can
drop the multiple-world part of the semantics and just keep an admissible
evidence function and a truth valuation function – which we do. We start
by giving the definition for Fitting models, then for Mkrtychev models, and
then we prove a soundness and completeness theorem for both.
Definition 2.2.1. Let J be one of the logics J, JD, J4, JD4, JT, or LP. A
Fitting model M for logic JCS is a quadruple (W,R, E ,V), where W 6= ∅ is
the set of worlds (or states) of the model, R is a binary relation on W , V
assigns a subset of W to each propositional variable, and E assigns a subset
of W to each pair of a justification term and a formula:
V : Prop −→ 2W
and
E : Tm× LJ −→ 2W .
E is called an admissible evidence function and must satisfy the following
closure conditions:
Application closure: for any formulas φ, ψ and justification terms t, s,
E(s, φ→ ψ) ∩ E(t, φ) ⊆ E(s · t, ψ);
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Sum closure: for any formula φ and justification terms t, s,
E(t, φ) ∪ E(s, φ) ⊆ E(t+ s, φ);
CS-closure: for any instance t :φ of AN,
E(t, φ) = W.
The following closure conditions are in effect only when J has Positive In-
trospection (i.e. J is J4, JD4, or LP):
Positive Introspection closure: for any formula φ and justification term t,
E(t, φ) ⊆ E(!t, t :φ);
Distribution: for any formula φ, justification term t and a, b ∈ W , if aRb
and a ∈ E(t, φ), then b ∈ E(t, φ);
Just like in the definition for Kripke models for Modal Logic, the accessi-
bility relation R must satisfy the following conditions:
• If J = JT or J = LP, then R must be reflexive.
• If J = JD or J = JD4, then R must be serial.
• If J = J4, J = JD4, or J = LP, then R must be transitive.
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS 39
Truth in the model – as described by relation |= – is defined in the follow-
ing way, given a state a:
• M,a 6|= ⊥.
• If p is a propositional variable, then M, a |= p iff a ∈ V(p)
• If φ, ψ are formulas, then M, a |= φ → ψ if and only if M,a |= ψ, or
M, a 6|= φ.
• If φ is a formula and t a term, thenM, a |= t :φ if and only if a ∈ E(t, φ)
and for all b ∈ W , if aRb, then M, b |= φ.
As we mention above, Mkrtychev models can mostly be considered Fitting
models of only one world; this view works out, if one carefully compares
the two definitions. The only exception comes up in the presence of the
Consistency axiom – when the logic in question is either JD or JD4. In that
case, the seriality condition for Fitting models enforces the existence of more
than one world. Thus it is replaced by the consistent evidence condition,
which turns out to be more general, in that it gives completeness for more
logics, but seems rather arbitrary – especially when dealing with complexity
issues.
Definition 2.2.2. Let J be one of the logics J, JD, J4, JD4, JT, or LP. A
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Mkrtychev model for JCS , where CS is a constant specification for J , is a
pair M = (A,V), where propositional valuation
V : Prop −→ {true, false}
assigns a truth value to each propositional variable and
E : Tm× LJ −→ {true, false}.
Many times E(t, φ) will be used as an abbreviation for E(t, φ) = true and
¬E(t, φ) as an abbreviation for E(t, φ) = false.
Like in the definition of Fitting models, the admissible evidence function
must satisfy certain conditions that depend on the axioms and rules of JCS :
Application Closure: if E(s, φ→ ψ) and E(t, φ), then E(s · t, ψ);
Sum Closure: if E(s, φ) or E(t, φ), then E(s+ t, φ);
CS Closure: if t :φ is an instance of Axiom Necessitation, then E(t, φ);
Positive Introspection Closure: if E(t, φ) then E(!t, t :φ) — when J has
Positive Introspection as an axiom;
Consistent Evidence Condition: E(t,⊥) = false — when J has Con-
sistency as an axiom.
The truth relation M |= φ is defined as follows:
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• M 6|= ⊥;
• M |= p iff V(p) = true for propositional variable p;
• M |= φ→ ψ iff M 6|= φ or M |= ψ;
• M |= t :φ iff M |= φ and E(t :φ) — if factivity is an axiom of J ;
• M |= t :φ iff E(t :φ) — if factivity is not an axiom of J .
So, the accessibility relation is not considered in the case of the Mkrtychev
models. The way factivity is ensured is through the definition of truth in
Mkrtychev models, which varies from logic to logic. We say that a Mkrtychev
model (respectively Fitting model) M with admissible evidence function E
has the Strong Evidence Property when for every t :φ ∈ LJ (resp. and state
a), M |= φ if and only if E(t, φ) = true (resp. M, a |= φ if and only if
a ∈ E(t, φ)).
Theorem 2.2.2 (Completeness Theorem for Mkrtychev models ). Each jus-
tification logic from JCS , JDCS , JTCS , J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS , where CS is a
constant specification for that logic is sound and complete with respect to its
Mkrtychev models; each such logic is also sound and complete with respect to
its Mkrtychev models that have the Strong Evidence Property.
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Proof. To prove soundness, we just need to prove that every Mkrtychev
model satisfies all axioms, since it is not hard to see that Modus Ponens
preserves truth. We do not deal with the axioms of Propositional Logic.
Application: if M |= s : (φ → ψ) and M |= t : φ, then E(s, φ → ψ) =
E(t, φ) = true, which in turn gives E(s · t, ψ) = true, by the application
closure; if J = JT or LP, then also M |= φ → ψ, φ, so M |= ψ; in
any case (whether J ∈ {JT, LP} or not), then, we can conclude that
M |= [s · t] :ψ.
Concatenation: by the sum closure condition, whether J has factivity or
not.
Factivity: trivial, by the definition of |=.
Consistency: trivial, by the Consistent Evidence condition.
Positive Introspection: if M |= t : φ, then E(t, φ) = true, so by the
Positive Introspection closure, E(!t, t :φ) = true and thusM |=!t : t :φ.
To prove completeness, let 6`J φ. Then, ¬φ is consistent. Let Γ be
a maximally consistent set of formulas such that ¬φ ∈ Γ. Notice that if
Γ ` ψ, then Γ ∪ {ψ} must be consistent (since Γ is consistent) and since Γ
is maximally consistent, ψ ∈ Γ. Let M = (E ,V) be such that E(t, ψ) = true
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iff t :ψ ∈ Γ and V(p) = true iff p ∈ Γ. It is not hard to prove that E satisfies
all the conditions that are required from an admissible evidence function:
Application Closure: If E(s, φ→ ψ) and E(t, φ), then s : (φ→ ψ), t :φ ∈
Γ, therefore Γ ` [s · t] :ψ, so [s · t] :ψ ∈ Γ and thus E(s · t, ψ);
Sum Closure: If E(s, φ) or E(t, φ), then s :φ or t :φ ∈ Γ, so Γ ` [s+ t] :φ
and therefore E(s+ t, φ);
CS Closure: If t : φ is an instance of Axiom Necessitation, Γ ` t : φ, so
t :φ ∈ Γ and thus E(t, φ) = true;
Positive Introspection Closure: If E(t, φ) then t : φ ∈ Γ, because of
Positive Introspection Γ `!s :s :φ and therefore E(!t, t :φ);
Consistent Evidence Condition: because of Consistency, if t : ⊥ ∈ Γ,
Γ ` ⊥, but Γ is consistent, so E(t,⊥) = false.
Therefore, M is indeed a Mkrtychev model for J . It remains to prove that
M |= ¬φ. For this we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.3 (Truth Lemma). For every ψ ∈ LJ , M |= ψ if and only if
ψ ∈ Γ.
Proof. We prove this by induction on ψ. Propositional cases are easy. If
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ψ = t : χ, then ψ ∈ Γ if and only if E(t, χ) = true; furthermore, if J has
Factivity and ψ ∈ Γ, then χ ∈ Γ, so M |= χ. Therefore, M |= ψ.
Therefore, since ¬ψ ∈ Γ, it is also the case that M |= ¬ψ. For the last
part of the theorem, notice that M has the Strong Evidence Property by
definition: using the Truth Lemma,
E(t, ψ) = true ⇔ t :ψ ∈ Γ ⇔ Γ |= s :ψ.
Now we prove the same theorem for Fitting models. The reader may
notice that completeness for Fitting models is less general than complete-
ness for Mkrtychev models: we need to assume an axiomatically appropriate
constant specification when the logic in question has the Consistency axiom
(i.e. it is either JD or JD4). However, we consider that the assumption that
a constant specification is axiomatically appropriate is a very natural one,
which also naturally corresponds to the Necessitation rule from Modal Logic.
Proposition 2.2.4. Let J be one of J, JT, J4, LP. JCS is sound and complete
with respect to its Fitting models. Furthermore, JCS is sound and complete
with respect to its Fitting models that have the Strong Evidence Property. If
J is either JD or JD4, then JCS is sound and complete with respect to its
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Fitting models as long as CS is axiomatically appropriate. In that case, JCS
is also sound and complete with respect to its Fitting models that have the
Strong Evidence Property.
Proof. Soundness is very similar to the case of Mkrtychev models from The-
orem 2.2.2. Completeness will be proven using a canonical model con-
struction. Let W be the set of all maximal consistent subsets of LJ . We
know that W is not empty, because J is consistent. For every Γ ∈ W , let
Γ# = {φ ∈ LJ | ∃t ∈ Tm t :φ ∈ Γ}. R is a binary relation on W , such that
ΓR∆ if and only if Γ# ⊆ ∆. Let E(t, φ) = {Γ ∈ W | t : φ ∈ Γ}. Finally,
V : Prop −→ 2W is such that V(p) = {Γ ∈ W | p ∈ Γ}. The canonical model
is M = (W,R, E ,V).
Define the relation between worlds of the canonical models and formulas
of LJ , |=, as in the definition of models.
Lemma 2.2.5 (Truth Lemma). For all Γ ∈ W , φ ∈ LJ , M,Γ |= φ if and
only if φ ∈ Γ.
Proof. By induction on the structure of φ. The cases for φ = p, a proposi-
tional variable, ⊥, or ψ1 → ψ2, are immediate from the definition of V and
|=. We examine the case when φ = t :ψ. If M,Γ |= t :ψ, then Γ ∈ E(t, ψ)
and therefore t :ψ ∈ Γ. For the other direction, if t :ψ ∈ Γ, then Γ ∈ E(t, ψ)
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and for every ∆ ∈ W such that ΓR∆, ψ ∈ ∆, so ∆ |= ψ – which means that
M,Γ |= ψ and completes the proof.
The canonical model is, indeed, a model for J . To establish this, we must
show that the conditions expected from R and E are satisfied. First, the
admissible evidence function closure conditions:
Application closure: If Γ ∈ E(s, φ→ ψ) ∩ E(t, φ), then s :(φ→ ψ), t :φ ∈
Γ. Because of the application axiom, [s · t] :ψ ∈ Γ, so Γ ∈ Ei(s · t, ψ).
Sum closure: If Γ ∈ E(t, φ), then t :φ ∈ Γ, so, by the Concatenation axiom,
[s+ t] :φ, [t+ s] :φ ∈ Γ, therefore, Γ ∈ E(t+ s, φ) ∩ E(s+ t, φ).
Positive Introspection closure: If J has Positive Introspection and Γ ∈
E(t, φ), then t :φ ∈ Γ and because of Positive Introspection, !t : t :φ ∈
Γ, therefore, Γ ∈ E(!t, t :φ).
CS closure: Any Γ ∈ W includes all instances of AN, so this is satisfied.
Distribution: If J has Positive Introspection, ΓR∆, and Γ ∈ E(t, φ), then
t :φ ∈ Γ and by Positive Introspection, !t : t :φ ∈ Γ, thus t :φ ∈ Γ# ⊆
∆, concluding that ∆ ∈ E(t, φ).
To complete the proof, we prove that R satisfies the required conditions:
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If F (i) = JT or LP, then R is reflexive. For this, we just need that if
Γ ∈ W , then Γ# ⊆ Γ. If φ ∈ Γ#, then there is some justification term,
t, for which t : φ ∈ Γ. Because of the Factivity axiom, ¬φ 6∈ Γ, since
{t :φ,¬φ} is inconsistent. Therefore, as Γ is maximal consistent, φ ∈ Γ.
If J = JD or JD4, then R is serial. To establish this, we just need to show
that Γ# is consistent. If it is not, then there are formulas φ1, . . . , φk ∈
Γ# s.t. φ1, . . . , φk ` ⊥. This means that there are t1 : φ1, . . . tk :
φk ∈ Γ, s.t. t1 : φ1, . . . tk : φk ` t : ⊥ (by Proposition 2.2.1, which
requires an axiomatically appropriate constant specification), which is
a contradiction.
If J has Positive Introspection and ΓR∆RE, then ΓRE. If t :φ ∈ Γ, then
!t : t : φ ∈ Γ. Therefore, t : φ ∈ Γ#. So, if ΓR∆, then t : φ ∈ ∆. So,
Γ# ⊆ ∆# and if ∆RE, then ΓRE.
Finally, notice that the canonical model has the Strong Evidence Property:
if Γ ∈ E(t, φ) then t :φ ∈ Γ and by the Truth Lemma, Γ |= t :φ.
The Strong Evidence Property is a very useful property; it is used in
tableaux to remove nondeterminism and in small-model results. It is not
hard from a modelM = (W,R, E ,V) to construct a modelM′ = (W,R, E ′,V)
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which has the Strong Evidence Property and for every w ∈ W and φ ∈ LJ ,
M, w |= φ iff M′, w |= φ: just define
E ′(t, φ) = {w ∈ W | M, w |= t :φ}.
2.2.4 Explicit Modal Logic
As the reader may have noticed from the axioms of Justification Logic and
the naming of each logic, there is a correspondence between Justification
Logic and Modal Logic. For each justification logic there is a corresponding
modal logic. For instance, J corresponds to K, JD to D, JT to T, J4 to K4, JD4
to D4, and LP to S4. The Realization Theorem makes this correspondence
formal, further justifying Justification Logic’s alternative characterization as
Explicit Modal Logic.
The Realization Theorem says that there is a straightforward translation
from the language of Justification Logicto the language of Modal Logic, called
forgetful projection. This translation simply turns justification terms into
boxes and translates theorems of a justification logic into theorems of the
corresponding modal logic. However, the most important property of this
translation that the Realization Theorem establishes is that for each theorem
φ of this corresponding modal logic, there is a theorem (perhaps more than
one) of the justification logic, such that φ is its translation.
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Definition 2.2.3. The forgetful projection is a function ◦ : LJ −→ LM that
converts justification formulas into modal formulas. It is defined recursively:
p◦ = p, ⊥◦ = ⊥, (φ→ ψ)◦ = (φ◦ → ψ◦), and (t :φ)◦ = 2(φ◦),
where p is a propositional variable, φ, ψ are justification formulas and t is a
justification term.
The forgetful projection can be generalized on sets of formulas: if A ⊆ LJ ,
then A◦ = {φ◦ ∈ JM | φ ∈ A}. By identifying a logic with the set of its
theorems, we can apply the forgetful projection on a logic and get the set of
the projections of the logic’s theorems.
Theorem 2.2.6 (Realization Theorem [Art95, Bre00, Art08]4 ). J◦ = K;
JD◦ = D; JT◦ = T; J4◦ = K4; JD4◦ = D4; LP◦ = S4.
In other words, the set of forgetful projections of the theorems of each
justification logic is exactly the set of the theorems of the corresponding
modal logic. It is not hard to see that the projection operator respects
Modus Ponens and that each axiom of a justification logic J is projected
to a tautology of the corresponding modal logic M . Therefore, immediately
J◦ ⊆ M . The other direction is the harder one to prove and requires a
realization procedure, which maps each modal box of a modal theorem to a
4See also [Fit03, Fit05, Fit06, Fit07b, Fit07a].
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certain justification term. The topic of realization procedures and theorems is
an extensive and important one. We do not cover it as it is beyond the scope
of this thesis. As such, in the following chapters we informally call a modal
logic the corresponding modal logic of a justification logic (and vice-versa) if
their axioms match. The reader can read [Fit15] for a recent investigation in
the matter, and [Yav08] for realization results for Multi-Agent Justification
Logic.
2.2.5 Two versions of the ∗-calculus and admissible ev-
idence
We present the ∗-calculus for Justification Logic. The ∗-calculus is an invalu-
able tool in the study of the complexity of Justification Logic. We present
two variations of the calculus, depending on the semantics we are using. Each
of those operates on ∗-expressions, which are expressions of the form ∗(t, φ),
where t : φ ∈ LJ . The difference is that while one of the two types, which
we simply call a ∗-calculus, operates on ∗-expressions as they are, the other
type, which we call a ∗-calculus on frames (or just ∗-calculus if it is clear from
the context which one we are using), has several instances, each based on a
fixed frame and operates on ∗-expressions prefixed by states from that frame.
In fact, we first present the ∗-calculus on frames and explain how we can re-
trieve the plain ∗-calculus by simply ignoring all parts that refer to a frame.
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A ∗-calculus was first introduced in [Kru06], but its origins can be found in
[Mkr97]. The first time it explicitly appeared as fully frame-based was in
[Ach14c].5 The form on which the ones in this section are based is mainly
from [Kuz08a]; this subsection’s results are from [Mkr97, Kru06, Kuz08a].
If t is a term and φ is a formula then ∗(t, φ) is a ∗-expression. Given a
frame F = (W,R) for J , the ∗F -calculus for J on the frame F is a calculus
on ∗-expressions prefixed by worlds from W (∗F -expressions from now on)
with the axioms and rules that are shown in Table 2.4.
If E is an admissible evidence function ofM, we defineM, w |= ∗(t, φ) iff
E |= w ∗(t, φ) iff w ∈ E(t, φ). Notice that the calculus rules correspond to the
closure conditions of the admissible evidence functions. In fact, because of
this, given a frame F = (W,R) and a set S of ∗F -expressions, the function E
such that E |= e ⇔ S `∗F e is an admissible evidence function. Furthermore,
E is minimal and unique: if some admissible evidence function E ′ is such that
for every e ∈ S, E ′ |= e, then for every ∗F -expression e, E |= e⇒ E ′ |= e.
Therefore, given a frame F = (W,R) and two sets X, Y of ∗F -expressions,
there is an admissible evidence function E on F such that for every e ∈ X,
E |= e and for every e ∈ Y , E 6|= e, if and only if there is no e ∈ Y such that
5[Kuz08a] shows a way to use the calculus with a frame in a meaningful way without
it being based on it.
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∗CS(F) Axioms: w ∗ (t, φ), where t :φ an instance of AN
∗App(F):
w ∗ (s, φ→ ψ) w ∗ (t, φ)
w ∗ (s · t, ψ)
∗Sum(F):
w ∗ (t, φ)
w ∗ (s+ t, φ)
w ∗ (s, φ)
w ∗ (s+ t, φ)
If J has Positive Introspection:
∗PI(F):
w ∗ (t, φ)
w ∗ (!t, t :φ)
and
∗Dis(F): For any (a, b) ∈ R,
a ∗ (t, φ)
b ∗ (t, φ)
Table 2.4: The ∗F -calculus for J : where F = (W,R)
X `∗ e. These statements are made exact by Theorem 2.2.7.
Theorem 2.2.7. For any J justification logic of the ones considered here, CS
constant specification for J , frame F = (W,R) and set S of ∗F -expressions,
The function E, such that
E(t, φ) = {w ∈ W | S `∗ w ∗ (t, φ)}
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is the unique minimal admissible evidence function such that E |= S – i.e. if
there is an admissible evidence function E ′ |= S, then for every ∗F -expression
e, if E |= e then E ′ |= e.
Proof. Simply notice that E is the closure of S under the admissible evidence
(closure) conditions.
Another version of the ∗-calculus – the one that actually appears in
[Mkr97, Kru06, Kuz08a] – is not based on a frame. In fact, it is identical
to the one we presented if we ignore all frame-related parts (and therefore it
does not have rule ∗Dis(F)). It appears in Table 2.5. This version of the cal-
culus is more appropriate when we discuss Mkrtychev models and admissible
evidence functions on Mkrtychev models.
An important difference from the ∗-calculus on frames is that we do not
know that this one will give us an admissible evidence function. M-models
have the additional consistent evidence condition for their admissible evi-
dence functions. Therefore, even if the calculus gives us the closure of a set
of ∗-expressions under the other conditions, we are not guaranteed to get an
admissible evidence function. We call a set S of ∗-expressions consistent if
there is no term t so that S `∗ ∗(t,⊥).
Corollary 2.2.8. For any J justification logic of the ones considered here,
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∗CS Axioms: ∗(t, φ), where t :φ an instance of AN
∗App:
∗(s, φ→ ψ) ∗(t, φ)










Table 2.5: The ∗-calculus for J
CS constant specification for J , and set S of ∗-expressions, if S is consistent
or J does not have the consistency axiom, then the function E, such that
E(t, φ) =
{
true , if S `∗ ∗(t, φ)
false , otherwise.
is the unique minimal (M-type) admissible evidence function such that E |= S
– i.e. if there is an admissible evidence function E ′ |= S, then for every ∗-
expression e, if E |= e then E ′ |= e.
Definition 2.2.4. For any justification logic J and constant specification
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CS, the reflected fragment of JCS is
rJCS = {t :φ | JCS ` t :φ}.
The ∗-calculus, in addition to providing a way to produce minimal ad-
missible evidence functions, also provides an independent axiomatization of
the reflected fragments of the justification logics:
Theorem 2.2.9. For any justification logic J and constant specification CS,
JCS ` t :φ ⇐⇒ `∗CS ∗(t, φ).
Proof. JCS ` t :φ if and only if (Theorem 2.2.2) for every Mkrtychev model
M, M |= t : φ, which is true if and only if for every Mkrtychev model
M = (E ,V), E |= ∗(t, φ), which is true if and only if Em |= ∗(t, φ), where Em
the minimal admissible evidence function (such that Em |= ∅), which in turn
is true if and only if `∗CS ∗(t, φ) (Theorem 2.2.8).
2.3 Computational Complexity
This thesis is mainly focused on Complexity results for Justification Logic.
Therefore it is natural to give a little background on Computational Com-
plexity Theory, especially as it relates to Modal Logic and Justification Logic.
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2.3.1 Short Background on Complexity Theory
The model of computation assumed is the Turing Machine, although others
could be easily used with no, or with minimal, effect. We consider only
classes of decision problems, also called languages, often literally considered
languages over the alphabet {0, 1}. For an overview of Complexity Theory,
the reader can see [Pap94].
Definition 2.3.1. We define the following time and space-complexity classes:
TIME(t(n)) (or DTIME(t(n))) is the class of problems that can be decided
by a deterministic Turing Machine in time t(n).
NTIME(t(n)) is the class of problems that can be decided by a nondetermin-
istic Turing Machine in time t(n).
SPACE(s(n)) (or DSPACE(s(n))) is the class of problems that can be decided
by a deterministic Turing Machine by using additional working space
s(n).
NSPACE(s(n)) is the class of problems that can be solved by a nondetermin-
istic Turing Machine by using additional working space s(n).
For a complexity class C, coC is the class of problems with their comple-
ment in C, i.e. coC = {A ⊆ {0, 1}∗ | Ā ∈ C}.
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• NPC is the class of problems that can be decided by a nondeterministic
Turing Machine that uses time p(n), where p a polynomial, and an
oracle from a problem in C;












and for k ∈ N,
Σpk+1 = NP
Σpk and Πpk+1 = coNP
Σpk .
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It is easy to see that
P = coP ⊆ NP ⊆ PH ⊆ PSPACE = coPSPACE ⊆ EXP = coEXP ⊆ NEXP.
As for inequalities, we know that
P 6= EXP and NP 6= NEXP,
(by the Time Hierarchy Theorems [HS65, Coo73]) but not much more; we
also know that PSPACE = NPSPACE (Savitch’s theorem [Sav70]). It is fairly
standard to assume that the remaining inclusions of these complexity classes
are proper, though.
Alternating Classes Often we use alternating complexity classes – or
rather alternating characterizations of certain classes. These are complexity
classes characterized relative to an alternating Turing Machine. An alternat-
ing Turing Machine is a nondeterministic Turing Machine, only it has univer-
sal and existential states. Like with a nondeterministic TM, a configuration
with an existential (respectively universal) state can reach an accepting con-
figuration if at least one (resp. all) of its subsequent configurations can reach
an accepting state. Therefore, a usual nondeterministic TM is an alternating
TM with only existential states.
ATIME(t(n)) is the class of problems that can be decided by an alternating
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Turing Machine in time t(n), i.e. a TM which can make both existential
and universal nondeterministic choices.
ASPACE(s(n)) is the class of problems that can be solved by an alternating








are not really new complexity classes, but very useful alternative characteri-
zations of ones we have presented before:
Theorem 2.3.1. AP = PSPACE ([SM73]); APSPACE = EXP ([CKS81]).
Each node represents a configuration, with the root being the starting
configuration. An ∃ configuration eventually accepts if and only if there is
a next configuration that eventually accepts; a ∀ configuration eventually
accepts if and only if all of its next configurations eventually accept.
Figure 2.1: The computation tree of an alternating TM (of exactly two
choices a each step).
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Reductions, Hard, and Complete Problems When we prove that a
problem is in a complexity class C, we establish an upper bound for its
complexity: we know that the problem can be solved using the resources
specified by C. On the other hand, the problem may be even easier to solve,
belonging into a lower complexity class. If we want to establish a lower bound
for the complexity of a problem, we must prove that the problem is one of
the hardest problems in C. For this, we need to be able to compare problems
with respect to their hardness.
We say that a language (decision problem) A is polynomially (or Karp)
reducible to B, A ≤pm B, if there is a polynomial time algorithm M which
transforms instances of A to instances of B and for every instance x of A,
x ∈ A if and only if M(x) ∈ B. Then we say that A is C-hard if for every B
∈ C, B ≤pm A and that A is C-complete if A is C-hard and A ∈ C.
To establish a lower bound for a problem – i.e. to establish that it is C-
complete for a certain class C – we usually give a reduction to that problem
from a known C-complete problem. Probably, the most well-known NP-
complete problem is SAT [Coo71], or Propositional Satisfiability. These are
not exactly the same problem, but they are close. Furthermore we discuss
several versions of satisfiability (of Propositional, First-order, Modal, and
Justification Logic) in this thesis, so it makes sense to consider SAT to be
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the propositional version of satisfiability.
In our reductions we use the following problems:
QBF2: Given a Quantified Boolean Formula,
φ = ∃x1∃x2 · · · ∃xk∀y1∀y2 · · · ∀yk′ψ,
where ψ is a propositional formula on propositional vari-
ables x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk′ , is φ true? That is, are there
truth-values for x1, . . . , xk, such that for all truth-values for
y1, . . . , yk′ , a truth-assignment that gives these values makes
ψ true?
QBF2 is known to be Σ
p
2-complete [Wra76].
QBF : Given a Quantified Boolean Formula,
φ = Q1x1 · · ·Qkxk,
where ψ is a propositional formula on propositional variables
x1, . . . , xk and Q1, . . . , Qk ∈ {∃,∀}, is φ true?
QBF is PSPACE-complete [SM73].
SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT:
Given a first-order formula φ of the form
∃x1 · · · ∃xk∀y1 · · · ∀yk′ψ,
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where ψ contains no quantifiers or function symbols, is φ
satisfiable?
SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT is NEXP-complete [Lew80].
BINARY SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT:
Given a first-order formula φ of the form
∃x1 · · · ∃xk∀y1 · · · ∀yk′ψ,
where ψ contains no quantifiers or function symbols, is φ
satisfiable by a first-order model of exactly two elements?
Lemma 2.3.2 was given in [Ach15a] and demonstrates that although
BINARY SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT (BINARY S-B SAT from
now on) is a special case of SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT (S-B
SAT from now on), it retains all the hardness of the original problem –
i.e. it is NEXP-complete.
Lemma 2.3.2. BINARY S-B SAT is NEXP-complete.
Proof. We use the following notation: for a non-negative integer x ∈ N,
let bin(x) = bin0(g), . . . , binlog g(g) be its binary representation. Let φ be a
first-order formula of the form
∃x1 · · · ∃xk∀y1 · · · ∀yk′ψ,
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where ψ contains no quantifiers or function symbols. Furthermore, we assume
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b in the quantifiers and wherever they
appear in a relation. Therefore ∃xa is replaced by ∃x1a∃x2a · · · ∃x
dlog ke
a (∃ ~xa
for short) and ∀xa is replaced by ∀x1a∀x2a · · · ∀x
dlog ke
a (∀~ya for short) and
R(z1, . . . , zr) is replaced by R(~z1, . . . , ~zr). Furthermore, every expression
z = z′ where z, z′ are variables, is replaced by
∧
1≤a≤dlog ke z
a = z′a (~z = ~z′
for short). The result of all these replacements in ψ is called ψ′. The new
formula is:






~xa = ~yb → ψ′
)
We can also define a corresponding transformation of first-order models: as-
sume that the universe of modelM for φ is a set of at most k natural numbers
(each of which is at most k− 1 and an interpretation for some xa); thenM′
is the model with {0, 1} as its universe, where for every relation R (on tuples
of naturals) of M there is some R′, which is essentially the same relation,
but on the binary representations of the elements of M. That is,
R′ = {(bin(a1), . . . , bin(ar)) ∈ {0, 1}∗ | (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ R}
It is not hard to see that ifM satisfies the original formula, thenM′ satisfies
the new one: each ~xa can be interpreted as the binary representation of
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the interpretation of xa in M and notice that the added equality assertions
effectively limit the ~y’s to range over the interpretations of the ~x’s, which are
then exactly the image of the elements of M.
On the other hand, if φ′ is satisfied by a model with {0, 1} as its universe,
then φ is satisfied by the model which has the dlog ke-tuples of {0, 1} that are
the interpretations of ~x1, . . . , ~xk as elements and as relations the restrictions
of the two-element model’s relations on these tuples.
Another way to prove completeness of a problem A for a class C is by a
reduction from a generic problem in C. To be able to do this we need a normal
form of the generic problem in C. But this normal form is readily provided in
the form of a Turing Machine that satisfies the restrictions of C. Therefore, a
PSPACE problem can be represented by a deterministic/nondeterministic TM
which uses polynomial space, or an alternating TM which uses polynomial
time; an EXP problem can be represented by a deterministic TM which uses
exponential time, or an alternating TM which uses polynomial space; and
so on. Therefore we may use a reduction from a Turing Machine to show
completeness with respect to a certain complexity class.
CHAPTER 2. DEFINITIONS 65
NP = Σp1coNP = Π
p
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A lot more going on here...
Figure 2.2: A hierarchy of complexity classes
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2.3.2 The Complexity of Modal Logic
It is immediately apparent that the satisfiability problem for all logics men-
tioned here is NP-hard, as any propositional formula is classically satisfi-
able iff it is satisfiable for any modal or justification logic and, furthermore,
the satisfiability problem for classical propositional logic is known to be NP-
complete. Therefore, to establish NP-completeness for the satisfiability prob-
lem on a modal logic, all that is needed is to show that the problem is in NP.
Most modal logics that interest us are PSPACE-complete.
Ladner proved in [Lad77] that satisfiability for certain modal logics (K,
D, T, K4, D4, S4) is PSPACE-complete, while for S5 and KD45 it is in NP.
Halpern and Rêgo in [HR07] characterized the gap in the complexity of Modal
Logic, determining that negative introspection is the cause of the drop in
complexity for S5 and KD45, since for all these logics, satisfiability drops
to NP if we add negative introspection. The claims of this subsection are
originally from [Lad77], but they were established in their full generality
(which we present here) in [HR07].
Proposition 2.3.3. Given a structure M , and a modal formula φ, there is
an algorithm for checking if φ is satisfied in M , that runs in time O(|M |·|φ|).
Proof. In time O(|φ|), an increasing (in terms of length) sequence of all
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subformulas of φ can be produced. Taking each formula in turn, we can fill
a |φ| × |M | matrix that keeps the information of which formula is true in
which state. By the definition of truth, this can be done in the required
time. Then, all we have to do is check if φ is satisfied in any state.
Theorem 2.3.4. If M is one of K, T, D, S4 (or any other combination of
axioms we have given for Modal Logic), then a M + 5-satisfiable formula can
be satisfied by an M + 5-model of at most O(|φ|) states.6
Proof. LetM = (W,R,V) be an M+5-model and s ∈ W , such thatM, s |=
φ. Let WR = {w ∈ W | ∃w′Rw}; we assume that there are no worlds in W
to which there is no path from s, therefore W = WR ∪ {s}. For convenience
we also assume φ is in negation normal form: all negations are pushed to
the level of the propositional connectives. Since M is an M + 5-model, R
is euclidean (if aRb, c, then bRc). Therefore, the restriction of R on WR is
reflexive (for all a ∈ WR, aRa). This in turn means R is symmetric in WR:
if a, b ∈ WR and aRb, since aRa, we also have bRa. Finally, R is transitive
in WR: if aRbRc and a, b, c ∈ WR, then bRa, so aRc. Therefore R is an
equivalence relation when restricted on WR.
If WR = ∅, then we are done. Otherwise let sR ∈ WR. Notice that if for
6Given a logic M and axiom A, M + A is the logic that results from adding axiom A
to M .
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some s′ ∈ W , M, s′ |= 3ψ, then M, sR |= 3ψ. Let
F = {ψ ∈ sub(φ) | M, sR |= 3ψ} ∪{¬ψ ∈ LM | ψ ∈ sub(φ),M, sR |= 3¬ψ}.
For every ψ ∈ F , there is some sψ ∈ WR, such that M, sψ |= ψ; let
W ′ = {sψ ∈ WR | ψ ∈ F} ∪ {s},
R′ the restriction of R on W ′, and V ′ the restriction of V on W ′ – i.e.
V ′(p) = V(p) ∩ W ′. By induction on ψ, where ψ a subformula of φ, we
can show that for every s′ ∈ W ′, M, s′ |= ψ iff M′, s′ |= ψ: propositional
variables and connectives are trivial; if ψ = 2ψ′ and M, s′ |= 2ψ′, then for
every s′′ ∈ WR, M, s′′ |= ψ′, then for every s′′ ∈ WR ∩ W ′, M, s′′ |= ψ′,
then (by the inductive hypothesis) for every s′′ ∈ WR ∩ W ′, M′, s′′ |= ψ′,
then M, s′ |= 2ψ′; if ψ = 2ψ′ and M, s′ 6|= 2ψ′, then M, s′ |= 3¬ψ′, then
¬ψ′ ∈ F , so there is some s¬ψ′ ∈ W ′ ∩WR, so M, s¬ψ′ |= ¬ψ′, so (by I.H.)
M′, s¬ψ′ |= ¬ψ′, so M′, s¬ψ′ 6|= 2ψ′; the cases for 3 are symmetrical.
That is, an M + 5-frame can be considered to be either one single equiv-
alence class or an equivalence class with the addition of a node s.
From the above, the following corollary follows immediately. To decide
whether a formula φ is satisfiable, all we have to do is guess nondeterminis-
tically a Kripke modelM of size at most |φ| and then check in time O(|φ|2)
if φ is satisfied in M.
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Corollary 2.3.5. The satisfiability problem for M+5 is NP-complete. There-
fore, the validity problem for these logics is coNP-complete.
Theorem 2.3.6. The satisfiability problem for K, T, D, K4, D4, and S4 is
PSPACE-hard.
Proof. The proof is by reducing the problem QBF (quantified boolean for-
mula) to the satisfiability problem for these logics. One way to check if a
QBF formula is true or not is the following. If the formula has no quan-
tifiers, i.e. all occurrences of variables are replaced by truth values, just
evaluate its truth value. If the formula is of the form ∃pψ, replace it with
ψ[>/p]∨ ψ[⊥/p],7 and if it is of the form ∀pψ, with ψ[>/p]∧ ψ[⊥/p]. Then,
check if the new formula is true. The correctness of this procedure is imme-
diate and follows from the definition of the problem.
To construct the reduction from QBF to S4, a formula will be con-
structed, that will describe the above procedure. Suppose the given formula,
φ, is Q1p1 · · ·Qmpmψ, where ψ contains no quantifiers and Qi ∈ {∃,∀}. We
construct formula φS4. The following propositional variables will be used:





7ψ[χ/p] is the result of substituting p by χ in χ.












(di ∧ ¬di+1)→ (3(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ pi) ∨3(di+1 ∧ ¬di+2 ∧ ¬pi))
and finally,
φS4A = d0 ∧ ¬d1 ∧2(depth ∧ determined ∧ branching ∧ (dm → B)).
The role of the formula depth is to make the truth values of the variables
d1, . . . , dm+1 characterize the depth of the decision tree for the procedure.
determined expresses the fact that once a truth value is assigned to a variable
in the decision tree, that value does not change when we go deeper in the
tree. Finally, branching describes if the current node of the decision tree
is universal, or existential, and how the tree continues. The size of φS4 is
linear w.r.t. the size of φ, and it is easily constructed from φ. As mentioned
before, φS4 mimics the previous procedure for determining the truth of QBF
formulas, on an reflexive and transitive structure. Therefore it is easy to see
that φ is true if and only if φS4 is satisfiable by a reflexive and transitive
structure.
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Respectively, the formulas constructed for T and K are φT and φK. They are
the same as φS4, except that to deal with the fact that structures for T are
not transitive, and structures for K are not even reflexive,
φT = d0 ∧ ¬d1 ∧2m(depth ∧ determined ∧ branching ∧ (dm → ψ)),
and
φK = d0 ∧ ¬d1 ∧
m∧
i=0
2i(depth ∧ determined ∧ branching ∧ (dm → ψ)).
We leave the remaining cases to the reader.
Below, a PSPACE procedure is given, that decides whether a formula is
satisfiable.
Theorem 2.3.7. If M ∈ {K,D,T,K4,D4, S4}, then the satisfiability problem
for M is in PSPACE.
Proof. An alternating algorithm that runs in polynomial time will be given
below. This proves that the satisfiability problem for these logics is in
APTIME=PSPACE.
The algorithm constructs a prefixed tableau branch for the given formula, φ.
At each step, a tableau rule is applied to add one or two new formulas to
the constructed branch, which we will call b. At first, b only contains 1.φ,
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which is not marked. b is a set, i.e. it contains each element at most once.
The algorithm does the following. We call a rule of the tableau a local rule
for prefix a if it is of the form a α
a β
(so the prefix does not change). Thus,
propositional rules are local and so are rules for axioms T and D. We keep
a “current prefix” w in memory. Initially w = 1.
1. Keep applying local rules for w as long as such a rule can be applied;
if a rule branches the tableau, nondeterministically (existential choice)
choose which branch you keep.
2. If the branch has both w T ψ and w F ψ in it, reject.
3. Universally choose a rule which produces a new prefix, called w′; if no
such rule exists, accept.
4. Apply all tableau rules that can be applied to formulas prefixed by w to
give formulas prefixed by w′. These new formulas are called the initial
formulas for w′.
5. If the initial formulas for w′ are the same as the initial formulas for w,
(terminate and) accept.
6. Delete all formulas prefixed by w.
7. w := w′.
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8. Go back to 1.
If 4 is an axiom of M , then since to increase the value of |w|, the complexity
of the formula used in the rule decreases, |w| ≤ |φ|. If it is not, then since
by the tableau rules for 4, the initial formulas of a prefix can only be more
than those of its previous one and we have an upper bound of |φ| for those,
|w| ≤ |φ|.8 The number of different prefixed formulas with at most the
same complexity as φ is therefore at most |φ|2. Every step of the algorithm
applies a rule to a different unmarked prefixed formula and marks it. So, the
algorithm runs in at most |φ|2 steps. Each step takes at most O(|φ|2) time,
so the algorithm uses polynomial time.
The correctness of the algorithm is immediate, as it simply follows the
tableau construction rules. Specifically, if φ is satisfiable, the algorithm can
accept by simply exploring certain parts (chosen universally) of an accepting
branch (chosen existentially). On the other hand, if the algorithm accepts,
let b′ be the union over universal choices of the sets of prefixed formulas the
algorithm produces. If the algorithm accepts because of step 5 at prefixes
w,w′, then b′ can easily be expanded to a complete accepting branch b, so
that b at w′ recursively simulates b at w.
8Depending on how you count the upper bound may be |φ| + 2, but this difference is
not important.
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Corollary 2.3.8. The satisfiability problem for K, D, T, K4, D4, and S4 is
PSPACE-complete. Therefore, the validity problem for these logics is PSPACE-
complete.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the placement of these logics in the complexity
hierarchy.
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Figure 2.3: The complexity of Unimodal Logic: in the figure, unless otherwise
specified, modal satisfiability (or validity, provability) refers to Unimodal
Logic (one modality).
Chapter 3
The Complexity of Single-agent
Justification Logic
In this chapter we examine the complexity of satisfiability for single-agent
Justification Logic – we mostly phrase the problem we study in terms of
satisfiability instead of validity/derivability, as it is not hard to translate
from one to the other: φ is satisfiable if and only if ¬φ is not valid. What
distinguishes Justification Logic from Modal Logic, if one compares their se-
mantics or axiomatizations, is the presence of justification terms. Therefore,
in Section 3.1 we present upper bounds for the complexity of the ∗-calculus,
which gives us a way to deal with justification terms in a satisfiability-testing
procedure. Then we present tableaux (that result in upper bounds) based on
M-models for J, J4, JT, and LP and tableaux based on F-models for JD and
JD4. Finally, we give a general lower bound for al these logics, which shows
that the upper bounds of the chapter are tight.
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3.1 Reflected Fragments and the ∗-calculus
As we see in this chapter (and all the following ones as well), the ∗-calculus is
an integral part of any algorithm that has been developed to test satisfiability
for Justification Logic. Therefore we first examine the derivability-from-
assumptions problem for the ∗-calculus. This section’s results are mainly
due to Krupski [Kru06] and Kuznets [Kuz08a]; the results concerning +-free
terms are from [AK06, AK09, AK13]. We first present a nondeterministic
polynomial-time algorithm for derivability in the ∗-calculus.
Proposition 3.1.1. If CS is schematic and in P, then the following problem
is in NP:
Given a finite set S of ∗-expressions and a ∗-expression e, is it
the case that
S `∗CS e?
Proof. The shape of a ∗-calculus derivation in mostly given away by the term
t. So, we can use t to extract the general shape of the derivation – the term
keeps track of the applications of all rules. We can then plug in to the leaves
of the derivation either axioms of the calculus or members of S and unify
(CS is schematic, so the derivation may include schemes) trying to reach the
root.
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The algorithm to decide the derivability of ∗(t, φ) from S is the following:
• Nondeterministically construct a rooted tree with subterms of t, as
nodes, such that t is the root and the following conditions are met.
Node s can be the parent of s1 or of both s1, s2 as long as there is a
rule ∗(s1,φ1)∗(s,φ3) or
∗(s1,φ1) ∗(s2,φ2)
∗(s,φ3) , respectively, of the ∗-calculus and s1, s2
are proper subterms of s. This results in a subtree of term t (when t
is seen as a tree) and the nondeterministic choices correspond to three
cases: wherever + appears in t (and we have to choose a version of the
∗Sum rule); whenever we encounter a term s, for which there is some
s :ψ ∈ S, so we can choose to not break down s any further; when we
encounter some subterm s =! · · ·!c, where c a constant, as s can be part
of an axiom of the calculus, or a result of consecutive applications of
∗PI on an axiom, but this is a choice without consequences.
• Nondeterministically assign to each leaf, l, either
– some formula ψ such that there is some ∗(l, ψ) ∈ S or
– as long as l is of the form ! · · ·!︸︷︷︸
k
c, where c a constant, k ≥ 0, then
we can also assign some ! · · ·!︸︷︷︸
k−1
c : · · ·!c : c : A, where A an axiom
scheme and c :A ∈ CS.
• If for some node s, all its children, say s1, s2 (resp. s1) have been
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assigned some scheme or formula P1, P2 (resp. P1), assign to s some





∗(s1,P ′1) ∗(s2,P ′2)
∗(s,P ) is a rule (resp.
∗(s1,P ′1)
∗(s,P ) is a rule) in the ∗CS-calculus. Apply
this step until the root of the tree has been assigned some scheme or
formula.
• Unify φ with the formula assigned to t.
If some step is impossible, the algorithm rejects. Otherwise, it accepts.
Using efficient representations of schemes using DAGs and Robinson’s uni-
fication algorithm, the algorithm runs in polynomial time (with respect to
|S| + |t| + |φ|). We can see that as the tree is constructed, if s is assigned
scheme P , then the construction effectively describes a valid derivation of
any expression of the form ∗(s, ψ), where ψ any instance of P . Therefore,
if the algorithm accepts, there exists a valid ∗-calculus derivation of ∗(t, φ).
On the other hand if there is some ∗-calculus derivation for ∗(t, φ) from S,
then the algorithm in the first two steps can essentially describe this deriva-
tion by producing the derivation tree and the formulas/schemes by which the
derivation starts. Therefore, the algorithm accepts if and only if there is a
∗-calculus derivation for ∗(t, φ) from S.
Corollary 3.1.2. Let J ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} and CS be a schematic
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constant specification for J , such that CS ∈ P. Then, rJCS ∈ NP.
By adjusting the algorithm from the proof of Proposition 3.1.1, we can
prove Proposition 3.1.3, which was proven in [AK09] - see also [AK06].
Proposition 3.1.3. Assume J ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} and that CS is a
schematically injective constant specification for J , such that CS ∈ P. Then,
there exists a deterministic algorithm that runs in polynomial time and de-
termines, given a formula φ and a term t with no appearances of +, whether
`∗CS ∗(t, φ).
Proof. Simply notice that if CS is schematically injective, + does not occur
in t, and there are no assumptions for the derivation, we have eliminated
all nondeterministic choices from the algorithm of the proof of Proposition
3.1.1.
Definition 3.1.1. Let J ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} and CS be a constant
specification for this logic. Then,
rJ−CS = {t :φ ∈ rJCS |+ does not appear in t}.
Corollary 3.1.4. Let J ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP} and CS be a schematically
injective constant specification for J , such that CS ∈ P. Then, rJ−CS ∈ P.
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Proposition 3.1.3 and corollary 3.1.4 were given by Artemov and Kuznets
in [AK09] (see also [AK06, AK13]). Their purpose in [AK06, AK09, AK13]
was to provide suggestions on how to treat Logical Omniscience, a widely
known, important problem of epistemology. Their suggestion was that Log-
ical Omniscience is an inherently computational complexity problem. Two
tests for logical omniscience in that context were presented, LOT and SLOT.
An epistemic system passes LOT if and only if for each valid knowledge as-
sertion of F , there is a proof of F of size bounded by a polynomial of |F |.
If furthermore this proof can be retrieved in polynomial time, the epistemic
system passes SLOT. By corollary 3.1.4, the epistemic system that occurs
from rJ−CS passes SLOT (and LOT), therefore being a non - logically omni-
scient system in a strong sense1. On the other hand, rJCS passes LOT, thus
being a non-logically omniscient system in the weaker, LOT sense.
Notice that we can tweak the algorithm from the proof of Proposition
3.1.1 so that it works for a ∗-calculus based on a frame F = (W,R) by
keeping track of the states for which the derivation succeeds; that is, as we
assign scheme P to the node that corresponds to term s, we keep track of a
set V of all states v such that we can derive v ∗ (s, P ). If we assign an axiom
to a leaf, then we also assign W to that leaf; if we assign a formula ψ such
1Note that we are talking about a generalized notion of proof here.
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that w ∗ (s, ψ) ∈ S, then we also assign to it some V ⊆ W such that (if the
logic has Positive Introspection, then) V is (the closure under R of) the set
{v ∈ W | v ∗ (s, ψ) ∈ S}. If the children of s have been assigned with V1
and V1, then we assign V = V1 ∩V2 to s. Then it is not hard to verify that if
V and P are assigned to the node corresponding to t, then the calculus can
derive v ∗ (t, φ) if and only if φ is an instance of P and v ∈ V . We conclude
with the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1.5. If CS is schematic and in P, then the following problem
is in NP:
Given a finite frame F , a finite set S of ∗F -expressions and a
∗F -expression e, is it the case that
S `∗FCS e?
3.2 Tableaux through Mkrtychev Models for
One Agent
The following theorem, due to Kuznets [Kuz00], is based on Mkrtychev model
semantics as well as on the properties of the ∗-calculus. Most of the upper
bounds presented here have been achieved through a variation of this tableau
procedure.
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Theorem 3.2.1. Satisfiability for JCS , JDCS , J4CS , LPCS with a schematic
CS ∈ P is in Σp2.
Proof. The algorithm for deciding these logics consists of two parts. Let φ
be the given formula. The first part constructs a tableau branch, starting
from T φ, and applying all the rules in Table 3.1. The first two are for logics
JCS and J4CS . The following two are used for JTCS and LPCS . What makes
the difference is Factivity.
For J and J4:
T s :ψ
T ∗ (s, ψ)
F s :ψ
F ∗ (s, ψ)
For JT and LP:
T s :ψ
T ψ
T ∗ (s, ψ)
F s :ψ
F ∗ (s, ψ) | F ψ
Table 3.1: Tableau rules for J, JT, J4, and LP.
We do not explicitly provide them, but, of course, we need a set of rules
to cover propositional cases as well. In particular we can use the same propo-
sitional rules we used for Modal Logic (see Table 2.2 and ignore the state-
prefixes).
Like before, separator | indicates a nondeterministic choice between the
two options it separates. The ∗-expressions are not analyzed any further
for the moment; intuitively they can be interpreted as requirements of an
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admissible evidence function of a Mkrtychev model - T ∗ (t, ψ) corresponds
to E(t, ψ) = true. If no more rules can be applied, the branch is called
complete, and if it contains either T ⊥ or both T ψ and F ψ, it is called
closed. Every application of a rule reduces the complexity of the formulas,
and, furthermore, the sum of the lengths of the resulting formulas is at
most as much as the length of the initial formula. Therefore, a closed, or a
completed tableau branch is reached in time linear with respect to the length
of the initial formula.
The second stage of the algorithm starts when a complete, or closed
branch is formed. If the branch is closed, reject. If not, then we know we can
decide in nondeterministic polynomial time if for some ∗-expression e, such
that F e was produced by the first part, X `∗CS e, where X is the set of all
positively prefixed ∗-expressions in the branch. If the answer is “no”, then
accept (and the branch is called accepting). Otherwise, reject.
The algorithm above runs in polynomial time, uses nondeterministic
choices and uses an NP oracle. Furthermore it is correct, that is it accepts φ
if and only if φ is satisfiable.
If there is an accepting complete branch for T φ, there is a model for φ: we
can construct a Mkrtychev model from an accepting branch by defining
V(p) = true iff T p appears and using the minimal admissible evidence
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function based on X. Then, we can see by induction on ψ that the
model satisfies ψ if T ψ in the branch and not if F ψ is in the branch.
If φ is satisfiable, then there is an accepting complete branch for T φ: we can
construct an accepting branch from a Mkrtychev model which satisfies
φ by inductively (on the applications of the rules) ensuring that all
nondeterministic choices produce formulas or ∗-expressions satisfied in
the model.
Therefore, satisfiability for these logics is in NPNP = Σp2.
3.3 Consistency and Fitting Models
In the case of JD, the same method cannot be applied as is, since the ∗-
calculus is not enough to provide with certainty a legitimate admissible ev-
idence function. In JD and JD4 Mkrtychev models, an additional condition
must be met, that is the consistency condition of the admissible evidence
function. For these logics we base our tableau rules on Fitting model seman-
tics. The tableau for JD is due to Kuznets [Kuz08a, Kuz09], while the one
for JD4 is from [Ach14b]. The most important observation of this section is
that for certain cases we have to (and that we also can) use F-models to base
our tableaux instead of using M-models.
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n T s :ψ
n T ∗ (s, ψ)
n+ 1 T ψ
n F s :ψ
n F ∗ (s, ψ) | n+ 1 F ψ
Table 3.2: Tableau for JD.
Theorem 3.3.1. JDCS-satisfiability, where CS ∈ P and is schematic and
axiomatically appropriate, is in Σp2.
Proof. For this theorem we simply provide the tableau rules (propositional
rules omitted). The difference in this case is that admissible evidence func-
tions for JDCS models must satisfy the Consistent Evidence function con-
dition. That is, for no admissible evidence function E and term t, should
it be true that E(t,⊥). To deal with this, the algorithm is modified in the
following ways:
• The formulas in the tableau are also prefixed with an integer. The for-
mulas are of the form n V ψ, where n is a natural number, V ∈ {T, F},
ψ is a formula of the logic. Instead of the tableau rules introduced for
J, JT, J4, and LP, we use the rules from Table 3.2.
• The ∗-calculus we run now is the one based on frames of Fitting models.
The frame we base the calculus on is F = (W,R), where W is the
collection of all world-prefixes that appear in the branch and
R = {(i, i+ 1) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(i, i) | i = max(W )}.
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• Instead of having X be the set of positive ∗ expressions in the branch,
it is the set of positive ∗F -expressions in the branch.
As before, the algorithm runs in polynomial time and correctness is what is
left to show.
Lemma 3.3.2. A formula φ is JDCS-satisfiable if and only if the tableau that
is produced from 1 T φ has a complete, not closed branch, where for every
∗-expression e, where n F e appears in the branch, X 6`∗CS e.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 and proceeds by
proving that a formula φ is satisfiable in JDCS , if and only if the tableau that
is produced from 1 T φ has a complete accepting branch.
First, lets assume that 1 T φ has a complete accepting branch. Let
V(p) = {n ∈ W | n T p appears in the branch} and M = (W,R,V). M is,
of course, a JDCS-model by induction on ψ, we can see that for every n T ψ
in the branch, M, n |= ψ, while for every n T ψ in the branch, M, n 6|= ψ:
propositional variables are trivial by the definition of V ; the case where ψ = e,
a ∗F -expression, is a consequence of Theorem 2.2.7; the remaining cases are
direct consequences of the tableau rules and the inductive hypothesis.
If there areM′, a |= φ, then let N−1 be the nesting depth of justifications
in φ and let a1a2 · · · aN be any path from a in M ′ (so a1 = a). Then we can
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ensure that whenever we apply a tableau rule and we produce n T ψ, that
M′, an |= ψ, while if we produce n T ψ, that M′, an 6|= ψ. Therefore, the
resulting branch is accepting: it can obviously not be closed and if X `∗csF
n e, then M′, an |= e (again, by Theorem 2.2.7), so it cannot be the case
that n F e has appeared in the branch.
The proof of the theorem is thus complete.
The upper bound for JD4-satisfiability is based on Proposition 3.3.3 and
the Fitting models we base our tableau are the ones described in that propo-
sition.
Proposition 3.3.3. A formula φ is JD4CS-satisfiable if and only if it is
satisfiable by a Fitting model M = (W,R, E ,V) for JD4CS that additionally
has the following properties:
• W has exactly two elements, a, b.
• R = {(a, b), (b, b)}.
Proof. Let φ be a formula that is JD4CS-satisfiable and letM∗ = (W,R, E ,V)
be a model and a ∈ W a world of the model that satisfies φ. Assume that
M∗ satisfies the Strong Evidence Property. For this proof, for a state a ∈ W ,
let Ea = {∗(t, φ) | a ∈ E(t, φ)}.
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We know that R is serial and transitive and that E satisfies the distribu-
tion closure condition. From this, we know that there is an infinite sequence
of elements of W , α = (ai)i∈N, such that a0 = a, i < j ⇒ aiRaj & Eai ⊆ Eaj .
For any t :ψ, there is at most one j ∈ N, M∗, aj 6|= t :ψ → ψ. Otherwise,
there are i < j s.t. M∗, ai, aj 6|= t :ψ → ψ. SinceM∗, ai 6|= t :ψ → ψ, we have
M∗, ai |= t :ψ. From this, it follows that M∗, aj |= ψ, so M∗, aj |= t :ψ → ψ
- a contradiction.
Therefore, for any finite set of term-prefixed formulas, there is an i, after
which for all terms c of sequence α that set is factive at c. More specifically,
let Φ be the set of term-prefixed subformulas of φ and let b be a term of
sequence α, where Φ is factive.
Define M to be the model ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)}, E ′,V ′), such that V ′, E ′
agree with V , E on a, b. That is, for any w ∈ {a, b}, t term, ψ formula, p
propositional variable, w ∈ V(p) if and only if w ∈ V ′(p), and w ∈ E(t, ψ) if
and only if w ∈ E ′(t, ψ). It is easy to see that the new model satisfies the
conditions required of Fitting models for JD4CS
2.
By induction on the structure of χ, we can show that for any χ, subfor-
mula of φ, M∗, b |= χ iff M, b |= χ. The propositional cases are trivial; if
2Of course, we assume here that a 6= b, but this is a legitimate assumption. If we
need to make this explicit, we could simply have W = {(a, 0), (b, 1)} and the accessibility
relation, V ′, A′ behave in the same way.
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χ = t : ω, then M∗, b |= χ iff M∗, b |= t : ω iff M∗, b |= ω and b ∈ E(t, ω)
(Strong Evidence) iff M, b |= ω and b ∈ E ′(t, ω) iff M, b |= χ.
To prove that M, a |= φ, we will first prove that
M∗, a |= ψ ⇔M, a |= ψ,
for any ψ subformula of φ, by induction on the structure of ψ. If ψ is a
propositional variable, and for the propositional cases, again, this is obvious
and the only interesting case is when ψ = t :χ. In this case, M∗, a |= t :χ iff
a ∈ E(t, χ) and M∗, b |= χ iff a ∈ E ′(t, χ) and M, b |= χ iff M, a |= t :χ.
Note that we can now replace the admissible evidence function with an-
other, say Em, such that w ∈ Em(t, ψ) iff M, w |= t :ψ. This new function
will satisfy the necessary conditions to be an admissible evidence function
and the new model will satisfy the same formulas as the old one in the same
worlds. Therefore, from this observation and the proof of proposition 3.3.3,
we can claim the following corollary, which is, in fact, what we will be using.
Corollary 3.3.4. A formula φ is JD4CS-satisfiable if and only if there is a
Fitting model M = (W,R, E ,V) for JD4CS that has the following properties:
• W has exactly two elements, a, b;
• R = {(a, b), (b, b)};
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• M, a |= φ;
• a ∈ E(t, ψ) if and only if M, a |= t : ψ for all t : ψ. (Strong Evidence
Condition)
At this point it is interesting to compare and contrast the models of
this section to Mkrtychev models for JD4. The models presented in this
section are as minimal as possible, which makes them similar to Mkrtychev
models: instead of focusing only on one world, use two worlds. This keeps
the simple character of Mkrtychev models, but we also have the advantage
of not needing the consistent evidence condition, which is convenient when
designing an algorithm to test satisfiability.
While these new models allow us to disregard the consistent evidence
condition, they also give us a different view of JD4: they reveal that a set {t1 :
φ1, . . . , tk :φk} is JD4-satisfiable if and only if {φ1, . . . , φk} is LP-satisfiable;
a JD4 agent believes they are an LP agent and this is characteristic of the
logic and separates it from JD.
Theorem 3.3.5. When CS is in P and is axiomatically appropriate and
schematic, then JD4-satisfiability is in Σp2.
Proof. The algorithm that determines JD4CS-satisfiability is similar to the
ones already used to establish the same upper bound for the satisfiability
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for J, J4, JT, LP, and JD, except for certain differences that stem from the
specific kind of models it is based on.
Prefixed expressions are used and there will be two types of prefixes and
two types of expressions. The first will be the usual T or F prefix and the
other will be the prefix that will intuitively denote the world we are referring
to; these are a and b. So, the prefixed formulas will be of the form w P e,
where w ∈ {a, b}, P ∈ {T, F} and e is either a formula of the language or a
∗-expression. w will be called the world prefix and P the truth prefix. If a
formula (or ∗-expression) is prefixed by w F , then it will be called a negative
or negatively prefixed formula (or ∗-expression) in w, or that the formula
appears negatively in the branch for world prefix w.
As was mentioned previously, the algorithm will be based on a tableau
construction. The propositional tableau rules will be the usual ones and they
are not mentioned here. The non-propositional cases are covered by the rules
of Table 3.3.
The algorithm runs in two phases, similar to the one we described for JD.
If φ is the formula which must be checked for JD4CS-satisfiability, then
during the first phase, the algorithm will construct a tableau branch, starting
from just a T φ and using the tableau rules to generate more prefixed formulas
in a non-deterministic way. After all possible tableau derivations have been
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a T s :ψ
a T ∗ (s, ψ)
b T s :ψ
,
b T s :ψ
b T ∗ (s, ψ)
b T ψ
,
a F s :ψ
a F ∗ (s, ψ) | b F ψ
,
b F s :ψ
b F ∗ (s, ψ) | b F ψ
Table 3.3: Tableau for JD4.
applied, there are two possibilities for the constructed branch. It can either
be propositionally closed, or it can be complete, that is, the branch is not
propositionally closed and no application of a tableau rule gives a new pre-
fixed formula. If it is propositionally closed, the input is rejected, otherwise,
the second phase of the algorithm begins. Let F = ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)})
and let X be the set of ∗F -expressions x e, such that x T e appears in the
branch (equivalently, let Xa be the set of star expressions prefixed with a T
and Xb the set of star expressions prefixed with b T in the branch). Con-
firm that no x F e appears in the branch such that x e a ∗F -expression and
X `∗F x e (equivalently that no ∗-expression e where w F e appears in the
branch can be derived from Xw). If this is indeed the case, the algorithm
accepts, otherwise, it rejects.
For a fixed, complete branch, let F , W , R, and X be as above. The proof
of the correctness of the algorithm follows.
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Supposing formula φ is satisfiable by M = ({a, b}, {(a, b), (b, b)}, E ,V)
such as the ones described in corollary 3.3.4 and starting the procedure with
a T φ, it is easy to see that there is a way to perform the tableau rules
while producing a-prefixed expressions satisfied at world a and b-prefixed
expressions satisfied at world b. Now, if X derives w ∗ (t, ψ), then, because
of Theorem 2.2.8, immediately w ∈ E(t, ψ). Therefore, if w F ∗(t, ψ) appears
in the branch, w ∗ (t, ψ) will not be derivable from X. In conclusion, the
algorithm accepts.
On the other hand, suppose the algorithm accepts. Consider a complete
branch of the tableau that is constructed in an accepting branch of the
computation tree. A model will be constructed to satisfy φ. This will be
M = (W, {(a, b), (b, b)}, E ,V). a ∈ V(p) iff a T p appears in the tableau
branch and similarly for b. E |= e iff X `∗F e; we know E is an admissible
evidence function, because of theorem 2.2.8. If for E so defined, E |= e, where
e a ∗-expression and F e has appeared in the branch, the second phase of the
algorithm would have rejected the input and the computation branch would
not be accepting.
The model satisfies at a all a-prefixed expressions and at world b all b-
prefixed expressions. This can be proven by induction on the structure of the
expressions. By the above argument, this is automatically true for starred
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expressions. Also, by definition of V , this is true for propositional variables.
Propositional cases are easy, so it remains to show this for formulas of the
form t :ψ.
First, for b-prefixed formulas. If b T t : ψ is in the branch, there must
also be b T ∗ (t, ψ) and b T ψ. By the I.H., these are already satisfied, so
b ∈ E(t, ψ) and M, b |= ψ. Therefore, M, b |= t : ψ. If b F t : ψ is in the
branch, then the branch must also include either b F ψ or b F ∗ (t, ψ). In
either case, the conclusion is M, b 6|= t :ψ.
Finally, the case of a-prefixed formulas. If a T t :ψ is in the branch, there
must also be a T ∗ (t, ψ) and b T ψ (and b T t :ψ too, but it is not relevant
here). By I.H., these are already satisfied, so a ∈ E(t, ψ) and M, b |= ψ.
Therefore, M, a |= t :ψ. If a F t :ψ is in the branch, then the branch must
also include either b F ψ or a F ∗ (t, ψ). In either case, the conclusion is
M, b 6|= t :ψ.
This completes the correctness proof of the algorithm.
The first phase of the algorithm runs in nondeterministic polynomial time,
while the second verifies a condition known to be in coNP (Theorem 3.1.1).
Therefore, the algorithm establishes that JD4-satisfiability is in Σp2.
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3.4 A Lower Complexity Bound
In this chapter so far we have seen that for (single-agent) justification logics
J, JT, J4, and LP, the satisfiability problem is in Σp2 for a schematic constant
specification ([Kuz00]) and for JD, JD4, the satisfiability problem is in Σp2 for
an axiomatically appropriate and schematic constant specification ([Kuz08a,
Ach14b]). It is normal to ask at this point whether we can do better. As
this section demonstrates, the answer is “no”. We present lower bounds for
the complexity of single-agent Justification Logic.
Milnikel has proven ([Mil07]) that J4-satisfiability is Σp2-hard for an ax-
iomatically appropriate and schematic constant specification and that LP-
satisfiability is Σp2-hard for an axiomatically appropriate, (schematic) and
schematically injective constant specification. Then, Buss and Kuznets gave
a general lower bound in [BK12], proving that for all the above logics, satisfia-
bility is Σp2-hard for an axiomatically appropriate, (schematic,) and schemat-
ically injective constant specification.
We present a general lower bound, which applies to all the single-agent
justification logics we have presented, for an axiomatically appropriate and
schematic constant specification. Furthermore, it holds for all multi-agent
justification logics we will present in the following chapters as well. The
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proof we give is from [Ach15a].
Of course, a trivial lower bound holds for all logics considered:
Proposition 3.4.1. For any CS, satisfiability for any of JCS , JDCS , JTCS ,
J4CS , JD4CS , LPCS is NP-hard.
This holds because any propositional formula is valid for classical propo-
sitional logic iff it is valid for any of these logics.
The main result of this section can be found in Theorem 3.4.2. We give
the theorem first and then its proof.
Theorem 3.4.2. If J has an axiomatically appropriate and schematic con-
stant specification, then J-satisfiability is Σp2-hard.
The idea behind the reduction we use to prove Theorem 3.4.2 is very sim-
ilar to Milnikel’s proof of Πp2-completeness for J4-provability [Mil07] (which
also worked for J-provability). Both Milnikel’s and this reduction are from
QBF2. The main difference has to do with the way each reduction trans-
forms (or not) the QBF formula. Milnikel uses the propositional part of the
QBF formula as it is and he introduces existential nondeterministic choices
on a satisfiability-testing procedure (think of Kuznets’ algorithm as described
above) using formulas of the form x : p ∨ y :¬p and universal nondetermin-
istic choices using formulas of the form x :p ∧ y :¬p and term [x+ y] in the
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final term, forcing a universal choice between x and y during the ∗-calculus
testing.
This approach works well for J and J4, but it fails in the presence of the
Consistency or Factivity axiom, as x : p ∧ y :¬p becomes inconsistent. For
the case of LP, he used a different approach and made use of his assumption
of a schematically injective constant specification (i.e. that all constants
justify at most one scheme) to construct a term t to specify an intended
proof of a formula of the form
∧
i(xi :pi ∧ yi :¬pi)→ s :ψ – which is always
provable, since the left part of the implication is inconsistent. In this paper
we bypass the problem of the inconsistency of x :p∧ y :¬p by replacing each
propositional formula by two corresponding propositional variables, [χ]> and
[χ]⊥ to correspond to “χ is true” and to “χ is false” respectively. Therefore,
we use x : [p]> ∧ y : [p]⊥ instead of x :p ∧ y :¬p and we have no inconsistent
formulas. As a side-effect we need to use several extra formulas to encode the
behavior of the formulas with respect to a truth-assignment – for instance,
[p]> → [p ∨ q]> is not a tautology, so we need a formula to assert its truth
(see the definitions of Evalj below).
Buss and Kuznets in [BK12] use the same assumption as Milnikel on the
constant specification to give a general lower bound by a reduction from
Vertex Cover and a Σp2-complete generalization of that problem. Their con-
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struction has the advantage that it additionally proves an NP-hardness result
for the reflected fragment of the logics they study, while ours does not. On
the other hand we do not require a schematically injective constant specifi-
cation, as, much like Milnikel’s construction for J4, we do not need to limit
a ∗-calculus derivation.
Lemma 3.4.3 is a simple observation on the resources (number of assump-
tions) used by a ∗-calculus derivation: if there is a derivation of ∗(t, φ) and
t only has one appearance of term s, then the derivation uses at most one
premise of the form ∗(s, ψ). In fact, this observation can be generalized to k
appearances of s using at most k premises, but this is not important for the
proof of Theorem 3.4.2.
Lemma 3.4.3. Let φ a justification formula, t a justification term in which
! does not appear, and s a subterm of t which appears at most once in t.
Let Ss = {s :φ1, . . . , s :φk} and S ⊂ rLJ , such that S ∪ Ss is consistent.
Then, S ∪ Ss ` t : φ if and only if there is some 1 ≤ a ≤ k such that
S ∪ {s :φa} ` t :φ.
Proof. Easy, by induction on the ∗-calculus derivation (on t).
The proof of Theorem 3.4.2 is by reduction from QBF2.
As mentioned above, for every ψa ∈ Ψ, let [ψa]>, [ψa]⊥ be new proposi-
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tional variables. As we argued earlier, we need formulas to help us evaluate
the truth of variables under a certain valuation in a way that matches the
truth of the original formula, ψ – [ψ]⊥ → [¬ψ]> for instance. These kinds of
formulas (prefixed by a corresponding justification term) are gathered into
S(φ). T J(φ) is constructed in such a way that under the formulas of S(φ)








⊥ ∧ S(φ) ` T J(φ) : [φ]>
if and only if v makes φ true. In other words, T J(φ) encodes the method we
would use to evaluate the truth value of φ.
To construct T J(φ), we first need certain justification terms to en-
code needed operations to manipulate formulas. We will often need
to work on long conjuncts like (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φr), which we can view as a string
of formulas. Therefore we need operations like projections (projrx), append-
ing a formula (append), appending a formula to a hypothesis (hypappend),
appending the conclusions of two implications (appendconc), and so on. We
start by providing these terms.
We define terms projrx (for x ≤ r), append, hypappend, and appendconc,
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to be such that
t : (φ1 ∧ φ2 ∧ · · · ∧ φr) ` [projrx · t] :φx,
t :φ1, s :φ2 ` [append · t · s] : (φ1 ∧ φ2),
t : (φ1 → φ2) ` [hypappend · t] : (φ1 → φ1 ∧ φ2), and
t : (φ1 → φ2), s : (φ1 → φ3) ` [appendconc · t · s] : (φ1 → φ2 ∧ φ3),
append, hypappend, and appendconc can simply be any terms such that
` append : (φ1 → (φ2 → φ1 ∧ φ2)),
` hypappend : ((φ1 → φ2)→ (φ1 → φ1 ∧ φ2)), and
` appendconc : ((φ1 → φ2)→ ((φ1 → φ3)→ (φ1 → φ2 ∧ φ3))).
Such terms exist, because they justify propositional tautologies and the con-
stant specification is schematic and axiomatically appropriate (see Lemma
2.2.1). To define projrx, we need terms left, right, id, tran, so that
` left : (φ1 ∧ φ2 → φ1), ` right : (φ1 ∧ φ2 → φ2),
` id : (φ1 → φ1), and
` tran : ((φ1 → φ2)→ ((φ2 → φ3)→ (φ1 → φ3)).
Again, such terms exist, because they justify propositional tautologies. Then,
proj11 = id; for r > 1, proj
r
r = right; and for l < r, proj
r+1
l = [trans · left ·
projrl ].
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Now we provide the formulas that will help us with evaluating
the truth of the propositional part of the QBF formula under a
valuation. These were axioms provided by the constant specification in
Milnikel’s proof [Mil07], but as we argued before, we need the following
formulas in our case. Let Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψl} be an ordering of all subformulas
of ψ, such that if a < b, then |ψa| ≤ |ψb|3. Furthermore, ρ = |{χ ∈ Ψ | |χ| =
1}| and for every 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
if ψj = ¬γ, then Evalj = truthj : ([γ]> → [ψj]⊥) ∧ truthj : ([γ]⊥ → [ψj]>);
if ψj = γ ∨ δ, then
Evalj = truthj : ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]>) ∧ truthj : ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]>)
∧truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]>) ∧ truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]⊥);
if ψj = γ ∧ δ, then
Evalj = truthj : ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]>) ∧ truthj : ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]⊥)
∧truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]⊥) ∧ truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]⊥);
if ψj = γ → δ, then
Evalj = truthj : ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]>) ∧ truthj : ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]⊥)
∧truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]> → [ψj]>) ∧ truthj : ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψj]>).
3assume a | · |, such that |pj | = 1 and if γ is a proper subformula of δ, then |γ| < |δ|
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We now construct term T J(φ). To do this we first construct terms T a,
where 1 ≤ a ≤ l. Given a valuation v in the form x1 : [p1]v1 , . . . , xk : [pk]vk , T 1
through T k simply gather these formulas in one large conjunct (or string).
Then for k+ 1 ≤ a ≤ l, T a evaluates the truth of ψa, resulting in either [ψ]>
or [ψ]⊥ and appending the result at the end of the conjunct.
Let T 1 = x1 and for every 1 < a ≤ k, T a = [append · T a−1 · xa]. It is not
hard to see that for v1, . . . , vk ∈ {>,⊥},
x1 : [p1]
v1 , . . . , xk : [pk]
vk ` T k : ([p1]v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pk]vk). (3.1)
If ψa = ¬ψb, then
T a = hypappend · [trans · proja−1b · trutha] · T
a−1 and
if ψa = ψb ◦ ψc, then
T a = hypappend · [trans · [appendconc · proja−1b · proj
a−1
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By induction on a, for every truth assignment v,
Sv(φ) ` T a : ([ψ1]v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [ψa]va),
where if ψb is true under v, then vb = > and vb = ⊥ otherwise. The cases
where a ≤ k are easy to see from (3.1). For the remaining cases it is enough
to demonstrate that
if ψa = ¬ψj, then S(φ) ` [trans · proja−1j · trutha · T a−1] : [ψa]va and
if ψa = ψb ◦ ψc, then
S(φ) ` [trans · [appendconc · proja−1b · proj
a−1
c ] · trutha · T a−1] : [ψa]va ,
which is not hard to see by the way we designed each term.
Finally, let T J(φ) = [right · T l]. We can now prove Lemma 3.4.4:
Lemma 3.4.4. T J(φ), S(φ) are computable in polynomial time with respect








⊥ ∧ S(φ) ` T J(φ) : [φ]>.
Proof. From the above construction we can see that if φ is true under v then
Sv(φ) ` T J(φ) : [φ]>. On the other hand, if Sv(φ) ` T J(φ) : [φ]>, then
∗Sv(φ) `∗ ∗([right ·T l], [φ]>), which in turn gives (Sv(φ))# ` [φ]> (the terms
do not include the operator ! and thus the right side of a ∗-derivation is a
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derivation in propositional logic). If φ is not true under v, then let v′ be the
valuation, such that v′([ψ]>) = true iff ψ is true under v and v′([ψ]⊥) = true
iff ψ is false under v. Then all of (Sv(φ))# is true under v′ and [φ]> is not,
therefore(Sv(φ))# 6` [φ]>, so Sv(φ) 6` T J(φ) : [φ]>.
Corollary 3.4.5. The QBF formula ∃p1, . . . , pk∀pk+1, . . . , pk+lφ is true if

















>∧xj : [pj]⊥)∧S(¬φ)∧¬T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>








>∧xj : [pj]⊥)∧S(¬φ) ` T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>,








> ∧ xj : [pj]⊥) ∧ S(¬φ) ` T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>,
and then since every variable from x1, . . . , xk+l appears at most once in
T J and T J does not include !, by Lemma 3.4.3 there is some choice c2 :
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c2(j)) ∧ S(¬φ) ` T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>.
Therefore, for every assignment of truth-values on p1, . . . , pk there truth-
values for pk+1, . . . , pl+k that make φ false.








>∧xj : [pj]⊥)∧S(¬φ)∧¬T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>








> ∧ xj : [pj]⊥) ∧ S(¬φ) ∧ ¬T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>
is satisfiable, and then since every variable from x1, . . . , xk+l appears at most








c2(j)) ∧ S(¬φ) 6` T J(¬φ)[¬φ]>.
Therefore, there is some truth assignment on p1, . . . , pk such that every truth
assignment on pk+1, . . . , pl+k makes φ true.
Theorem 3.4.2 is then a direct corollary of the above.
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Figure 3.1: The complexity of single-agent Justification and Modal Logic
Chapter 4
Justification Logic and Modal
Logic with Multiple Agents
We present the multi-agent justification and modal logics we examine in this
thesis. Then we give certain immediate upper bounds for the complexity of
Multi-Agent Justification Logic. For these we can either use known tech-
niques, or expected ones. We first reiterate the ∗-calculus results in the
multi-agent context. Then we handle the cases where there is no agent with
the Consistency Axiom. Finally, we prove a general, probably expected,
upper bound based on a small model theorem.
4.1 Multi-Agent Justification Logic
The first multi-agent justification logics were defined in [Yav08] by Yavorskaya,
who presented two-agent variations of LP. These logics feature interactions
between the two agents’ justifications: for LP↑, for instance, every justifica-
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tion for agent 1 can be converted to a justification for agent 2 for the same
fact, while in LP! agent 2 is aware of agent 1’s justifications. In this section we
present the general family of multi-agent justification logics with interactions
that we study.
Other multi-agent justification logics have been introduced as well (for
example, see [BKS11, Ren11]). They present a different approach. Our anal-
ysis is static: we concern ourselves with interactions among the justifications
of the agents and not with actual agent interactions.
For every n ∈ N, the justification terms of the language LnJ include con-
stants c1, c2, c3, . . . and variables x1, x2, x3, . . . and if t1 and t2 are terms, then
the following are also terms: [t1 + t2], [t1 · t2], !t1. The set of terms will be
referred to as Tm – notice that we use one set of terms for all agents. We
use a set Prop of propositional variables, which will usually be p1, p2, . . ..
Formulas of the language LnJ include all propositional variables and if φ, ψ
are formulas, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (i.e. i is an agent) and t is a term, then the following
are also formulas of LnJ : ⊥,¬a, a∨b, a∧b, φ→ ψ, and t :iφ. We may consider
certain propositional connectives as constructed from the others as needed.
For example: ¬a := a→ ⊥, a ∨ b := ¬a→ b, and a ∧ b := ¬(¬a ∨ ¬b). The
operators ·,+ and ! are explained by the following axioms. Intuitively, · ap-
plies a justification for a statement A→ B to a justification for A and gives
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a justification for B. Using + we can combine two justifications and have a
justification for anything that can be justified by any of the two initial terms
– much like the concatenation of two proofs. Finally, ! is a unary operator
called the proof checker. Given a justification t for φ, !t justifies the fact that
t is a justification for φ. A multi-agent justification logic is denoted by the
quadruple J = (N,⊂, , F )CS , where N 6= ∅, so that N = {1, 2 . . . , n} is
the set of agents (therefore n = |N |), ⊂, are binary relations on N , and
for every agent i, F (i) is a (single-agent) justification logic. In this paper
we assume that F : N −→ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}. CS is called a constant
specification and is explained later in this section. We also define i ⊃ j iff
j ⊂ i and i j iff j i.
For an agent i, F (i) specifies the logic agent i is based on – and as we
observe below, this mainly affects the reliability of the agent’s justifications.
As for the interactions, for agents i, j, if i ⊃ j, then the justifications of i are
also accepted as such by agent j. If i j, then agent j is aware of agent
i’s justifications – but awareness does not necessarily imply acceptance. In
the latter case, we also say that j can verify the justifications of i. In the
original logic, LP, where justifications were proofs, if t is a proof of φ, then
the proof of that fact comes from verifying t for φ and is denoted as !t. In
the current system we expect that since j is aware that t :iφ, j should have
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a justification for the fact and this justification simply comes from verifying
that t is a justification of φ for i.
J uses modus ponens and all agents share the following common axioms.
Propositional Axioms: Finitely many schemes of classical propositional
logic;
Application: s :i (φ→ ψ)→ (t :iφ→ (s · t) :iψ);
Concatenation: s :iφ→ (s+ t) :iφ, s :iφ→ (t+ s) :iφ.
For every agent i, we also include a set of axioms that depend upon the logic i
is based on (i.e. F (i)). So, if F (i) has Factivity, then we include the Factivity
axiom for i, if F (i) has Consistency, then we include Consistency for i, while
if F (i) has Positive Introspection, then we include Positive Introspection for
agent i.
Factivity: for every agent i, such that F (i) ∈ {JT, LP}, t :iφ→ φ;
Consistency: for every agent i, such that F (i) ∈ {JD, JD4}, t :i⊥ → ⊥;
Positive Introspection: for every i, such that F (i) ∈ {J4, LP}, t :iφ→!t :i
t :iφ.
The following, interaction axioms depend upon the binary relations ⊂ and
.
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Conversion: for every i ⊃ j, t :iφ→ t :j φ;
Verification: for every i j, t :iφ→!t :j t :iφ.
In this context Positive introspection is a special case of Verification. From
now on we assume that for every agent i, F (i) ∈ {J, JD, JT}, so agent i has
positive introspection iff i i.
To complete the description of justification logic (N,⊂, , F )CS , a con-
stant specification CS is needed: A constant specification for (N,⊂, , F )
is a set of formulas of the form c :iA, where c a justification constant, i an
agent, and A an axiom of the logic from the ones above. We say that axiom
A is justified by a constant c for agent i when c :i A ∈ CS. Then we can
introduce our final axiom,
Axiom Necessitation: t :i φ, where either t :i φ ∈ CS or φ = s :j ψ an
instance of Axiom Necessitation and t =!s.
Axiom Necessitation will be called AN for short. In this paper we will be
making the assumption that the constant specifications are axiomatically
appropriate: each axiom is justified by at least one constant; and schematic:
every constant justifies only a certain number of schemes from the ones above
(as a result, if c justifies A for i and B results from A and substitution, then
c justifies B for i).
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Proposition 2.2.1’s version for this multi-agent family can be stated for
any agent and using the same proof: for an axiomatically appropriate con-
stant specification CS, if φ1, . . . , φk ` φ, then for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n and terms
t1, . . . , tk, there is some term t such that t1 :iφ1, . . . , tk :iφk ` t :iφ.
We fix a certain logic J = (N,⊂, , F )CS and we make certain (reason-
able) assumptions. We assume that ⊂ is transitive and (N,⊂) has no cycles.
This is reasonable, because if i ⊂ j ⊂ k, then t :k φ → t :i φ is a theorem
and if i ⊂ j ⊂ i, then agent i and j have exactly the same justifications for
the same formulas, since t :i φ ↔ t :j φ is a theorem and thus the agents are
indistinguishable – there may be some effect of these ⊂-paths and cycles on
the logic, depending on the constant specification, but not in any way that
interests us here. We also assume that if F (i) = JD (resp. F (i) = JT) and
i ⊂ j, then F (j) = JD (resp. F (j) = JT), that if i j and k ⊂ i, then
j k, and that if j i and F (i) = JT, then i ⊂ j – notice that if j i,
F (i) = JT, and c :j (t :iφ→ φ) ∈ CS, then t :iφ→ (c·!t) :j φ is a theorem of
J . Making these assumptions simplifies the system and often the notation,
as they make the behavior and interactions among the agents clearer, while it
is not hard to adjust the analysis in their absence. However, the assumptions
we will be making about CS (that it is schematic, axiomatically appropriate,
in P, or a combination of these) are mostly required.
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4.1.1 Semantics
We introduce Fitting models for this multi-agent context. We use similar
notation as with the single-agent logics; the main difference comes up due to
the agent interactions.
Definition 4.1.1. A Fitting modelM for J = (N,⊂, , F )CS is a quadru-
ple (W, (Ri)
n
i=1, (Ei)ni=1,V), where W 6= ∅ is a set, for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Ri ⊆ W 2 is a binary relation on W ,
V : Prop −→ 2W
and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Ei : (Tm× LnJ) −→ 2W .
W is called the universe of M and its elements are the worlds or states of
the model. V assigns a subset of W to each propositional variable, p, and
Ei assigns a subset of W to each pair of a justification term and a formula.
(Ei)ni=1 will often be seen and referred to as
E : N × Tm× LnJ −→ 2W
and E is called an admissible evidence function. Additionally, E and (Ri)ni=1
must satisfy the following conditions:
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Application closure: for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, formulas φ, ψ, and justification
terms t, s,
Ei(s, φ→ ψ) ∩ Ei(t, φ) ⊆ Ei(s · t, ψ).
Sum closure: for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, formula φ, and justification terms t, s,
Ei(t, φ) ∪ Ei(s, φ) ⊆ Ei(t+ s, φ).
AN-closure: for any instance of AN, t :iφ, Ei(t, φ) = W .
Verification Closure: If i j, then Ej(t, φ) ⊆ Ei(!t, t :j φ)
Conversion Closure: If i ⊂ j, then Ej(t, φ) ⊆ Ei(t, φ)
Distribution: for any formula φ, justification term t, j i and a, b ∈ W ,
if aRjb and a ∈ Ei(t, φ), then b ∈ Ei(t, φ).
• If F (i) = JT, then Ri must be reflexive.
• If F (i) = JD, then Ri must be serial (∀a ∈ W ∃b ∈ W aRib).
• If i j, then for any a, b, c ∈ W , if aRibRjc, we also have aRjc.1
• For any i ⊂ j, Ri ⊆ Rj.
Truth in the model is defined in the following way, given a state a:
1Thus, if i has positive introspection (i.e. i i), then Ri is transitive.
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• M, a 6|= ⊥ and if p is a propositional variable, then M, a |= p iff
a ∈ V(p).
• M, a |= φ→ ψ if and only if M, a |= ψ, or M, a 6|= φ.
• M, a |= t :iφ if and only if a ∈ Ei(t, φ) and M, b |= φ for all aRib.
Like before, a formula φ is called satisfiable if there are some M, a |= φ;
we then say that M satisfies φ in a. A pair (W, (Ri)ni=1) as above is a frame
for (N,⊂, , F )CS . We say thatM has the Strong Evidence Property when
M, a |= t :iφ iff a ∈ Ei(t, φ).
Like for the single-agent cases we now define Mkrtychev models for (N,⊂
, , F )CS .
Definition 4.1.2. A Mkrtychev modelM for J = (N,⊂, , F )CS is a pair
((Ei)ni=1,V), where
V : Prop −→ {true, false}
and for every i ∈ N ,
Ei : (Tm× LnJ) −→ {true, false}.
V assigns a truth value to each propositional variable, p, and Ei characterizes
the set of admissible justification terms for a given formula. (Ei)ni=1 will often
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be seen and referred to as
E : N × Tm× LnJ −→ {true, false}
and E is called an admissible evidence function. Additionally, E must satisfy
the following conditions:
Application closure: for any i ∈ N , formulas φ, ψ, and terms t, s,
if Ei(s, φ→ ψ) = true and Ei(t, φ), then Ei(s · t, ψ);
Sum closure: for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, formula φ, and justification terms t, s,
if Ei(t, φ) = true or Ei(s, φ) = true, then Ei(t+ s, φ) = true;
AN-closure: for any instance of AN, t :iφ, Ei(t, φ) = true;
Verification Closure: If i j and Ej(t, φ) = true, then Ei(!t, t :j φ) = true;
Conversion Closure: If i ⊂ j and Ej(t, φ) = true, then Ei(t, φ) = true.
Truth in the model is defined in the following way:
• M 6|= ⊥;
• if p is a propositional variable, then M |= p iff a ∈ V(p);
• M |= φ→ ψ if and only if M |= ψ, or M 6|= φ;
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• M |= t :i φ if and only if a ∈ Ei(t, φ) and M |= φ in case F (i) ∈
{JT, LP} – i.e. in case F (i) has Factivity;
• M |= t :iφ if and only if a ∈ Ei(t, φ) in case F (i) /∈ {JT, LP}.
Proposition 4.1.1. J with an axiomatically appropriate constant specifi-
cation is sound and complete with respect to its Fitting models; it is also
complete with respect to Fitting models with the Strong Evidence property.
Proof. Soundness is left to the reader. Completeness will be proven using a
canonical model construction. Let W be the set of all maximal consistent
subsets of LnJ . We know that W is not empty, because J is consistent. For
Γ ∈ W and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Γ#i = {φ ∈ LnJ | ∃t ∈ Tm t :i φ ∈ Γ}. For
any 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ri is a binary relation on W , such that ΓRi∆ if and only if
Γ#i ⊆ ∆. Also, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let Ei(t, φ) = {Γ ∈ W |t :i φ ∈ Γ}. Finally,
V : Prop −→ P(W ) is such that V(p) = {Γ ∈ W |p ∈ Γ}. The canonical
model is M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V).
Define the relation between worlds of the canonical models and formulas
of LnJ , |=, as in the definition of models.
Lemma 4.1.2 (Truth Lemma). For all Γ ∈ W , φ ∈ LnJ , M,Γ |= φ⇐⇒ φ ∈
Γ.
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Proof. By induction on the structure of φ. The cases for φ = p, a proposi-
tional variable, ⊥, or ψ1 → ψ2, are immediate from the definition of V and
|=.
If φ = t :iψ, then M,Γ |= t :iψ ⇒ Γ ∈ Ei(t, ψ)⇔ t :iψ ∈ Γ;
t :iψ ∈ Γ⇒ ∀∆ ∈ W (ΓRi∆→ ψ ∈ ∆)⇒ ∀∆ ∈ W (ΓRi∆→ ∆ |= ψ);
finally, Γ ∈ Ei(t, ψ) and ∀∆ ∈ W (ΓRi∆→ ∆ |= ψ)⇒M,Γ |= t :iψ, which
completes the proof.
The canonical model is, indeed, a model for J . To establish this, we must
show that the conditions expected from R1, R2 and E1, E2 are satisfied. First,
the admissible evidence function conditions:
Application closure: If Γ ∈ Ei(s, φ → ψ) ∩ Ei(t, φ), then s :i (φ → ψ), t :i
φ ∈ Γ. Because of the application axiom, [s·t] :iψ ∈ Γ, so Γ ∈ Ei(s·t, ψ).
Sum closure: If Γ ∈ Ei(t, φ), then t :i φ ∈ Γ, so, by the Concatenation
axiom, [s+ t] :iφ, [t+s] :iφ ∈ Γ, therefore, Γ ∈ Ei(t+s, φ)∩Ei(s+ t, φ).
CS closure: Any Γ ∈ W includes all instances of AN, so this is satisfied.
Verification closure: If Γ ∈ Ei(t, φ), then t :iφ ∈ Γ. If i j then !t :j t :i
φ ∈ Γ, therefore, Γ ∈ Ej(!t, t :iφ).
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Conversion closure: If Γ ∈ Ei(t, φ), then t :iφ ∈ Γ. If i ⊃ j then t :j φ ∈ Γ,
therefore, Γ ∈ Ej(t, φ).
Distribution: If ΓRj∆ and Γ ∈ Ei(t, φ), then t :i φ ∈ Γ. If i j then
!t :j t :iφ ∈ Γ, thus t :iφ ∈ Γ#j ⊆ ∆, concluding that ∆ ∈ Ei(t, φ).
To complete the proof, we prove that (Ri)
n
i=1 satisfy the required condi-
tions:
If F (i) = JT, then Ri is reflexive. For this, we just need that if Γ ∈ W ,
then Γ#i ⊆ Γ. If φ ∈ Γ#i , then there is some justification term, t,
for which t :i φ ∈ Γ. Because of the Fitting Factivity axiom, ¬φ 6∈ Γ,
since {t :iφ,¬φ} is inconsistent. Therefore, as Γ is maximal consistent,
φ ∈ Γ.
If F (i) = JD, then Ri is serial. To establish this, we just need to show that
Γ#i is consistent. If it is not, then there are formulas φ1, . . . , φk ∈ Γ#i
s.t. φ1, . . . , φk ` ⊥. This means that there are t1 :i φ1, . . . tk :i φk ∈ Γ,
s.t. t1 :i φ1, . . . tk :i φk ` t :i ⊥ (by Proposition 2.2.1 ), which is a
contradiction.
If i j and ΓRj∆RiE, then ΓRiE. If t :i φ ∈ Γ then !t :j t :i φ ∈ Γ, so
t :i φ ∈ Γ#j . If ΓRj∆, then t :i φ ∈ ∆. So, Γ#i ⊆ ∆#i and if ∆RiE,
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then ΓRiE.
If i ⊂ j, then Ri ⊆ Rj. If i ⊂ j then for any Γ ∈ W , Γ#i ⊆ Γ#j , i.e.
Rj ⊆ Ri.
Finally, notice that the canonical model has the Strong Evidence Property:
if Γ ∈ Ei(t, φ) then t :iφ ∈ Γ and by the Truth Lemma, Γ |= t :iφ.2
Proposition 4.1.3. J is sound and complete with respect to its Mkrtychev
models.
Notice that completeness for M-models does not have any requirements of
the constant specification. We skip the proof of soundness and completeness
for M-models since it is very similar to the single-agent case and the F-model
case – for the F-models we had slightly different conditions because of the
agent interactions.
4.1.2 Some Examples and Graphical Representations
We present some examples of logics, each of interest for different reasons.
In the following, for i ∈ [16], let Ji = (Ni,⊂i, i, Fi)CSi , where Ni =
2In fact, it is not hard to demonstrate how to construct from a model M =
(W, (Ri)
n
i=1, E ,V) a model M′ = (W, (Ri)ni=1, E ′,V) which has the Strong Evidence Prop-
erty and for every w ∈ W and φ ∈ LnJ , M, w |= φ iff M′, w |= φ: just define
Ei(t, φ) = {w ∈W | M, w |= t :iφ}.
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{1, 2, . . . , ni} and CS i is an axiomatically appropriate constant specification
for logic Ji. It is convenient to also assume that CS i ∈ P. For some of these
logics we provide graphical representations where each agent is represented
by a node marked with a letter from a, j, t, and d. A generic agent may
be marked with a; if F (i) = J, then the node representing i is marked
with j; if F (i) = JD, then the node representing i is marked with d; and if
F (i) = JT, then the node representing i is marked with t. The interactions
are represented by arrows: if i ⊂ j, then there is an arrow from i to j marked
with a c; if i j, then there is an arrow from i to j marked with a v. Since the
constant specification, as long as it is schematic, axiomatically appropriate
and in P (which we always assume), does not affect the complexity of the
logic, it is not represented in the graphical representation.
J1 through J5: The five logics defined in [Yav08]3; n1 = n2 = n3 = n4 =
n5 = 2, for i = 1, 2, F1(i) = F2(i) = F3(i) = F4(i) = F5(i) = LP;
for J1 = LP2, 1 = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} and ⊃1= ∅; for J2 = LP2↑,
2 = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} and ⊃2= {(1, 2)}; for J3 = LP2! , 3 =
{(1, 1), (2, 2), (1, 2)}, ⊃3= ∅; for J4 = LP2↑↑, 4 = {(1, 1), (2, 2)} and
3The reader may notice some differences between the logics defined in [Yav08] and the
ones defined here. We took a somewhat different approach when defining the logics in
this paper. With this in mind, it is easy to see that logics J1 through J5 correspond to
Yavorskaya’s logics and for simplicity we treat them as the same.
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⊃4= {(1, 2), (2, 1)}; for J5 = LP2, 5 = {(1, 1), (2, 2), (1, 2), (2, 1)}
and ⊃5= ∅.
J6: Let J6 be some logic, where 6,⊃6⊆ {(i, i) ∈ N26}. That is, there
are no interactions between the agents. In a way, J6 is the generic
justification logic of multiple agents when we have no interactions.
J7: Let n7 = 3, F7(2) = F7(3) = JD, F7(1) = JT, ⊃7= {(1, 2), (2, 3)}
and 7 = {(3, 1)}. Instead of interpreting 1, 2, 3 as three different
agents, we can think of them as three different degrees of belief of some
agent. 1 can be thought the agent’s knowledge, so if the agent knows
φ with justification t (i.e. t :1 φ is true), then it may be considered
reasonable to assume that the agent also believes φ with degree 2 and
thus with degree 3. On the other hand, if we want the agent to have
some sort of positive introspection and be aware of their own beliefs,
it may be reasonable to assume that that awareness is knowledge and
thus t :3 φ →!t :1 t :3 φ is true. An interesting phenomenon here
is that if the agent knows a fact, then the agent knows they believe
the fact, but does not necessarily know this belief is knowledge, i.e.
t :1φ→!t :1 t :3φ is valid, but t :1φ→!t :1 t :1φ is not. A countermodel
for t :1 φ →!t :1 t :1 φ is: (W, (Ri)i∈[3], E ,V) is the following: W =
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{a, b, c}, R2, R3 = {(a, b), (b, b), (c, b)}, R1 = R2 ∪ {(a, a), (b, c), (c, c)},
V(p) = {a, b} and assume that if p 6= q, V(q) = ∅, while Ei(s, ψ) = W
always.
Figure 4.1: The logic J7 graphically.
J8 and J9: For J8 and J9, let n8 = n9 = 2, F8(1) = F8(2) = F9(1) =
F9(2) = JD, ⊃8= 9 = ∅ and 8 =⊃9= {(1, 2), (2, 1)}.
Figure 4.2: The logic J8 or J9, depending on how we mark the edges.
J10: Let J10 be any logic, such that D10 = ∅. For any such logic, we can
simply use Mkrtychev models and, as we will see, it makes it easier to
build an algorithm to solve satisfiability.
J11: Let n11 = 3, for i ∈ N , F11(i) = JT, and 11,⊃11⊆ {(1, 2), (1, 3)}.
J12: Let n12 = 2, F12(1) = F12(2) = JD, 12 = {(1, 1)}, and ⊃12=
{(1, 2)}.
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Figure 4.3: The logic J12 graphically.
J13: Let n13 = 2, for i = 1, 2, F13(i) = JD, 13 = {(1, 2)}, and ⊃13=
{(1, 2)}.
Figure 4.4: The logic J13 graphically.
J14: Let n14 = 3, for = 1, 2, 3, F14(i) = JD, 14,= ∅, and ⊃14=
{(1, 2), (1, 3)}.
Figure 4.5: The logic J14 graphically.
J15: Let n15 = 3, for i = 1, 2, 3, F15(i) = JD and 15∪ ⊃15= {(1, 2), (1, 3)}.
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Figure 4.6: The logic J15 can be any of these two, or J14.
J16: Let n16 = 3, for i = 1, 2, 3, F16(i) = JD, 16 = {(1, 1)}, and
⊃16= {(1, 2), (1, 3)}.
Figure 4.7: The logic J16 graphically.
For J11, J14 and J15, the beliefs of one agent affect the beliefs of the other
two. We will see how this affects the complexity of each of these logics. In
fact, we will present some result about the complexity of each of these logics.
4.1.3 The ∗-calculus.
We present the ∗-calculus for (N,⊂, , F )CS . As we have seen in previous
chapters, the ∗-calculi for the single-agent justification logics are an invalu-
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able tool in the study of the complexity of these logics. This concept and
results were adapted to the two-agent setting in [Ach14c] and to the gen-
eral multi-agent setting in [Ach15b]. Although the calculi have significant
similarities to the ones of the single-agent justification logics, there are dif-
ferences that mainly have to do with the interactions between the agents.
Their overall principle and form remain the same, though.
If t is a term, φ is a formula, and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ∗i(t, φ) is a ∗-expression.
Given a frame F = (W, (Ri)ni=1) for J , the ∗F -calculus for J on the frame
F is a calculus on ∗-expressions prefixed by worlds from W (∗F -expressions
from now on) with the axioms and rules that are shown in Table 4.1.
We can repeat similar arguments and definitions as for the single-agent
∗-calculus: if E is an admissible evidence function of M, we define M, w |=
∗i(t, φ) iff E |= w ∗i (t, φ) iff w ∈ Ei(t, φ). Notice that the calculus rules
correspond to the closure conditions of the admissible evidence functions.
In fact, because of this, given a frame F = (W, (Ri)ni=1) and a set S of ∗F -
expressions, the function E such that E |= e ⇔ S `∗F e is an admissible
evidence function. Furthermore, E is minimal and unique: if some admissible
evidence function E ′ is such that for every e ∈ S, E ′ |= e, then for every ∗F -
expression e, E |= e ⇒ E ′ |= e. Therefore, given a frame F = (W, (Ri)ni=1)
and two set X, Y of ∗F -expression there is an admissible evidence function
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∗CS(F) Axioms: w ∗i (t, φ), where t :iφ an instance of AN
∗App(F):
w ∗i (s, φ→ ψ) w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗i (s · t, ψ)
∗Sum(F):
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗i (s+ t, φ)
w ∗i (s, φ)
w ∗i (s+ t, φ)
∗ (F): For any i j,
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗j (!t, t :iφ)
∗ ⊂ (F): For any i ⊃ j,
w ∗i (t, φ)
w ∗j (t, φ)
∗ Dis(F): For any i j and (a, b) ∈ Rj,
a ∗i (t, φ)
b ∗i (t, φ)
where F = (W, (Ri)ni=1) and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Table 4.1: The ∗F -calculus for J .
E on F such that for every e ∈ X, E |= e and for every e ∈ Y , E 6|= e, if
and only if there is no e ∈ Y such that X `∗ e. When X = ∅, as for the
single-agent logics, this yields the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1.4. For any frame F , state w, J ` t :iφ ⇐⇒ `∗F w ∗i(t, φ).
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4.2 The Complexity of the ∗-calculus on Mul-
tiple Agents
Proposition 4.2.1. If CS is schematic and in P, then the following problem
is in NP:
Given a finite frame F = (W, (Ri)ni=1), a finite set S of ∗-expressions
prefixed by worlds from W , a formula t :i φ, and a w ∈ W , is it
the case that S `∗F w ∗i (t, φ)?
Proof. The proof of this proposition is very similar to the one for Proposition
3.1.1, which can be found in [Kuz08a]. The shape of a ∗-calculus derivation
is mostly given away by the term t. So, we can use t to extract the general
shape of the derivation – the term keeps track of the applications of all rules
besides ∗ ⊂ and ∗ Dis. We can then plug in to the leaves of the derivation
either axioms of the calculus or members of S and unify (CS is schematic, so
the derivation may include schemes) trying to reach the root – at the same
time we need to keep track of the states of the frames and the agents for which
each step of the derivation is possible (i.e. for step (s, ψ) we keep track for
which (j, v) we can derive v ∗j (s, ψ)). What is different here is the additional
assignment of an agent and state set R(s) ⊆ N ×W to each node s of the
derivation tree, which does not change things a lot. R(s) will satisfy the
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following closure conditions: if (j, v) ∈ R(s) and j ⊃ j′, then (j′, v) ∈ R(s),
while if (j, v) ∈ R(s), j j′, and vRj′v′ then (j, v′) ∈ R(s). Then for every
node s, R(s) will be the smallest set such that these closure conditions are
satisfied, as well as the ones described in the following algorithm.
The algorithm to decide the derivability of w ∗i (t, φ) from S is the following:
• Nondeterministically construct a rooted tree with subterms of t, as
nodes, such that t is the root and the following conditions are met.




v ∗j1 (s1,φ1) v ∗j2 (s2,φ2)
v ∗j(s,φ3) , respectively, of the ∗-calculus
and s1, s2 are proper subterms of s. This results in a subtree of term t
(when t is seen as a tree) and the nondeterministic choices correspond
to two cases: wherever + appears in t (and we have to choose a version
of the ∗Sum rule) and whenever we encounter a term s, for which there
is some s :j ψ ∈ S, so we can choose to not break down s any further –
there is a third possibility, when we encounter some subterm s =! · · ·!c,
where c a constant; s can be part of an axiom of the calculus, or a
result of consecutive applications of ∗ on an axiom, but this is a
choice without consequences.
• Nondeterministically assign to each leaf, l, either
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– some formula ψ such that there is some v ∗j (l, ψ) ∈ S – in which
case (j, v) ∈ R(l) – or
– as long as l is of the form ! · · ·!︸︷︷︸
k
c, where c a constant, k ≥ 0, then
we can also assign some ! · · ·!︸︷︷︸
k−1
c :ik · · ·!c :i2 c :i1 A, where A an
axiom scheme and c :i1 A ∈ CS – in which case if k = 0, then for
every c :j A ∈ CS and v ∈ W , (j, v) ∈ R(l) and if k > 0, then
R(l) = N ×W .
• If for some node s, all its children, say s1, s2 (resp. s1) have been
assigned some scheme or formula P1, P2 (resp. P1), assign to s some














v∗j(s,P ) is a rule) in the ∗
F
CS(V,C)-
calculus (but not ∗ ⊂ or ∗ Dis). Then, if the rule was ∗App or
∗Sum, then R(s) = R(s1)∩R(s2); if the rule was ∗ , then for every
(j, v) ∈ R(s1) and j j′, (j′, v) ∈ R(s). Apply this step until the root
of the tree has been assigned some scheme or formula.
• Unify φ with the formula assigned to t and verify that (i, w) ∈ R(t)
If some step is impossible, the algorithm rejects. Otherwise, it accepts.
Using efficient representations of schemes using DAGs and Robinson’s uni-
fication algorithm, the algorithm runs in polynomial time (with respect to
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|S| + |t| + |φ| + |W |). We can see that as the tree is constructed, if s is
assigned scheme P and set R(s) 3 (j, v), then the construction effectively
describes a valid derivation of any expression of the form v ∗j (s, ψ), where
ψ an instance of P . Therefore, if the algorithm accepts, there exists a valid
∗F -calculus derivation of w ∗i (t, φ). On the other hand if there is some
∗F -calculus derivation for w ∗i (t, φ) from S, then the algorithm in the first
two steps can essentially describe this derivation by producing the derivation
tree and the formulas/schemes by which the derivation starts. Therefore, the
algorithm accepts if and only if there is a ∗F -calculus derivation for w ∗i (t, φ)
from S. See [Kru06] and [Kuz08a] for a more detailed analysis.
4.3 Tableaux through Mkrtychev Models
If we do not have agents with consistent beliefs (there is no i ∈ N such
that F (i) ∈ {JD, JD4}), then the study of the complexity of Multi-Agent
Justification Logic with interactions becomes trivial. We can simply use the
same methods as Kuznets in [Kuz00] and proofs and give tableaux through
Mkrtychev models, which work nicely in this context as well. This is exactly
what we do in this section.
Theorem 4.3.1. Satisfiability for (N,⊂, , F )CS , where JD, JD4 /∈ F [N ],
with an efficiently decidable, schematic CS is in Σp2.
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Proof. We just use the same tableaux and proofs as for Theorem 3.2.1 –
see Table 4.2. Of course, what is not immediately obvious is that we use
a different ∗-calculus which accounts for the interactions and the multiple
agents.
If F (i) = J or J4:
T t :iψ
T ∗i (t, ψ)
F t :iψ
F ∗i (t, ψ)
If F (i) = JT or LP:
T t :iψ
T ψ
T ∗i (t, ψ)
F t :iψ
F ∗i (t, ψ) | F ψ
Table 4.2: Tableau rules for (N,⊂, ↪→, F )CS when no agent has the Consis-
tency axiom.
4.4 A Small Model Theorem
In this section we prove a small model theorem, that is, that a satisfiable
formula is satisfiable in a (Fitting) model of at most an exponential number
of states. We then use it to prove a general upper bound for Multi-Agent
Justification Logic. We start with a lemma.
Lemma 4.4.1. If φ ∈ Ln is consistent and Φ is a maximally consistent set
of subformulas of φ, then Φ ∪ {¬t :iφ ∈ LnJ | Φ 6` t :iφ} is consistent.
Proof. We define M = (E ,V), where E(t, φ) = true and V(p) = true iff
for every M-model M′ = (E ′,V ′) |= Φ with the strong evidence property,
E ′(t, φ) = true and V ′(p) = true. It is not hard to see that E satisfies all
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closure conditions, so it is an admissible evidence function and for every
Φ 6` t :i ψ, there is some M′ |= Φ,¬t :i ψ, so M 6|= t :i ψ. What remains is
to prove that M |= Φ, by proving that for every ψ subformula of φ, M |= ψ
iff ψ ∈ Φ. By induction on ψ: this is obvious for propositional variables and
connectives, while we have already argued about the case of t :iψ.
Corollary 4.4.2. If φ is J-satisfiable, then φ is satisfiable by a Fitting model
for J of at most 2|φ| states which has the strong evidence property.
Proof. Let M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V) be the canonical model from the




i=1,Vf ), where W f
is the set of all maximally consistent sets of subformulas of φ and for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n, X, Y ∈ Wf ,
• XRfi Y iff there is some X ′ ∈ W such that X ⊆ X ′ and for every
Y ′ ∈ W , if Y ⊆ Y ′ then X ′RiY ′;
• X ∈ Efi (t, ψ) iff for every X ′ ∈ W such that X ⊆ X ′ ∈ W , X ′ ∈ Ei(t, ψ)
and
• X ∈ Vf (p) iff for every X ′ ∈ W such that X ⊆ X ′ ∈ W , X ′ ∈ V(p).
Then, define Mf , X |= ψ in the usual way as for models. Notice that since
the elements of Wf are maximally consistent w.r.t. subformulas of φ, for
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every set Ψ of subformulas of φ, Ψ ⊆ X ∈ Wf ⇔ for every Γ ∈ W s.t.
X ⊆ Γ ∈ W , Ψ ⊆ Γ ⇔ there is some Γ ∈ W s.t. X ⊆ Γ ∈ W and
Ψ ⊆ Γ. Also, for every X ∈ W f , let X = {ψ ∈ LnJ |X ` ψ}. Then, for every
X, Y ∈ Wf , propositional variable p and t :iψ subformula of φ, X ∈ Efi (t, ψ)
iff t :iψ ∈ X, and X ∈ Vf (p) iff p ∈ X.
Furthermore, XRfi Y iff X
#i ⊆ Y : if XRfi Y , then there is some X ′ ∈ W
such that X ⊆ X ′ and for every Y ′ ∈ W for which Y ⊆ Y ′, X ′RiY ′. Then,
for every Y ′ ∈ W for which Y ⊆ Y ′, X#i ⊆ (X ′)#i ⊆ Y ′, so X#i ⊆ Y . On
the other hand, if X
#i ⊆ Y , then let G = X ∪ {¬t :j ψ ∈ LnJ | t :j ψ /∈ X}.
Then G is consistent by Lemma 4.4.1 and can be expanded to a maximally
consistent X ′ ∈ W . (X ′)#i = X#i ⊆ Y ⊆ Y ′ for every Y ′ ∈ W for which
Y ⊆ Y ′. Thus, XRfi Y .
It is not hard to follow the proof of Lemma 4.1.2 to prove that for every
subformula ψ of φ and X ∈ W f , X |= ψ iff ψ ∈ X and then continue by
following the proof of Proposition 4.1.1 to complete this one.
The number of nondeterministic choices made by the algorithm in the
proof of proposition 4.2.1 is bounded by |t|+ |S ′|, where S ′ = {∗j(s, ψ)|∃w ∗j
(s, ψ) ∈ S}. Therefore, if there is some formula ψ such that t :i φ is a
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subformula of ψ and for every ∗j(s, ψ′) ∈ S ′, s :j ψ′ is a subformula of ψ, then
2|ψ| ≥ |t| + |S ′| and therefore we can simulate all nondeterministic choices
in time 2O(|ψ|). Thus the algorithm can be turned into a deterministic one
running in time 2O(|φ|) ·O(|W |2). This observation, the fact that a satisfiable
φ can be satisfied by a model of at most 2|φ| states (Corollary 4.4.2) and
Propositions 4.1.4 and 4.2.1 give Corollary 4.4.3.
Corollary 4.4.3. 1. If CS is schematic and in P, then deciding for t :iφ
that J ` t :iφ is in NP.
2. If CS is axiomatically appropriate, in P, and axiomatically appropriate,
then the satisfiability problem for J is in NEXP.
Proof. 1 is a direct consequence of Propositions 4.1.4 and 4.2.1. For 2, to
decide satisfiability of φ, nondeterministically guess a frame F = (W, (Ri)ni=1)
of at most 2|φ| states, state s, a propositional valuation V restricted on the
propositional variables that appear in φ and set of ∗F -expressions X, where
if w ∗i (t, ψ) ∈ X then w ∈ W and t :i ψ a subformula of φ. Then confirm
that for any admissible evidence function E such that e ∈ X iff E |= e,
(W, (Ri)
n
i=1, E ,V), s |= φ (in time at most 2O(|φ|)) and that there is actually
such an E (the nondeterministic choices in the algorithm for Proposition 4.4.3
come from t, so they can be simulated in at most time 2|φ|).
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Figure 4.8: First results for multi-agent Justification Logic
Chapter 5
The Complexity of Interacting
Agents: Conversion
5.1 Multi-Modal Logic
The language of Multi-Modal Logic for n modalities (agents), LnM , is defined
in the following way, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
φ ::= p | ¬φ | ⊥ | ¬⊥ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ | 3iφ | 2iφ.
If we only consider formulas in negation normal form (NNF), we push all
negations to the propositional level, so instead of ¬φ we would have ¬p
above. p and ¬p are called literals. When we consider only formulas in L1M ,
21 is often just called 2, so we identify LM with L
1
M .
We describe each logic with a triple (N,⊂, F ), where N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |}
is nonempty, ⊂ a binary relation on N , and for every i ∈ N , F (i) is a modal
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logic;1 a frame for (N,⊂, F ) is a (W, (Ri)i∈N), where for every i ∈ N , (W,Ri)
a frame for F (i) and for every i ⊂ j, Ri ⊂ Rj. It is reasonable to assume
that (N,⊂) has no cycles – otherwise we can collapse all modalities in the
cycle to just one – and that ⊂ is transitive. Furthermore, we also assume
that all F (i)’s have frames with serial accessibility relations – otherwise there
is either some j ⊆ i for which F (j)’s frames have serial accessibility relations
and R(i) would inherit seriality from Rj, or 2iψ can always be true by
default, which makes the situation not very interesting. Thus, we assume
that F (i) ∈ {D,T,D4, S5}.234
Specifically, a Kripke model for a multimodal logic (a logic based on
language LnM) is a tuple M = (W, (Ri)ni=1,V), where for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Ri ⊆
W×W and for every propositional variable p, V(p) ⊆ W . Then, (W, (Ri)ni=1)
is called a frame and the Ri are called accessibility relations. We define the
1In the general case, we describe a modal logic with a quadruple (N,⊂, , F ), but
when = ∅ as in this chapter, we omit the symbol altogether from the description; thus,
(N,⊂, F ) is the same as (N,⊂, ∅, F ). The remaining definitions for syntax and semantics
are the same, but we also need the condition that if i j and in frame (W, (Ra)a∈N ),
xRiyRjz, then also xRjz – just like for Justification Logic.
2We can consider more logics as well, but these ones are enough to make the points we
need. Besides, it is not hard to extend the reasoning of this section to other logics (ex. B,
S4), especially since the absence of diamonds makes the situation simpler.
3Frames for D have serial accessibility relations; frames for T have reflexive accessibility
relations; frames for D4 have serial and transitive accessibility relations; frames for S5 have
accessibility relations that are equivalence relations (reflexive, symmetric, transitive).
4Note that we do not define modal logics with verification, although it is not hard to
go that extra step. The reason is that we will concern ourselves with Modal Logic mainly
when the only interaction is Conversion.
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truth relation |= between models, worlds (elements of W , also called states)
and formulas in the following recursive way, similarly as for unimodal logics:
M, a 6|= ⊥ and M, a |= p iff a ∈ V(p);
M, a |= ¬φ iff M, a 6|= φ;
M, a |= φ ∧ ψ iff both M, a |= φ and M, a |= ψ;
M, a |= φ ∨ ψ iff M, a |= φ or M, a |= ψ;
M, a |= 3iφ iff there is some b ∈ W such that aRib and M, b |= φ;
M, a |= 2iφ iff for all b ∈ W such that aRib it is the case thatM, b |= φ.
5.1.1 Relating Diamond-free Modal Logic and Justifi-
cation Logic
We first examine the complexity of satisfiability for the diamond-free frag-
ments of several modal logics. Diamond-free fragments of Modal Logic may
seem like an odd topic, especially in a thesis focused on the complexity of
Justification Logic. In this section we explain why it is not. In fact, when
trying to determine the complexity of a justification logic, it makes a lot
of sense to closely examine the diamond-free fragment of the corresponding
modal logic.5
5The observations in this section first appeared in [Ach14a].
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If one examines the tableaux for various justification logics, there is a
certain similarity with tableaux for Modal Logic – a similarity more evident
when a tableau is based on Fitting models instead of Mkrtychev models,
like the ones for JD and JD4. The differences are two: when the tableau
encounters a T t :φ, it additionally produces a T ∗ (t, φ) to account for the
admissible evidence function; and when it encounters a F t :φ, it may either
produce a F ∗ (t, φ), or a.n F φ. So, unlike the modal case, where a F 2φ
produces a new prefix, the Justification Logic tableau may choose not to,
instead giving a ∗-calculus condition. In fact, if we base our tableaux on
models with the Strong Evidence Condition (see the definition of F-models),
which is what we will be doing from now on, the tableau does not even need
to make a choice: a F t :φ always results in a F ∗ (t, φ).6
Therefore, it seems that although t :φ may behave much like the modal
2φ, there is no construct corresponding to 3φ in Justification Logic. If we
ignore the ∗-calculus of the tableaux, with respect to satisfiability testing,
Justification Logic seems to be behaving a lot like diamond-free Modal Logic;
therefore, one would expect these to have very similar complexity with re-
spect to their satisfiability problem. Lemma 5.1.1 makes this observation
6This is, in fact, a standard rule, which we use in all our tableaux, preceding and
following.
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more explicit in a general setting. It also gives a tool for automatically
transferring lower bounds from (diamond-free) Modal Logic to Justification
Logic.
Lemma 5.1.1. • Let J be a justification logic whose Fitting models are
characterized by constraints on their frames and their admissible ev-
idence functions, so that the total admissible evidence function is an
appropriate evidence function for J ;
• let M be the modal logic characterized by the class of frames for J ;
• let C be a complexity class closed under polynomial-time reductions.
If satisfiability for the diamond-free fragment of M is C-hard, then so
is J-satisfiability. If J-satisfiability is in C, then so is satisfiability for the
diamond-free fragment of M .
Proof. For every diamond-free modal formula φ, let φJ be the result of sub-
stituting each 2i by x :i. If φ is satisfied by (W, (Ri)i∈N ,V), then φJ is
satisfied by (W, (Ri)i∈N , Etot,V), where Etot(t, ψ) = W for every t, ψ – the
total admissible evidence function. On the other hand, if φJ is satisfied by
some (W, (Ri)i∈N , E ,V), then φ is satisfied by (W, (Ri)i∈N ,V).
Notice that Lemma 5.1.1 is general and relates to all justification logics
we encounter in this thesis and possibly many more.
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5.1.2 Work on Dependent Modal Logic
The complexity of the satisfiability problem for Modal Logic, and thus of its
dual, modal provability/validity, has been extensively studied. Whether one
is interested in areas of application of Modal Logic, or in the properties of
Modal Logic itself, the complexity of modal satisfiability plays an important
role.
As we have shown, Ladner has established most of what are now con-
sidered classical results on the matter ([Lad77]), determining that most of
the usual modal logics, especially ones with more than one modality are
PSPACE-hard. Therefore, it makes sense to try to find fragments of these
logics that have an easier satisfiability problem by restricting the modal el-
ements of a formula – or prove that satisfiability remains hard even in frag-
ments that seem trivial (ex. [Hal95, CR02]). In this section we present mostly
hardness results for this direction and for certain cases of multimodal logics
with modalities that affect each other. Relevant syntactic restrictions and
their effects on the complexity of various modal logics have been examined
in [Hem01] and [HSS10]. For more on modal logic and its complexity, see
[HM92, FHMV95, Spa93].
We analyze the complexity of the satisfiability problem for modal formulas
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in negation normal form that have no diamonds. When testing a modal
formula for satisfiability (for example, trying to construct a model for the
formula by using a tableau procedure), a clear source of complexity is the
occurrence of diamonds in the formula. When we try to satisfy 3φ, we need
to assume the existence of an extra world where φ is satisfied. Furthermore,
when trying to satisfy 3p1 ∧ 3p2 ∧ 2φ, we require two new worlds where
p1 ∧ φ and p2 ∧ φ are respectively satisfied, which can potentially cause an
exponential explosion to the size of the constructed model (we just doubled
the number of worlds by adding constant length to the formula). There
are several modal logics, but it is usually the case that in the process of
satisfiability testing, as long as there are no diamonds in the formula, we
are not required to add more than one world to the constructed model,
which makes identifying the existence of diamonds as an important source
of complexity a natural conclusion. On the other hand, when the modal
logic is D, its models are required to have a serial accessibility relation (no
sinks in the graph). Thus, when we test 2φ for D-satisfiability, we require
a world where φ is satisfied. In such a unimodal setting and in the absence
of diamonds, we avoid an exponential explosion in the number of worlds and
we can consider models with only a polynomial number of worlds.
Several authors have examined the complexity of combinations of modal
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logic (ex. [MV97, Gab03, Kur07]). The most relevant to this paper work on
the complexity of combinations of modal logic is by Spaan in [Spa93] and
Demri in [Dem00]. In particular, Demri studied L1 ⊕⊆ L2, which is L1 ⊕ L2
(see [Spa93]) with the additional axiom 22φ → 21φ and where L1, L2 are
among K, T, B, S4, and S5. For when L1 is among K, T, B and L2 among
S4, S5, he establishes EXP-hardness for L1 ⊕ L2-satisfiability. We consider
L1⊕⊆L2, where L1 is a unimodal or bimodal logic (usually D, or D4). When
L1 is bimodal, L1 ⊕⊆ L2 is L1 ⊕ L2 with the extra axioms 23φ → 21φ and
23φ→ 22φ.
We examine the effect on the complexity of modal satisfiability testing
of restricting our input to diamond-free formulas under the requirement of
seriality and in a multimodal setting with connected modalities. In particu-
lar, we initially examine four examples: D2 ⊕⊆ K, D2 ⊕⊆ K4, D ⊕⊆ K4, and
D42 ⊕⊆ K4. For these logics we look at their diamond-free fragment and
establish that they are PSPACE-hard and in the case of D2 ⊕⊆ K4, EXP-
hard. Furthermore, D2⊕⊆K, D⊕⊆K4, and D42⊕⊆K4 are PSPACE-hard and
D2 ⊕⊆ K4 is EXP-hard even for their 1-variable fragments. Of course these
results can be naturally extended to more modal logics, but we treat what
we consider simple characteristic cases. For example, it is not hard to see
that nothing changes when in the above multimodal logics we replace K by
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D, or K4 by D4, as the extra axiom 23φ → 33φ (22φ → 32φ for D ⊕⊆ K4)
is a derived one. It is also the case that in these logics we can replace K4 by
other logics with positive introspection (ex. S4, S5) without changing much
in our reasoning.
Then, we examine a general setting of a multimodal logic where we in-
clude axioms 2iφ → 2jφ for some pairs i, j. For this setting we determine
exactly the complexity of satisfiability for the diamond-free (and 1-variable)
fragment of the logic and we are able to make some interesting observations.
The study of this general setting is of interest, because determining exactly
when the complexity drops to tractable levels for the diamond-free fragments
illuminates possibly appropriate candidates for parameterization: if the com-
plexity of the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of a logic drops to P, then we
may be able to develop algorithms for the satisfiability problem of the logic
that are efficient for variables of few diamonds and propositional variables; if
the complexity of that fragment does not drop, then the development of such
algorithms seems unlikely (we may be able to parameterize with respect to
some other parameter, though). Another argument for the interest of these
fragments is the hardness results of this paper. The fact that the complexity
of the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of a logic remains high means that
this logic is likely a very expressive one, even when deprived of a significant
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part of its syntax.
A very relevant approach is presented in [Hem01, HSS10]. In [Hem01],
Hemaspaandra determines the complexity of Modal Logic when we restrict
the syntax of the formulas to use only a certain set of operators. In [HSS10],
Hemaspaandra et al. consider multimodal logics and all Boolean functions.
In fact, some of the cases we consider have already been studied in [HSS10].
Unlike [HSS10], we focus on multimodal logics where the modalities are not
completely independent – they affect each other through axioms of the form
2iφ → 2jφ. Furthermore in this setting we only consider diamond-free for-
mulas, while at the same time we examine the cases where we allow only one
propositional variable. As far as the results of this section are concerned, it
is interesting to note that in [Hem01, HSS10] when we consider frames with
serial accessibility relations, the complexity of the logics under study tends
to drop, while in this paper we see that serial accessibility relations (in con-
trast to arbitrary, and sometimes reflexive, accessibility relations) contribute
substantially to the complexity of satisfiability.
As far as this thesis is concerned, of course, the motivation we have is the
relation between the diamond-free fragments of Modal Logic with Justifica-
tion Logic. As we are interested in the complexity of systems of multimodal
and multi-Agent justification logics, we are additionally interested in these
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diamond-free fragments.
5.1.3 Hardness Without Diamonds
In general, if M1,M2 are single-agent modal logics, we can define M
k
1⊕⊆M2 as
being the logic (N,⊂, , F ), where N = {1, 2, . . . , k+1}, ⊂= N ×{k+1},
F (k+ 1) = M2, if i ≤ k then F (i) = M1, and = ∅ (but as we have seen,
in this chapter we will omit , as it will always be empty).
In this subsection we deal with five logics: K, D2⊕⊆K, D2⊕⊆K4, D⊕⊆K4,
and D42 ⊕⊆ K4. All except for K and D⊕⊆ K4 are trimodal logics, based on
language L3M , K is the unimodal logic we defined in Chapter 2 (the simplest
normal modal logic) based on L1M , and D⊕⊆ K4 is a bimodal logic based on
L2M . Each modal logic M is associated with a class of frames C, where C
is the class of frames so that M is sound and complete with respect to the
derived class of models is. Therefore:
K
is the logic associated with the class of all frames;
D2 ⊕⊆ K
is the logic associated with the class of frames F = (W,R1, R2, R3) for
which R1, R2 are serial (for every a there are b, c such that aR1b, aR2c)
and R1 ∪R2 ⊆ R3;
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D2 ⊕⊆ K4
is the logic associated with the class of frames F = (W,R1, R2, R3) for
which R1, R2 are serial, R1 ∪R2 ⊆ R3, and R3 is transitive;
D⊕⊆ K4
is the logic associated with the class of frames F = (W,R1, R2) for
which R1 is serial, R1 ⊆ R2, and R2 is transitive;
D42 ⊕⊆ K4
is the logic associated with the class of frames F = (W,R1, R2, R3) for
which R1, R2 are serial, R1 ∪R2 ⊆ R3 and R1, R2, R3 are transitive.
Tableau
We present tableau rules for K7 and for the diamond-free fragments of D2⊕⊆K
and then for the remaining three logics. The reason we present these rules
is because they are useful for later proofs and because they help to give
intuition regarding the way we can test for satisfiability. The ones for K are
classical and were given in Chapter 2; we restate them here. Formulas used
in the tableau are given a prefix, which intuitively corresponds to a state in
a model we attempt to construct and is a string of natural numbers, with
. representing concatenation. The tableau procedure for a formula φ starts
7These were already presented in Chapter 2, but we give another version here for clarity.
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σ φ ∨ ψ
σ φ | σ ψ










Table 5.1: Tableau rules for K. Notice that we do not use a truth prefix.
from 0 φ and applies the rules it can to produce new formulas and add them
to the set of formulas we construct, called a branch. As usual, a rule of the
form a
b | c means that the procedure nondeterministically chooses between a
and b to produce, i.e. a branch is closed under that application of that rule
as long as it includes b or c. If the branch has σ ⊥, or both σ p and σ ¬p,
then it is called propositionally closed and the procedure rejects its input.
Otherwise, if the branch contains 0 φ, is closed under the rules, and is not
propositionally closed, it is an accepting branch for φ; the procedure accepts
φ exactly when there is an accepting branch for φ. The rules for K are in
Table 5.1.
For the remaining logics, we are only concerned with their diamond-free
fragments, so we only present rules for those to makes things simpler. The
rules for D2 ⊕⊆ K are in Table 5.2.
We sketch a proof that these rules are correct, that is, there is a model
for φ iff there is an accepting branch for φ. From an accepting branch for φ
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σ φ ∨ ψ
σ φ | σ ψ










Table 5.2: The rules for D2 ⊕⊆ K
we construct a model for φ: let W be all the prefixes that have appeared in
the branch,
R1 = {(w,w.1) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2 | w.1 /∈ W},
R2 = {(w,w.2) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2 | w.2 /∈ W},
R3 = R1 ∪ R2, and V(p) = {w ∈ W | w p appears in the branch}. Then,
it is not hard to see that (W,R1, R2, R3) is indeed a frame for D2 ⊕⊆ K
(R1, R2 ⊆ R3 and they are all serial), and that for M = (W,R1, R2, R3,V),
M, 0 |= φ – by proving through a straightforward induction on ψ that for
every w ψ in the branch, M, w |= ψ.
On the other hand, given someM, a |= φ, we can construct an accepting
branch for φ in the following way. We map 0 to a and for every w.i, where i =
1, 2, if w is mapped to state b of the model, then w.i is mapped to some state
c, where bRic. Then we can make sure we make appropriate nondeterministic
choices when applying a rule to ensure that whenever w ψ is produced and
w is mapped to a, then M, a |= ψ: if ψ = φ, then this is trivially correct; if










Table 5.3: Tableau rules for the diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4
we apply the first rule on w ψ1∨ψ2, then sinceM, a |= ψ1∨ψ2, it is the case
that M, a |= ψ1 or M, a |= ψ2 and we can choose the appropriate formula
to introduce to the branch; the remaining rules are trivial. Therefore, the
branch can never be propositionally closed.
To come up with tableau rules for the other three logics, we can modify
the above rules. The first two rules that cover the propositional cases are
always the same, so we give the remaining rules for each case without proof.
In the following, notice that the resulting branch may be infinite. However
we can simulate such an infinite branch by a finite one: we can limit the
size of the prefixes, as after a certain size it is guaranteed that there will
be two prefixes that prefix the exact same set of formulas. Thus, we can
either assume the procedure terminates or that it generates a full branch,
depending on our needs.
The rules for the diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4 are in Table 5.3;
the rules for the diamond-free fragment of D⊕⊆ K4 are in Table 5.4; and the
















where ni(σ) = σ if σ = σ
′.i for some σ′ and ni(σ) = σ.i otherwise.
Table 5.5: Tableau rules for the diamond-free fragment of D42 ⊕⊆ K4
rules for the diamond-free fragment of D42⊕⊆ K4 can be found in Table 5.5.
We skip any proof of correctness for these cases, as they are similar to
the previous case. The exception is the tableau procedure for D42 ⊕⊆ K4,
which is a little different and for which we must give some adjustments in the
constructions of the model from the accepting branch and of the accepting
branch from a model. The construction of the model is similar as for the case
of D2 ⊕⊆ K, only this time for i = {1, 2} Ri = {(σ, ni(σ)) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(σ, σ) ∈
W 2 | ni(σ) /∈ W} (notice they are transitive) and R3 the transitive closure
of R1 ∪ R2. On the other hand, when constructing an accepting branch, we
need to make sure that if we map σ to b, then we map σ.i to some c such
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that for every 2iψ, subformula of φ, c |= 2iψ → ψ. We can find such a
c by considering a sequence bRic1Ric2Ri · · · ; if some cj 6|= 2iψ → ψ, then
cj |= 2iψ, so for every j′ > j, cj |= 2iψ → ψ. Since the subformulas of φ are
finite in number, we can find some large enough j ∈ N and c = cj.
Proposition 5.1.2. The satisfiability problem for the diamond-free frag-
ments of D2⊕⊆K, of D⊕⊆K4, and of D42⊕⊆K4 is in PSPACE; the satisfiability
problem for the diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4 is in EXP.
Proof. We can use the rules to prove that satisfiability of the diamond-free
fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K is in PSPACE. In fact, we can use an alternating
polynomial-time algorithm to simulate the tableau procedure and given a
formula φ to construct an accepting branch for φ. The algorithm uses an
existential non-deterministic choice when we apply the first rule to choose
which of the resulting prefixed formulas to add to the branch; it also uses a
universal choice to choose between σ.1 and σ.2 for every σ it has produced.
Other than that, it applies all the tableau rules it can, until there are none
left. It is not hard to construct an accepting tableau branch from an accept-
ing run of the algorithm and vice-versa. The fact that the algorithm runs in
polynomial time can be established by observing that only up to |φ| formu-
las can be prefixed by a specific prefix, while the nesting depth of the boxes
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in the formulas (also called modal depth) strictly decreases as the length of
their prefix increases.
To establish upper complexity bounds for the diamond-free fragments of
the remaining logics, we can use a similar procedure, only this time it is an
alternating polynomial space algorithm to simulate the tableau procedure –
we do not have the same bounds on the length of the prefixes as above, but
we can just keep formulas prefixed by a single prefix in memory and as we
argued before this is at most |φ| formulas – of course this means we give
priority to propositional rules. Furthermore we do not even need to keep
the current prefix in memory, but we can just use a counter of polynomial
size for the length of the prefix (an important point, because the length of a
prefix can be exponential); when the counter becomes larger than 2|φ|, then of
course we can terminate. This gives an (APSPACE =)EXP-upper bound for
the complexity of satisfiability for the diamond-free fragment of D2⊕⊆K4; to
get a PSPACE-upper bound for the other two logics, notice that the tableau
for D⊕⊆K4 uses only prefixes of the form 0.1x and the tableau for D42⊕⊆K4
only subprefixes of 0.(1.2)ω and 0.(2.1)ω, therefore making universal choices
unnecessary.
The cases of D⊕⊆K4 and D42⊕⊆K4 are especially interesting. In [Dem00],
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Demri established that D ⊕⊆ K4-satisfiability (and because of the follow-
ing section’s results also D42 ⊕⊆ K4-satisfiability) is EXP-complete. Here,
though, we see that the complexity of these two logics’ diamond-free (and
one-variable) fragments are PSPACE-complete (in this subsection we estab-
lish the PSPACE upper bounds, while in the next one the lower bounds),
which is a drop in complexity (assuming PSPACE 6= EXP), but not one that
makes the problem tractable (assuming P 6= PSPACE).
Lower Complexity Bounds for Diamond-free Fragments
We give hardness results for the logics presented in the previous subsection –
except for K. In [CR02], the authors prove that the variable-free fragment of
K remains PSPACE-hard. We make use of that result here and prove the same
for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K. Then we prove EXP-
hardness for the diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4 and PSPACE-hardness
for the diamond-free fragments of D ⊕⊆ K4 and of D42 ⊕⊆ K4, which we
later improve to the same result for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragments
of these logics.
Proposition 5.1.3. The diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K is
PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The upper bound was given by Proposition 5.1.2. We give a trans-
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lation from unimodal formulas to formulas of three modalities such that φ
is K-satisfiable if and only if φtr (the result of the translation) is D2 ⊕⊆ K-
satisfiable. The translation uses an extra propositional variable (not appear-
ing in φ), q. It is defined in the following way.
We want the tableau for φtr to simulate the tableau for φ. However, φ
may have diamonds, which are not allowed in φtr. When the tableau for
K encounters a diamond, then it generates a unique prefix. Therefore, we
must replace a diamond with something which will generate a unique prefix
in the tableau for D2⊕⊆ K. This unique prefix can be generated by a unique
sequence of boxes, which is provided by dseq:
For a formula φ, let θ1, . . . , θk be an enumeration of its subformulas which
we view as distinct from each other (we can mark them if needed) and in
increasing order with respect to their size (to ensure that if η1 is a subformula
of η2, then η1 appears first). Also, let
8
dseq : {1, 2, . . . , k} −→ {21,22}dlog ke
be some one-to-one mapping from those subformulas to a unique sequence
of boxes. The actual mapping is not important, but an easy choice would
be dseq(x) = 2x1+12x2+1 · · ·2xdlog ke+1, where bin(x) := x1x2 · · ·xdlog ke is the
8Notice that if there is at least one diamond in φ, then φ has at least two subformulas,
thus if there are diamonds, then log k ≥ 1; if k = 1, then this discussion is meaningless:
φtr = φ.
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binary representation of x – so this is the one we assume. We can recursively
on i define itr:
• if θi is a literal, >, or ⊥, then itr = θi;
• if θi = θj ◦ θl, where ◦ is either ∧ or ∨, then itr = jtr ◦ ltr;
• if θi = 2θj, then itr = 2dlog ke3 (jtr ∨ ¬q);
• finally, if θi = 3θj, then itr = dseq(i)(jtr ∧ q).
Then, φtr = ktr ∧ q (as θk is actually φ). The extra variable, q, is used to
mark which prefixes in the D2 ⊕⊆ K-tableau correspond to prefixes in the
K-tableau that have appeared.
For convenience assume that in the K-tableau for φ, σ θi, where θi = η
produces σ.i η – which is reasonable, since for each σ each θi appears at most
once. Assume a complete accepting K-branch b for φ. Let m(0) = 0 and
m(σ.i) = m(σ).bin(i). Then, b′ is constructed in a recursive way, so that
for every σ′ η, σ′ q ∈ b′, where η 6= q,¬q, there is some σ θi ∈ b such that
σ′ = m(σ) and η = itr. When we apply the 21- or 22-rule from the ones
we presented in Table 5.2, that is in the course of generating a prefix m(σ)
– so, from m(σ) itr, where θi = 3θj, we eventually generate m(σ.i) j
tr and
m(σ.i) q (and some auxiliary boxed formulas in-between); when we apply
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the 23-rule, then this started from some m(σ) i
tr, where θi = 2θj, so for
every σ.l θj ∈ b, we produce m(σ.l) jtr, while for σ.l θj ∈ b (where l ≤ k),
we produce m(σ.l) ¬q (and auxiliary boxed formulas in-between); when we
apply a propositional rule on m(σ) itr ◦ jtr, we just need to make the same
nondeterministic choice that was made for b (if applicable). Then, naturally,
if b′ is rejecting, then that is because m(σ) p,m(σ) ¬p ∈ b′, or m(σ) ⊥ ∈ b′;
but then either σ p, σ ¬p ∈ b, or σ ⊥ ∈ b, respectively.
On the other hand it is easier to give a complete accepting K-branch b for
φ given a complete accepting D2⊕⊆K-branch b′ for φtr: b = {σ θi | m(σ) itr ∈
b′}. We leave the reader to verify this claim.
Notice that χtr has no diamonds and the number of propositional variables
in χtr is one more than in χ. Since we can assume χ is variable-free (see
[CR02]), the proposition follows.
For the remaining logics we first present a reduction to show hardness for
their diamond-free fragments and then we provide translations to their 1- or
2-variable fragments. We first treat the case of D2 ⊕⊆ K4.
Lemma 5.1.4. The diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4 is EXP-complete,
while the diamond-free fragments of D⊕⊆K4 and of D42⊕⊆K4 are PSPACE-
complete.
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Proof. The upper bounds were given by Proposition 5.1.2. The proof re-
sembles the one in [FL79] and is by reduction from a generic APSPACE
problem given as the alternating Turing machine of two tapes (input and
working tape) which uses polynomial space to decide it. Let the machine
be (Q,Σ, δ, s), where Q the set of states, Σ the alphabet, δ the transition
relation and s the initial state. Let Q = U ∪ E, where E and U are dis-
tinct, E the set of existential and U the set of universal states and assume
that the machine only has two choices at every step of the computation, pro-
vided by two transition functions, δ1, δ2: when the transition functions are
given state q ∈ Q, and symbols a, b ∈ Σ for tape 1 and 2 respectively, for
i = 1, 2, δi(q, a, b) = (q
′, c, j1, j2) ∈ Q × Σ × {0,−1, 1}2, where q′ the new
state, c the symbol to replace b in tape 2, and j1, j2 the respective moves
for each tape, where 0 indicates no move, −1 a move to the left, and 1 a
move to the right. Furthermore, let x = x1x2 · · ·x|x| be the input, where for
every i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |x|}, xi ∈ Σ. Since the Turing machine uses polynomial
space, there is a polynomial p, such that the working tape only uses cells 1
to p(|x|) for an input x. For the input tape, we only need cells 0 through
|x| + 1 (we may assume additional symbols to indicate the beginning and
end of the input), because the head does not go any further and an output
tape is not needed, since we are interested only in decision problems. There-
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fore, there are Y,N ∈ Q, the accepting and rejecting states respectively. Let
r1 = {0, 1, 2, . . . , |x|+ 1} and r2 = {1, 2, . . . , p(|x|)}. A configuration c of the
Turing machine is called accepting if the computation of the machine that
starts from c is an accepting computation.
For this reduction, a formula will be constructed that will enforce that any
model satisfying it must describe a computation by the Turing machine. Each
propositional variable will correspond to some fact about a configuration of
the machine and the following propositional variables will be used:
• t1[i], t2[j], for every i ∈ r1, j ∈ r2; t1[i] will correspond to the head for
the first tape pointing at cell i and similarly for t2[j],
• σ1[a, i], σ2[a, j], for every a ∈ Σ, i ∈ r1, j ∈ r2; σ1[a, i] will correspond
to cell i in the first tape having the symbol a and similarly for σ2[a, j]
and the second tape,
• q[e], for every e ∈ Q; q[e] means the machine is currently in state e.
For each configuration c of the Turing machine there is a formula that de-
scribes it. This formula is the conjunction of the following and from now on
it will be denoted as φc: q[e], if e is the state of the machine in c; t1[i] and
t2[j], if the first tape’s head is on cell i and the second tape’s head is on cell
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j; σ1[a1, i1], σ2[a2, i2], if i1 ∈ r1, i2 ∈ r2 and a1 is the current symbol in cell i1
of the first tape and a2 is the current symbol in cell i2 of the second tape.
We need the following formulas. Intuitively, a world in a model for φ
corresponds to a configuration of our Turing machine. q ensures there is
exactly one state at every configuration; σ that there is exactly one symbol
at every position of every tape; t that for each tape the head is located
at exactly one position; σ′ ensures that the only symbols that can change
from one configuration to the next are the ones located in a position the
head points at; ac ensures we never reach a rejecting state (therefore the
machine accepts); st starts the computation at the starting configuration of
the machine; finally, dE, dU ensure for each configuration that the next one
is given by the transition relation (functions). Then, if com = q∧σ∧ t∧σ′∧



































[(tj[i] ∧ σj[a, i′])→ 21σj[a, i′] ∧22σj[a, i′]] ;
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ac = ¬q[N ];
st = φc0 , where c0 is the initial configuration of the machine;
let locconf(e, i1, i2, j1, j2) = q[e] ∧ σ1[i1, j1] ∧ σ2[i2, j2] ∧ t1[j1] ∧ t2[j2] and
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locconf(e, i1, i2, j1, j2)→
















2) = δ2(e, i1, i2).
The few implications that appear above are of the form a∧b∧· · ·∧c→ ψ
(where a, b, . . . , c are propositional variables) and can thus be rewritten in
negation normal form: ¬a∨¬b∨· · ·∨¬c∨ψ. The correctness of the reduction
follows from the following two claims.
Claim: If for some model M, w |= φ and for some u, such that (u = w
or wR3u), u |= φc and c1, c2 are the next configurations from c, then if c
a universal configuration, there are wR3u1 and wR3u2, such that u1 |= φc1,
u2 |= φc2 and if c an existential configuration, there is some wR3u1, such that
either u1 |= φc1 or u1 |= φc2. From this claim, it immediately follows that
if φ is satisfiable, then the Turing machine accepts its input (since it never
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rejects it ). We prove the claim for the case of the universal configuration.
Because of formulas q, σ, t, in every world v, such that wR3v, there is exactly
one φc satisfied. There are worlds u1, u2, (because of seriality of R1, R2) such
that wR1u1 and wR2u2 and if u1 |= φc3 , u2 |= φc4 , then because of dU , c3 will
differ from c in all respects δ1 demands; furthermore, because of σ
′, c3 differs
only in the ways δ1 (or δ2) demands and we can reason the same way for c4.
Therefore, {c3, c4} = {c1, c2}.
Claim: If the Turing machine accepts x, then φ is satisfiable. Given the
machine’s computation tree for x, we can construct model (W,R1, R2, R3, V )
for φ. W is the set of configurations in the computation tree; let R1, R2 be
minimal such that if u is a universal configuration and v, w its next configu-
rations, then uR1v and uR2w (or uR2v and uR1w), while if u an existential
configuration and v its next accepting configuration, then uR1v and uR2v;
let R3 be the transitive closure of R1 ∪ R2. V is defined to be such that if
M = (W,R1, R2, R3, V ), then M, u |= φu. Then, it is not hard to see that
M, c0 |= φ.
For the case of D ⊕⊆ K4, notice that if the machine is deterministic, we
can eliminate dU , half of dE and the subformulas beginning with 22 from σ
′
and rename the remaining modalities from 21,23 to 21,22. For the case
of D42 ⊕⊆ K4, we can define a translation from the language of D ⊕⊆ K4 to
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the language of D42 ⊕⊆ K4: given a formula φ with 21,22 as modalities,
simply replace 22 by 212322 and 21 by 2122. The remaining argument is
similar for the one for the case of D2⊕⊆ K – the iteration of 21 and 22 helps
cut off the propagation of boxes in the tableau, which does not happen for
D⊕⊆ K4.
We can use Lemma 5.1.4 to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1.5. The 1-variable, diamond-free fragment of D2 ⊕⊆ K4 is
EXP-complete; the 1-variable, diamond-free fragments of D ⊕⊆ K4 and of
D42 ⊕⊆ K4 are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. We present a method to translate a formula φ in negation normal
form into a 1-variable formula φ′ such that φ is D2 ⊕⊆ K4-satisfiable iff φ′
is D2 ⊕⊆ K4-satisfiable. Let p1, . . . , pk be all the propositional variables that
appear in φ and assume q is not one of them. Then, pvi = 212
i
2q and
(¬pi)v = 212i2¬q. φ′ results from φ by replacing each literal l by lv. Notice
that in a model M and state u, only one of pvi and (¬pi)v can be true. Let
M = (W,R1, R2, R3, V ), where (W,R1 ∪R2) is an infinite rooted tree (aR1b
iff b the left child of a and aR2b iff b the right child of a), u ∈ W , the root,
andM, u |= φ (it is not hard to see how to construct such a model from any
other). Then, for every x ∈ W , if there are some y ∈ W and some positive
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j ∈ N, such that yR1Rj2x (R
j
2 is defined: R
1
2 = R2 and aR
j+1
2 b iff there is
some c s.t. aR2cR
j
2b), then y, j are unique. Thus, if V
′(q) = {x ∈ W |
∃yR1Rj2x s.t. y ∈ V (pj)}, it is the case that for M′ = (W,R1, R2, R3, V ′),
M′, u |= φ′. On the other hand given a modelM′, u |= φ′, we can just define
V (pi) = {x ∈ W | M′, x |= 212i2q}, thus φ is satisfiable iff φ′ is. If φ is
diamond-free, then φ′ is diamond-free.
Notice that the method above does not work for D ⊕⊆ K4. Thus we use
another method: we translate a formula φ to a formula φ1 such that φ is
D⊕⊆K4-satisfiable iff φ1 is D⊕⊆K4-satisfiable and φ1 only uses one variable.
Let p1, . . . , pk be the propositional variables that appear in φ and let q be a




we recursively define: (pi)
1 = 22i1 q; (¬pi)1 = 22i1 ¬q; ⊥1 = ⊥; (¬⊥)1 = ¬⊥;
(ψ1 ∧ψ2)1 = ψ11 ∧ψ12; (ψ1 ∨ψ2)1 = ψ11 ∨ψ12; (21ψ)1 = 22k+21 (ψ1 ∧ s) (2x1 is x
iterations of 21); finally, (22ψ)
1 = 22((ψ
1∧q∧21q)∨(¬q∨2¬q)). Formula s
gives a “mold” to a model. We can assume that the frames for D⊕⊆K4 are of
the form (N,+1,≤). Furthermore, if we restrict ourselves to formulas of the
form ψ1, then we can assume that for every n ∈ N, n(2k+2), n(2k+2)+1 |= q
and for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, n(2k + 2) + 2i + 1 |= ¬q. Then, n(2k + 2) |= (21ψ)1
if and only if (n + 1)(2k + 2) |= ψ1, while q ∧ 21q is true only at multiples
of 2k + 2. So, n(2k + 2) |= (22ψ)1 exactly when (n + 1)(2k + 2) |= ψ1.
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Therefore, by induction on φ, we can see that φ is D⊕⊆ K4-satisfiable iff φ1
is D⊕⊆ K4-satisfiable.
We can end this argument like the one for the case of D2 ⊕⊆ K: the
tableau run for φ can simulate the run for φ1 and vice-versa. Just map every
prefix σ from the first tableau to σ′ of the second one, such that 0′ = 0 and
(σ.1)′ = σ′.12k+2. Then σ ψ appears in a branch of the first procedure iff σ′ ψ1
appears in a branch which results from the “same” nondeterministic choices
in the second procedure. Furthermore, it is not hard to see that σ′ (pi)
1 and
σ′ (¬pj)1 result in a closed branch iff i = j.
One may wonder whether we can say the same for the variable-free frag-
ment of these logics. The answer however is that we cannot. The models
for these logics have accessibility relations that are all serial. This means
that any two models are bisimilar when we do not use any propositional
variables, thus any satisfiable formula is satisfied everywhere in any model,
thus we only need one prefix for our tableau and we can solve satisfiability
recursively on φ in polynomial time.
Notice that for the proofs above, the requirement that the respective
accessibility relations are serial was central. Indeed, otherwise there was no
way to achieve these results, as we would not be able to force extra worlds
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in a constructed model. Then we would have to rely on the complexity
contributed by propositional reasoning and at best we would get an NP-
hardness result – as long as we allowed enough variables in our formula.
Then what about D4 ⊕⊆ K4? Maybe we could attain similar hardness
results for this logic as for D42 ⊕⊆ K4. Again, the answer is no. As frames
for D4 come with a serial and transitive accessibility relation, frames for
D4⊕⊆ K4 are of the form (W,R1, R2), where R1 ⊆ R2 and R1, R2 are serial
and transitive. It is not hard to come up with tableau rule(s) for the diamond-
free fragment, by adjusting the ones we gave for D42⊕⊆K4 to simply produce
0.1 φ from every σ 2iφ. This drops the complexity of satisfiability for the
diamond-free fragment of D4⊕⊆K4 to NP (and of the diamond-free, 1-variable
fragment to P), as we can only generate two prefixes during the tableau
procedure.
5.1.4 A General Characterization
In this section we examine a more general setting and we conclude by estab-
lishing tight conditions that determine the complexity of satisfiability of the
diamond-free (and 1-variable) fragments of such multimodal logics. As we
have mentioned before, in this chapter we omit the relation (interaction)
from the description; thus, a multimodal logic is a triple (N,⊂, F ).
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The cases for which ⊂= ∅ have already had the complexity of their
diamond-free (and other) fragments determined in [HSS10]. For the gen-
eral case, we already have an EXP upper bound from [DDN05]. We leave
to the reader to verify that (N,⊂, F ) is, indeed, a (fragment of a) regular
grammar modal logic with converse. For example, D2 ⊕⊂ D4 can easily be
reduced to K2 ⊕⊂ K4 by mapping φ to 31>∧32>∧23(31>∧32>) ∧ φ to
impose seriality, for which the corresponding regular languages would be 21,
22, and (21 + 22 + 23)
∗ (see [DDN05] for more details).
For every i ∈ N , let min(i) = {j ∈ N | j ⊂ i or j = i, and 6 ∃j′ ⊂ j} and
min(N) =
⋃
i∈N min(i). We can now give tableau rules for (N,⊂, F ). Let
• ni(σ) = σ, if either
– the accessibility relations of the frames for F (i) are reflexive, or
– σ = σ′.i for some σ′ and the accessibility relations of the frames
for F (i) are transitive;
• ni(σ) = σ.i, otherwise.
The tableau rules appear in Table 5.6.
From these tableau rules we can reestablish EXP-upper bounds for all of
these cases (see the previous sections). To establish correctness, we only show
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σ 2iφ
σ 2jφ














where j ∈ min(i)
and F (i)’s frames
have transitive ac-
cessibility relations
Table 5.6: Tableau rules for the diamond-free fragment of (N,⊂, F )
how to construct a model from an accepting branch for φ, as the opposite
direction is easier. Let W be the set of all the prefixes that have appeared in
the branch. The accessibility relations are defined in the following (recursive)
way: if i ∈ min(N), then Ri = {(σ, ni(σ)) ∈ W 2}∪{(σ, σ) ∈ W 2 | ni(σ) /∈ W
or F (i) has reflexive frames}; if i /∈ min(N) and the frames of F (i) do
not have transitive or reflexive accessibility relations, then Ri =
⋃
j⊆iRj;
if i /∈ min(N) and the frames of F (i) do have transitive (resp. reflexive,
resp. transitive and reflexive) accessibility relations, then Ri is the transitive
(resp. reflexive, resp. transitive and reflexive) closure of
⋃
j⊆iRj. Finally,
(as usual) V(p) = {w ∈ W | w p appears in the branch}. Again, to show
that the constructed model satisfies φ, we use a straightforward induction.
By taking a careful look at the tableau rules above, we can already make
some simple observations about the complexity of the diamond-free frag-
ments of these logics. Modalities in min(N) have an important role when
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determining the complexity of a diamond-free fragment. In fact, the prefixes
that can be produced by the tableau depend directly on min(N).
Lemma 5.1.6. If for every i ∈ min(N), F (i) has frames with reflexive
accessibility relations (F (i) ∈ {T, S5}), then the satisfiability problem for
the diamond-free fragment of (N,⊂, F ) is NP-complete and the satisfiability
problem for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of (N,⊂, F ) is in P.
Proof. Notice that in this case, for every i ∈ min(N), ni(0) = 0, so there is
no way to generate any other prefix besides 0. NP-hardness is the result of
the NP-hardness of propositional satisfiability. By the above we can restrict
ourselves to 1-world models; when we use only one variable, they can all be
generated in constant time.
Taking this reasoning one step further:
Corollary 5.1.7. If min(N) ⊆ {i} ∪ A and F (i) has frames with transi-
tive accessibility relations (F (i) ∈ {D4, S5}) and for every j ∈ A, F (j) has
frames with reflexive accessibility relations, then the satisfiability problem for
the diamond-free fragment of (N,⊂, F ) is NP-complete and the satisfiability
problem for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment of (N,⊂, F ) is in P.
Proof. Like above, notice that we can only generate two prefixes: 0 and
0.i.
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In [Dem00], Demri shows that satisfiability for L1 ⊕⊆ L2 ⊕⊆ · · · ⊕⊆ Ln is
EXP-complete, as long as there are i < j ≤ n for which Li ⊕⊆ Lj is EXP-
hard. On the other hand, Corollary 5.1.7 shows that for all these logics, their
diamond-free fragment is in NP, as long as L1 has frames with transitive (or
reflexive) accessibility relations.
Finally, we can establish a general result about the complexity of the
diamond-free fragments of these logics.
Theorem 5.1.8. 1. If there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for
which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {T, S5} = ∅),
• either
– |A| = 2 and for some j ∈ A, F (j) has frames with accessi-
bility relations that are not transitive, or
– |A| = 3 and
• F (i) has frames with transitive accessibility relations (i.e. F (i) ∈
{D4, S5}),
then the satisfiability problem for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment
of (N,⊂, F ) is EXP-complete;
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2. otherwise, if there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {T, S5} = ∅) and
• either
– |A| = 2 and for some j ∈ min(N), F (j) has frames with
accessibility relations that are neither reflexive nor transitive,
or
– |A| = 3,
then the satisfiability problem for the diamond-free, 1-variable fragment
of (N,⊂, F ) is PSPACE-complete;
3. otherwise, if there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {T, S5} = ∅),
• either
– |A| = 1 and for j ∈ A, F (j) has frames with accessibility
relations that are not transitive, or
– |A| = 2, and
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• F (i) has frames with transitive accessibility relations (i.e. F (i) ∈
{D4, S5}),
then the satisfiability problem for the diamond-free (1-variable) frag-
ment of (N,⊂, F ) is PSPACE-complete;
4. otherwise, the satisfiability problem for the diamond-free (resp. and
1-variable) fragment of (N,⊂, F ) is NP-complete (resp. in P).
Proof. All the lower bounds (except for the one in 4, of course) are established
by providing suitable translations. Notice that by definition, if |min(i)| > 1,
then i /∈ min(i) (and thus, i /∈ min(N)). In every case, assume that φ is the
formula that is given.
We first prove 1. This is done by a translation from D2 ⊕⊆ K4. φ is
translated to φm, such that φ is D2 ⊕⊆ K4-satisfiable if and only if φm is
(N,⊂, F )-satisfiable. If A = {x, y} and F (x) has frames with accessibility
relations that are not transitive, then let 2(1) = 2x2x2x2y2x2y2x2x and
2(2) = 2y2x2x2y2x2y2x2x, and 2(3) = 2i2y2x2y2x2x. Then, φ
m results
from φ by replacing 2k by 2(k), where k = 1, 2, 3. We can see that the tableau
for φm follows the one for φ – as long as we map (say w is mapped to wm) 0 to
0 and σ.1 to σm.x.x.x.y.x.y.x.x and σ.2 to σm.y.x.x.y.x.y.x.x. The important
observation here is that if σm 23ψ eventually produces α ψ, then α is either
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some (σ.τ)m, or it is not an initial segment of any such (σ.τ)m. Therefore,
by restricting the branches produced by the tableau for φm to prefixes of
the form (σ.τ)m, we have a simulation of the corresponding branch for φ,
while there are some other prefixes, but we can see that each of those (say
π.a) prefixes a set of formulas, which is a subset of a set of formulas prefixed
by another prefix, which ends at a and is mapped from a prefix of the first
tableau. This means that if φ is satisfiable, than φm is satisfiable. The other
direction is easier.
When |A| = 3, we can use a more straightforward translation, which
resembles than one given to translate from D ⊕⊆ K4 to D42 ⊕⊆ K4. For
{a, b, c} = {x, y, z}, φma is defined recursively: (p)ma = p; (¬p)ma = ¬p;
⊥ma = ⊥; (¬⊥)ma = ¬⊥; (ψ1∧ψ2)ma = ψma1 ∧ψma2 ; (ψ1∨ψ2)ma = ψma1 ∨ψma2 ;
(21ψ)
ma = 2bψ
mb , where if a = x (resp. y, z), then b = y (resp. z, x);
(22ψ)
ma = 2cψ
mc , where if a = x (resp. y, z), then c = z (resp. x,
y); finally, (23ψ)
ma = 2iψ. As the main translation we can pick any of
φmx ,φmy ,φmz and as in the previous cases, we can simulate one tableau by
the other..
To establish the stated lower bound for 2 when |A| = 3, we can use
the exact same translation as above (from D2 ⊕⊆ K). When |A| = 2 and
A = {x, y}, define 2(1) = 2x2j, 2(2) = 2y2j, and 2(3) = 2i2j. The
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translation happens just by replacing 2a by 2(a), for all a = 1, 2, 3. The
translations to prove the lower bound for (iii) are just simplified versions of
the above.
To establish the stated upper bounds, we give bounds for the number of
prefixes that a tableau run can produce. For this, assume that all subformulas
of φ are distinct.
If for some σ 2iψ, the branch produces both σ.x ψ and σ.y ψ (and x 6= y),
then x, y ∈ min(i) and F (x), F (y) have frames with accessibility relations
that are not reflexive, which means we are either in case (i) or case (ii). On
the other hand, if for σ 2iψ, the branch produces σ.x 2iψ, then x ∈ min(i)
and F (x) has frames with accessibility relations that are not reflexive, while
F (i) has frames with accessibility relations that are transitive. If F (x) has
frames with accessibility relations that are not transitive, or there is also
some y ∈ min(i) such that F (y) has frames with accessibility relations that
are not reflexive, then we are either in case (i), or in case (iii). Otherwise,
σ and σ.x are the only prefixes for 2iψ and thus the only possible prefixes
for ψ – if σ.x′ or σ.x.x′ is another prefix for ψ, then x′ ∈ min(i), which
is a contradiction, because of the above. This establishes 4, because every
subformula of φ can only have up to 3 prefixes.
Assume we are not in case 1. We give a non-deterministic algorithm which
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uses polynomial space to solve satisfiability. The algorithm runs the tableau
procedure and uses non-determinism exactly for the non-deterministic propo-
sitional rule. Since it uses only polynomial space, it (possibly) cannot hold
the whole branch in memory, so it explores the prefixes in a certain order.
This order is what enables the algorithm to use only polynomial space. Every
time the algorithm visits prefix σ, it applies all the rules that have as premise
a formula prefixed by σ = σ′.y. This possibly results in new sets of formulas
that are prefixed by new prefixes, σ.x1, . . . , σ.xk. If there is some xa such
that there is some i ∈ N for which xa, y ∈ min(i) and F (i) has frames with
transitive accessibility relations, then the algorithm visits σ.xa last (there is
at most one) and σ.xa is called a last prefix.
If σ.xb is not a last prefix, then the maximum modal depth
9 of the formulas
prefixed by σ.xb is one less than the maximum modal depth of the formulas
prefixed by σ′. This bounds the number of prefixes that are not last prefixes
and that are initial segments of a current prefix by at most 2|φ|. The space
the algorithm uses at any time is the number of prefixes it has scheduled
to visit (and has not done so yet), times some quantity which is linear with
respect to |φ| (the formulas prefixed by those prefixes). This number of
prefixes is at most |N | times the number of initial segments of the current
9The nesting depth of the boxes in a formula.
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prefix that are not last prefixes. But we argued above that these prefixes are
at most |φ|.
Case 4 is given by Corollary 5.1.7.
5.2 The Complexity of Multi-Agent Justifi-
cation Logic with Conversion
Using the results on Diamond-free Modal Logic we can finally conclude with
a characterization of Multi-Agent Justification Logic with Conversion. As
the following proposition suggests (especially if contrasted to Lemma 5.1.1),
the complexity of Diamond-free Modal Logic and of Justification Logic are
very close. The observations of this section first appeared in [Ach14a].
Lemma 5.2.1. Let F be a finite frame and S∪{e} be a set of ∗F -expressions.
Let ⊆ {(i, i) ∈ N2} (if we allow positive introspection as in this chapter,
= ∅). If S `∗F e, then e can also be derived by a derivation for the
∗F -calculus where ∗ ⊂ (F) is applied some times first, then ∗ Dis(F),
and then these rules are not applied any more.
Proof. By induction on the derivation length we can prove the lemma just for
∗ ⊂ (F); then, separately for ∗ Dis(F) in a way that does not introduce
any applications of ∗ ⊂ (F) if none are already present; then we can assume
S is closed under ∗ ⊂ (F) and the full lemma follows.
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Figure 5.1: The complexity of Diamond-free Modal Logic
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σ t :iφ
σ t :j φ
where j ⊂ i
σ t :iφ
ni(σ) φ
σ ∗i (t, φ)
where i ∈ min(N)
σ t :iφ
σ φ
σ ∗i (t, φ)




where j ∈ min(i) and F (i)’s
frames have transitive accessi-
bility relations
σ ¬t :iφ
σ ¬ ∗i (t, φ)
Table 5.7: Tableau rules for the diamond-free fragment of (N,⊂, F )
Proposition 5.2.2. If (N,⊂, FM) corresponds to (N,⊂, FJ)CS , CS ∈ P, is
schematic and axiomatically appropriate, and satisfiability for the diamond-
free fragment of (N,⊂, FM) is in complexity class C ∈ {PSPACE,EXP} (resp.
in NP), then (N,⊂, FJ)-satisfiability is in C (resp. in Σp2).
Proof. For (N,⊂, FJ)CS-satisfiability we can use practically the same tableau
as for (N,⊂, FM)-satisfiability (see Table 5.7). Only now, for a branch b to
be accepting it additionally requires that if X = {v ∗i (t, ψ) ∈ b}, then
there is no w ¬ ∗i (t, ψ) ∈ b such that X `∗F(b)CS w ∗i (t, ψ). Soundness,
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completeness, and complexity arguments are essentially the same. The dif-
ference is the ∗-calculus procedure, which is easy to see it ensures soundness
and completeness (see also the tableaux for JD and JD4). The ∗-calculus
derivation can be performed on each prefix separately (by Lemma 5.2.1, the
rules ∗ ⊂ (F) and ∗ Dis(F) are handled by the tableau); this can be
performed using an oracle to NP.
Corollary 5.2.3. Let (N,⊂, F )CS , such that F [N ] ⊆ {J, JT, J4, JD, JD4, LP}
and CS is axiomatically appropriate, schematic, and in P.
1. If there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {JT, S4} = ∅),
• either
– |A| = 2 and for some j ∈ A, F (j) has frames with accessi-
bility relations that are not transitive, or
– |A| = 3
and
• F (i) has frames with transitive accessibility relations (i.e. F (i) ∈
{JD4, LP}),
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then the satisfiability problem for (N,⊂, F )CS is EXP-complete;
2. otherwise, if there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {JT, LP} = ∅) and
• either
– |A| = 2 and for some j ∈ min(N), F (j) has frames with
accessibility relations that are neither reflexive nor transitive,
or
– |A| = 3,
then the satisfiability problem for (N,⊂, F )CS is PSPACE-complete;
3. otherwise, if there is some i ∈ N and some A ⊆ min(i) for which
• there is no j ∈ A where F (j) has frames with reflexive accessibility
relations (i.e. F [A] ∩ {JT, LP} = ∅),
• either
– |A| = 1 and for j ∈ A, F (j) has frames with accessibility
relations that are not transitive, or
– |A| = 2, and
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• F (i) has frames with transitive accessibility relations (i.e. F (i) ∈
{JD4, LP}),
then the satisfiability problem for (N,⊂, F ) is PSPACE-complete;
4. otherwise, the satisfiability problem for (N,⊂, F )CS is Σp2-complete.
Proof. This corollary is the immediate result of Lemma 5.1.1 and Proposi-
tions 4.2.1 and 5.2.2.
A, perhaps unexpected, consequence of this section is that when justi-
fication logic (N,⊂, F )CS is PSPACE-complete (or EXP-complete), so is its
fragment that uses only one propositional, one justification variable, and no
other kinds of justification terms.
CHAPTER 5. THE COMPLEXITY OF CONVERSION 184
Figure 5.2: The complexity of Diamond-free Modal Logic and Multi-Agent
Justification Logic with Conversion
Chapter 6
The Complexity of Interacting
Agents: Conversion and
Verification
Now we present complexity results for Multi-Agent Justification Logic when
we also have Verification as an interaction (and not just Conversion). We
first examine what happens when we only have two agents; then we identify a
class of logics for which the satisfiability problem remains in the second level
of the Polynomial Hierarchy; finally, we demonstrate that with Verification
we can achieve a higher complexity than with just Conversion. In fact, in
the final section of this chapter we present the first known justification logic
with a higher complexity than its corresponding modal logic.
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6.1 Two-agent Justification Logic
The original systems by Yavorskaya were two-agent versions of LP [Yav08]. In
this section we examine what happens in terms of the complexity of Satisfia-
bility when we have exactly two agents. The results of this section come from
[Ach14c]. In these cases we can use special notation. Logic J = (J1×◦J2)CS
is ({1, 2},⊂, , F )CS , where
• F (1) = J1, F (2) = J2;
• if ×◦ is ×, then ⊂= = ∅;
• if ×◦ is ×C , then ⊂= {(1, 2)} and = ∅;
• if ×◦ is ×CC , then ⊂= {(1, 2), (2, 1)} and = ∅;
• if ×◦ is ×!, then ⊂= ∅ and = {(1, 2)};
• if ×◦ is ×!!, then ⊂= ∅ and = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}.
6.1.1 Tableaux and Satisfiability - the Method and the
Tools
To test the satisfiability of φ, we use a tableau procedure, which starts from
0 T φ and we apply tableau rules to gradually decompose the initial formula
and produce more formulas. Formulas used in the tableau are of the form
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w T φ→ ψ
w F φ | w T ψ
w F φ→ ψ
w T φ
w F ψ
w T t :iφ
w.i T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
w F t :iφ
w F ∗i (t, φ)
Table 6.1: Tableau rules for (JD× JD)CS
0.w S α, where w ∈ {1, 2}∗ is the world prefix, S ∈ {T, F} the truth prefix
and α either a formula or a ∗-expression. When all applicable rules have
been applied, then we have a complete branch. If either w T ⊥ is in the
branch, or there are some w T a and w F a in the branch then the branch
is propositionally closed. If it is not propositionally closed, then W is the
set of world-prefixes appearing in the branch. Depending on the logic (and
thus on the tableau rules), we can define a frame. On this frame we can run
the ∗-calculus to confirm that there is some admissible evidence function E
such that for every x T ∗i (t, ψ) in the branch, x ∈ Ei(t, ψ) and for every
x F ∗i (t, ψ) in the branch, x /∈ Ei(t, ψ).
As an example we give tableau rules for (JD× JD)CS in Table 6.1.
For these rules,
Ri = {(w,w.i) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2 | w.i /∈ W}.
Then, F = (W,R1, R2) and V(p) = {w ∈ W | w T p appears in the branch}.
Let S = {w ∗i (t, ψ) | w T ∗i (t, ψ) appears in the branch} and E be the
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admissible evidence function such that
Ei(t, φ) = {w ∈ W | S `∗FCS(J ) w ∗i (t, φ)}.
M = (W,R1, R2, E1, E2,V) is a model, as R1, R2 are serial and E is an admis-
sible evidence function. It is not hard to see by induction on the structure
of formulas ψ, ψ′ that for every w T ψ and w F ψ′ in the branch,M, w |= ψ
and M, w 6|= ψ′, as long as there is no prefixed ∗-expression w F ∗i (t, υ)
appearing in the branch that w ∈ Ei(t, υ). Thus we say the branch is ac-
cepting exactly when it is not propositionally closed and there is no prefixed
∗-expression w F e in the branch such that S `∗ w e.
If there is an accepting branch, then from the above we see that φ is
satisfiable. On the other hand it is not hard to see how to construct an
accepting branch for φ given a Fitting model for φ that satisfies the Strong
Evidence property: we map each world prefix w to a world wM of the model
such that 0M is a world satisfying φ and w.i is mapped to a world accessible
through Ri from w
M. Then we ensure that we only produce formulas w T ψ
such that the world M, wM |= ψ and formulas w F ψ such that M, wM 6|=
ψ. Thus we ensure the branch is accepting. That the number of formulas
in the branch is polynomially bounded results from the observation that
the formulas prefixed by distinct world-prefixes are distinct – assuming all
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subformulas of φ are distinct. This means that (JD × JD)CS-satisfiability is
in Σp2.
For the cases that follow we use a similar tableau procedure and argu-
ments for its correctness and complexity. We will only explain what changes
for each case as needed. The propositional rules (the first two) an the rule
for w F t :iφ (the last one) remain exactly the same for all logics – we only
consider models with the strong evidence property. Notice that to prove the
Σp2 upper bound for a two-agent logic, it is enough to have a polynomial as a
bound on the number of the world-prefixes in a branch of its corresponding
tableau. This in turn gives a polynomial as an upper bound for the total
size of a branch and thus the time it takes to (nondeterministically) apply
all the tableau rules, as each rule increases the size of the branch. Since to
decide satisfiability for a formula we need to do just that (nondeterministi-
cally run the tableau) and at the end for every prefixed ∗-expression w F e
in the branch we need to determine whether S `∗ w e, we already have a
nondeterministic algorithm that runs in polynomial time and uses an oracle
from NP.
For several cases it is important to know Lemmata 6.1.1 and 6.1.2, as
well as the finite frame property of these logics, as established by Corollary
4.4.2. Lemma 6.1.1 describes the situation when the logic is a pair of logics
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with serial accessibility relations and has both versions of the Verification
axiom. On the other hand, Lemma 6.1.2 is more general and, perhaps, more
surprising. A very similar result is Proposition 3.3.3.
Lemma 6.1.1. If φ is (J1 ×!! J2)CS-satisfiable and J1,J2 ∈ {JD, JD4},
then there is some (J1 ×!! J2)CS-model M = (W,R1, R2, E1, E2,V), where
W = {u, a1, a2}, M, u |= φ, and for i ∈ {1, 2} Ri = {(x, ai) ∈ W 2}.
Proof. Consider a Fitting model M = (W,R1, R2, E1, E2,V) which has the
strong evidence property and such that W is finite (see Corollary 4.4.2) and
some u ∈ W such that M, u |= φ. Let a0, b0 ∈ W such that uR1a0 and
a0R2b0. Then, for k ∈ N, let ak+1, bk+1 ∈ W be such that bkR1ak+1R2bk+1.
Then, for every l, k ∈ N such that l < k, u, al, blR1ak and u, al, blR2bk. Since
W is finite, there are some k, k′ ∈ N such that k < k′ and ak = ak′ (and thus,
ak, bkR1ak and ak, bkR2bk).
Let W ′ = {u, ak, bk}, R′1 = {(a, ak) | a ∈ W ′}, R′2 = {(a, bk) | a ∈ W ′},
and V ′(p) = V(p)∩W ′. E ′i(t, ψ) = Ei(t, ψ)∩W ′ and E ′ is then an admissible
evidence function. If not, it should violate one of its closure conditions, but
it is not hard to see that they are all satisfied.
Then, M′ = (W ′, R′1, R′2, E ′,V ′) is a model and we can determine in a
straightforward way that M′, u |= φ.
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Lemma 6.1.2. Let J = (J1 ×◦ J2) and for some i ∈ {1, 2}, Ji = JD4.
If M = (W,R1, R2, E1, E2,V) is a J-model and W is finite, then for every
a ∈ W , there is some b ∈ W , such that aRibRib and for every c ∈ W , if
there is some b′ ∈ W for which c, bRib′, then cRib.
Proof. Consider such a Fitting model for J , M = (W,R1, R2, E1, E2,V).
For that a ∈ W let a0 ∈ W such that aRia0. Let Sk = {x ∈ W |
∃y, akRix and not yRiak} and let ak+1 ∈ Sk, if Sk 6= ∅, and ak+1 = ak other-
wise. Then, for every l, k ∈ N such that l < k, a, alRiak and thus Sk ⊂ Sl.
But since W is finite, there must be some k ∈ N such that Sk = ∅.
6.1.2 Complexity Results
The results of this section are summed up by Theorem 6.1.3:
Theorem 6.1.3. Let J = (J1 ×◦ J2)CS , where
J1,J2 ∈ {J, JD, JT, J4, JD4, LP}
and
×◦ ∈ {×,×!,×!!,×C ,×CC}.
If J2 = JD, J1 ∈ {J4, JD4, LP} and ×◦ = ×C, or J2 = JD, J1 ∈ {JT, LP}
and ×◦ = ×!, then J-satisfiability is PSPACE-complete. In every other case,
J-satisfiability is in Σp2.
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w T t :iφ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
J
w T t :iφ
w.i T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
JD
w T t :iφ
w T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
JT
w T t :iφ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
J4
w T t :iφ
v.i T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
JD4
where if w of the form
w′.i, then v = w′ and
otherwise v = w
w T t :iφ
w T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
LP
Table 6.2: Tableau rules for logics without interactions. We use two of these
rules: the ones that correspond to J1 and J2.
We do not examine (J1×CC J2)CS , as it is essentially a single-agent logic:
it is not hard to see that t :1φ↔ t :2φ is a theorem of the logic. Furthermore,
the cases where ×◦ ∈ {×C ,×CC} are handled by Corollary 5.2.3.
No interactions: ×◦ = ×.
Since there are no interactions we simply use the usual rule for w F t :i ψ
that gives w F ∗i (t, ψ) and one rule for each agent i depending on what
Ji is. These are given in Table 6.2 together with the corresponding Ji. The
reasoning follows the one for the case of (JD × JD)CS , except for the case
when Ji = JD4, where when we construct an accepting branch from a model
(of finite states and with the strong evidence property), we can use Lemma
6.1.2 and thus if we map w to a we map w.i to some b such that aRibRib.
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Of course, when we construct a model from an accepting branch we need
to provide a different accessibility relation to account for the different logics.
In particular, if Ji ∈ {J, J4}, then Ri = ∅; if Ji ∈ {JT, LP}, then Ri =
{(w,w) ∈ W 2}; if Ji = JD, as in the case of (JD× JD)CS ,
Ri = {(w,w.i) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2 | w.i /∈ W};
finally, if Ji = JD4, then
Ri = {(w,w.i) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w.i, w.i) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ W 2 | w.i /∈ W}.
Verification: ×◦ = ×!!.
When ×◦ = ×!! and J1, J2 are among JD, JT, JD4, and LP, Lemma 6.1.1
applies, so we can base our rules on the three-world models it describes.1
Then, the remaining argument remains the same as before, except when we
define the accessibility relations, depending on the logics, if Ji ∈ {JT, LP},
then Ri = {(w,w) ∈ W 2} and otherwise, Ri = {(w, 0.i) ∈ W 2}. The rules
are in Table 6.3.
On the other hand if one of the two agents is based on J or J4, then we
can use the same rules and reasoning as for the case when ×◦ = ×.
1In fact if one of J1,J2 is JT or LP, then only up to two worlds are required in the
model, as these logics require reflexivity and not seriality of their accessibility relation.
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w T t :iφ
0.i T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
JD,JD4
w T t :iφ
w T φ
w T ∗i (t, φ)
JT,LP
Table 6.3: Tableau rules for when ×◦ = ×!!.
w T t :1φ
w.s.1 T φ
w T ∗1 (t, φ)
JD
w T t :1φ
w.s T φ
w T ∗1 (t, φ)
JT,LP
w T t :1φ
v.1 T φ
w T ∗1 (t, φ)
JD4
where for the first two rules, s ∈ 2∗ and w.s has already appeared and for the
third one, either w of the form 0.a, where a ∈ 2∗ and v = w.s where s ∈ 2∗
and w.s has already appeared, or w of the form 0.w1.1.w2 (and w1, w2 ∈ 2∗)
and v = 0.w1. (2
∗ is the set of strings that only use 2 as a symbol. If A is
a binary relation, then A∗ is its reflexive transitive closure. When A is a set
(of symbols) and not a binary relation, then A∗ is the set of strings that use
A as their alphabet. 0.2∗ = {0.a | a ∈ 2∗}.)
Table 6.4: Tableau rules for ×◦ = ×!.
Verification: ×◦ = ×!.
Like before, if one of the two agents is based on J or J4, then we can use
the same rules and reasoning as for the case when ×◦ = ×. Thus we only
examine the cases when J1,J2 ∈ {JD, JT, JD4, LP}. For these cases we can
use the same rules as in the case where ×◦ = × for J2 as well as one of the
following two rules for J1 (Table 6.4). The first should be used if J1 = JD,
the second one if J1 ∈ {JT, LP} and the third one should be used if J1 = JD4.
The argument for this case is similar to the ones that have already been
covered. Notice in all these cases that if in a frame, aR∗2bR1c, then aR1c. To
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justify the third rule, which is different from the ones we have encountered,
we gave Lemma 6.1.2. Then, when constructing a branch from a model, if w
is mapped to u, then we map w.1 to such a b ∈ W as indicated by Lemma
2, such that for every c ∈ W , if there is some b′ ∈ W such that c, bR1b′, then
cR1b. When we construct a model from an accepting branch, we can define
W to be the set of all world prefixes that appear in the branch as well as
0.s.1 for every s ∈ 2∗ such that no world prefix 0.s.i where i ∈ {1, 2} appears.
Then,
R1 = {(w,w.u.1) ∈ W 2} ∪ {(w.1.u, w.1) ∈ W 2}.
For the first rule we can impose two extra restrictions (without affecting
the argument for correctness): we give this rule the lowest priority – it can
only be applied when there are other rules to apply – and when it introduces
w.s.1, then there must be no w.s.s′ already in the branch, where s′ not empty
(i.e. w.s must be maximal). Thus we ensure that for every w T t :i φ that
appears in the branch, the rule produces only one formula of the form w′ T φ;
this condition gives an upper bound of |φ| (where φ the initial formula) for
the number of world-prefixes. When we use the third rule (J1 = JD4), then
notice that 1 can only appear once in a prefix. Then, the number of prefixes
of the form 0.2∗ is at most |φ| and so is for any given w.1 the number of
prefixes of the form w.1.2∗; this gives an upper bound of O(|φ|2) on the total
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w T t :2φ
w.2 T φ
w T ∗2 (t, φ)
w T t :1φ
w T ∗1 (t, φ)
w T φ
w.2 T t :1φ
w F t :iφ
w F ∗i (t, φ)
Table 6.5: Tableau rules for (JT×! JD)CS and (LP×! JD)CS .
number of world-prefixes. The exception is when J1 ∈ {JT, LP}; in that case,
if J2 ∈ {JT, LP, JD4}, we still have at most two prefixes, but (J1 ×! JD)CS-
satisfiability is PSPACE-complete:
Proposition 6.1.4. (JT×! JD)CS-satisfiability and (LP×! JD)CS-satisfiability
are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. To prove the stated upper bound we use the tableau from Table 6.5.
Correctness is proven as usual. Notice that Lemma 5.2.1 can also be proven
for these logics, as rule ∗ (F) cannot be applied before rule ∗ Dis(F) in
the ∗F -calculus, so the ∗F can be applied locally at each prefix. Therefore we
can simulate the tableau using nondeterministic (for the propositional rules)
polynomial space (keeping up to two prefixes – represented by their length
in binary – in memory and terminating after 2|φ|+1 steps).
For the lower bound, simply notice that these logics have exactly the
same corresponding modal logic as (LP×C JD)CS .
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6.2 Tableau Procedures for Multi-Agent Jus-
tification Logic
In this section we give a general tableau procedure for every logic which
varies according to each logic’s parameters. We can then use the tableau for
a particular logic and make observations on its complexity.
If A1, . . . , Ak are binary relations on the same set, then A1 · · ·Ak is the
binary relation on the same set, such that xA1 · · ·Aky if and only if there
are x1, . . . , xk in the set, such that x = x1A1x2A2 · · ·Ak−1xkAky. If A is a
binary relation, then A∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure of A; if A is a set
(but not a set of pairs), then A∗ is the set of strings from A. We also use
the following relation on strings: a v b iff there is some string c such that
ac = b.
We define D = {i ∈ N | F (i) = JD}, min(D) = {i ∈ D |6 ∃j ∈ D s.t. j ⊂
i} and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n min(i) = {j ∈ min(D) | j ⊂ i or i = j} (notice
that if F (i) 6= JD, then min(i) = ∅). These are important because we can
use them to identify the agents that need to contribute new states we need to
consider as we construct a model during the tableau. For example, consider
a situation of three agents F (1) = F (2) = F (3) = JD, where 1 ⊂ 2 ⊂ 3 and
a state w in a model. Then, since the accessibility relations (R1, R2, R3) are
CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION AND VERIFICATION 198
serial, given formulas t1 :1φ1, t2 :2φ2, and t3 :3φ3, we need to consider some
states v1 |= φ1, v2 |= φ2, and v3 |= φ3. However, we also know that R1 ⊆
R2 ⊆ R3, so v1 is enough, as v1 |= φ1, φ2, φ3. We will use this observation
during the tableau.
The formulas used in the tableau will have the form 0.σ s βψ, where
ψ ∈ LnM or is a ∗-expression, σ ∈ D∗, β is (either the empty string or) of the
form 2i2j · · ·2k, i, j, . . . , k ∈ D, and s ∈ {T, F}. Furthermore, 0.σ will be
called a world-prefix or state-prefix, s a truth-prefix and world prefixes will
be denoted as 0.s1.s2 . . . sk, instead of 0.s1s2 · · · sk, where for all 1 ≤ x ≤ k,
sx ∈ D.
Prefixes of the form 0.σ, where σ ∈ D∗ represent states in the constructed
model (M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V) for this paragraph). The intuitive mean-
ing of σ T ψ is thatM, σ |= ψ and of course, σ F ψ declares thatM, σ 6|= ψ.
Then, σ T ∗i (t, ψ) declares that E |= σ T ∗i (t, ψ) and σ F ∗i (t, ψ) declares
that E 6|= σ T ∗i (t, ψ). As one may expect, the meaning of σ T 2iψ is that
M, σ′ |= ψ for every σRiσ′. Finally, σ.i is some state in W such that σRiσ.i.
A tableau branch is a set of formulas of the form σ s βψ, as above. A
branch is complete if it is closed under the tableau rules (they follow). It
is propositionally closed if σ T βψ and σ F βψ are both in the branch, or
if σ T ⊥ is in the branch. We say that a tableau branch is constructed by
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the tableau rules from φ, if it is a closure of {0 T φ} under the rules. The
tableau rules for J can be found in Table 6.6, but before that we need some
extra definitions.
For every i, j ∈ N , i ∈ Nex(j) if i, j ∈ D and there is some j i′ such
that i ∈ min(i′). We can say that i is a “next” agent from j – if we can reach
some state in the constructed model through Ri, then we must consider a
state that we can access through Rj from there. This is the essence of rule
S (Table 6.6) and it is needed to prove correctness for the tableau (see the
proof of Proposition 6.2.2).
We define the equivalence relation i ≡ j if i ⊂∗ ∗j ⊂∗ ∗i
(notice that i ⊂∗ i′ iff i ⊂ i′ or i = i′). As an equivalence relation, it gives
equivalence classes on D+ = D ∪ {i ∈ N | F (i) = JT}; let the set of these
classes be P . Furthermore, notice that for any L ∈ P , ∃x, y ∈ L s.t. x y,
or |L| = 1. In the first case, L is called a V-class of agents. For each agent
i ∈ D+, P (i) is the equivalence class which contains i. The tableau we use
for J-satisfiability makes use of the following lemma, which in many cases
allows us to save on the number of states that are produced in the constructed
frame.
Lemma 6.2.1. Let M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V) be a Fitting model on a
finite frame, L ∈ P a V-class, and u ∈ W . Then, there are states of W ,
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(ai)i∈L, such that
1. For any i ∈ L, uRiai.
2. For any i, j ∈ L, v, b ∈ W , if ai, bRjv, then bRjaj.
(ai)i∈L will be called an L-cluster for u.
Proof. For this proof we need to define the following. Let 1 ≤ i ≤ n, w, v ∈
W . An EV -path ending at i (and starting at i
′) from w to v is a finite sequence
v1, . . . , vk+1, such that for some j1, . . . , jk ∈ N , E1, . . . , Ek−1 ∈ {⊂, },
where for some j ∈ [k − 1] Ej = and jk = i (and j1 = i′), for every
a ∈ [k−1], jaEaja+1 and if Ea =⊂, then va+1 = va+2, while if Ea = , then
va+1Rja+1va+2 and v1 = w, vk = v, v1R1v2. The EV -path covers a set s ⊆ N
if {j1, . . . , jk} = s. For this path and a ∈ [k], va+1 is a ja-state. Notice that
if there is an EV path ending at i from w to v and some j ∈ s and z ∈ W
such that the path covers s and zRjw, it must also be the case that w, zRiv.
Let p : [m] −→ L be such that m ∈ N, p[[m]] = L and for every i+1 ∈ [m],
either p(i + 1) ⊂ p(i) or p(i + 1)V p(i) and there is some i + 1 ∈ [m] such
that p(i+ 1)V p(i). For any s ∈ W , x ∈ N let b0(s), b1(s), b2(s), . . . , bm(s) be
the following: b0(s) = s, for all k ∈ [m], b1(s) will be such that there is an
EV path ending at p(1) from s to b1(s) and covering Pa and if k > 1, bk(s)
is such that b0(s), b1(s), b2(s), . . . , bk(s) is an EV path ending at p(k). Let
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(bxi )i∈[m],x∈N, (a
x
i )i∈[m],x∈N be defined in the following way. For every i ∈ [m],
b0i = bi(u) and for every x ∈ N, axi = bi(bxm). Finally, for 0 < x ∈ N, (bxi )i∈[m]
is defined in the following way. If there are some bx, v ∈ W , i, j ∈ L, such that
bxRjv, a
x−1
i Rjv and not bxRja
x−1
j , then for all i ∈ L, bxi = bi(v). Otherwise,
(bxi )i∈L = (a
x
i )i∈L. By induction on x, we can see that for every x, y ∈ N,
i ∈ L, if y ≥ x, then bxRibyi , a
y
i . Since the model has a finite number of states,
there is some x ∈ N such that for every y ≥ x, (byi )i∈L = (a
y
i )i∈L. Therefore,
we can pick appropriate (ai)i∈L among (a
k
i )i∈L that satisfy conditions 1, 2.
We recursively define relation ⇒ on (D+)∗: if i ⊂ j then i⇒ j; if i j,
then ij ⇒ j; if β ⇒ δ, then αβγ ⇒ αδγ. ⇒∗ is the reflexive, transitive closure
of⇒. We can see that⇒∗ captures the closure conditions on the accessibility
relations of a frame, so if for some frame (W, (Ri)
n
i=1), aRi1Ri2 · · ·Rikb and
i1i2 · · · ik ⇒∗ j1j2 · · · jl, then aRj1Rj2 · · ·Rjlb. Furthermore, if, in addition,
l = k, then for every r ∈ [k], jr ⊂ ir. For every agent F (i) = JD, we introduce
a new agent, i and we extend ⇒∗, so that i ⇒∗ i.χ for every χ ∈ D∗ such
that i.χ ⇒∗ i (notice that χ is not the empty string only if P (i) a V-class).
Furthermore, if xy ∈ D∗, then xy = x y. This extended definition of ⇒∗
tries to capture the closure of the conditions on the accessibility relations of
a frame like the ones that will result from a tableau procedure as defined in
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the following.
Let L ∈ P and σ ∈ D∗. Then, L is visible from 0.σ if and only if there
is some i ∈ L and some χ, α ∈ D∗ such that σ = τ.i.χ and χα ⇒∗ i; τ.χ(i)
is then called the L-view from σ. Notice that there is a similarity between
this definition and the statement of Lemma 6.2.1 – this will be made explicit
later on.
This discussion above the rules should explain rules TrB, SB, FB, C, and
V, as well as S. Rule TrD merely says that when we encounter σ T t :i ψ,
we need to consider the states σ′ where σRiσ
′ (see also the discussion on
min(i) above). We do not need to produce σ.j T ψ, as this is handled by the
following successive applications of the rules: TrB, C, SB. Rule Fa may seem
strange, as in a model there may be two reasons for which σ 6|= t :iψ: either
because of the admissible evidence function or because of the accessibility
relation. Therefore, one would expect a nondeterministic choice for this rule
(see for example [Kuz08a]); we use Fitting models with the Strong Evidence
property, though, and in these models we know that σ 6|= t :i ψ because of
the admissible evidence function.
If b is a tableau branch, then Let (Ri)
n
i=1 be such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Ri = {(σ, σ.i) ∈ (W (b))2} ∪ {(w,w) ∈ (W (b))2 | F (i) = JT} ∪
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σ T t :iψ
σ T ∗i (t, ψ)
σ T 2iψ
TrB
σ T t :iψ
σ.j F ⊥
TrD
if j ∈ min(i), P (j) not a V -
class visible from σ;
σ F t :iψ




if i ∈ Nex(j), σ.i has ap-
peared, and P (i) is not a V -




















if P (i) a V -class visible from σ,
τ.j is the P (i)-view from σ and
τ.i has already appeared in the
tableau.
Table 6.6: The tableau rules for J
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∪{(σ, τ.i) ∈ (W (b))2 | P (i) a V -class, τ.j the P (i)-view from σ}
then F(b) = (W (b), (R′i)ni=1), where (R′i)ni=1 is the closure of (Ri)ni=1 under
the conditions of frames for the accessibility relations, except for seriality.
Finally, let X(b) = {σ ∗i (t, ψ)|σ T ∗i (t, ψ) appears in b} and Y (b) = {σ ∗i
(t, ψ)|σ F ∗i (t, ψ) appears in b}. Branch b of the tableau is rejecting when
it is propositionally closed or there is some f ∈ Y (b) such that X(b) `∗F(b) f .
Otherwise it is an accepting branch.
Proposition 6.2.2. Let φ ∈ LnM . φ is J-satisfiable if and only if there is a
complete accepting tableau branch b that is produced from 0 T φ.
Proof. We first prove the “if” direction. By induction on the construction of
F(b), it is not hard to see that for every (σ, τ.j) ∈ Ri, it must be the case
that i ⊂ j or that F (i) = JT and σ = τ.j and that if σ T 2iφ appears in
b and σRiτ , then τ T φ appears in b. Let M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, E ,V), where
(W, (Ri)
n
i=1) = F(b), V(p) = {w ∈ W |w T p ∈ b}, and Ei(t, ψ) = {w ∈
W | ∗T (b) `∗FCS(V,C) w ∗i (t, ψ)}.
LetM′ = (W, (R′i)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V), where for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, if F (i) = JD,
then R′i = Ri ∪ {(a, a) ∈ W 2 | ∃j ∈ min(i) 6 ∃(a, b) ∈ Rj} and R′i = Ri,
otherwise. M′ is a Fitting model for J : (Ei)ni=1 easily satisfy the appropriate
conditions, as the extra pairs of the accessibility relations do not affect the
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∗-calculus derivation, and we can prove the same for (R′i)ni=1. If aR′ibR′jc and
i j, if (a, b) ∈ R′irRi, then a = b and thus aR′ic. If (a, b) ∈ Ri, then, from
rule S, there must be some (b, c′) ∈ Rj, so (b, c) ∈ Rj and thus, (a, c) ∈ Rj. If
(a, b) ∈ R′i and i ⊂ j, then, trivially, whether (a, b) ∈ Ri or not, (a, b) ∈ R′j.
By induction on χ, we prove that for every formula χ and a ∈ W , if
a T χ ∈ b, then M′, a |= χ and if a F χ ∈ b, then M′, a 6|= χ. Propositional
cases are easy. If χ = t :iψ and a F χ ∈ b, then a /∈ Ei(t, ψ), so M′, a 6|= χ.
On the other hand, if a T t :i ψ ∈ b, then a ∈ Ei(t, ψ) and by rule TrD, for
every j ∈ min(i), there is some (a, b) ∈ Rj. Therefore, for every (a, b) ∈ R′j,
it is the case that (a, b) ∈ Rj, so by rule TrB and the inductive hypothesis,
for every (a, b) ∈ Ri, M′, b |= ψ and therefore, M′, a |= t :iψ.
We now prove the “only if” direction. Let M = (W, (Ri)ni=1, (Ei)ni=1,V)
that has the strong evidence property and a state s ∈ W such thatM, s |= φ.
For every a ∈ W and V-class L fix some L-cluster for a (Lemma 6.2.1). For
x ∈ D∗, we define (0.x)M to be such that 0M = s and (0.σ.i)M is some
element of W s.t. ((0.σ)M, (0.σ.i)M) ∈ Ri; particularly, if P (i) a V-class and
(aj)j∈L is the fixed L-cluster for σ
M, then (σ.i)M = ai.
Let Ln2J = {2i1 · · ·2ikφ | φ ∈ LnJ , k ∈ N, i1, . . . , ik ∈ N}. Given a state
a of the model, and 2iψ ∈ sub2(φ), M, a |= 2iψ has the usual, modal
interpretation, M, a |= 2iψ iff for every (a, b) ∈ Ri, M, b |= ψ.
CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION AND VERIFICATION 206
Notice that if P (i) a V -class visible from σ and τ.j is the P (i)-view
from σ, then in model M there is some v such that σM, (τ.j)MRiv, which
by the definition of clusters in turn means that σMRj(τ.j)
M. It is then
straightforward to see by induction on the tableau derivation that there is
a branch, such that if σ T ψ appears in the branch and ψ ∈ Ln2J or is a
∗-expression, then M, σM |= ψ and if σ F ψ appears, then M, σM 6|= ψ.
The proposition follows.
6.2.1 Inside the Second Level of the Polynomial Hier-
archy
In the tableau we presented, if for all appearing world-prefixes σ.i, i in the
same V-class L, then all prefixes are either of the form 0.j, where j ∈ L. In
this case we can simplify the box rules and in particular just ignore rule V
and end up with the following result.
Corollary 6.2.3. When min(D) = ∅ or there is some V-class L ∈ P such
that min(D) ⊆ L, then J-satisfiability is in Σp2.
Corollary 6.2.3 may seem rather specific, but it settles that J-satisfiability
is in Σp2 for several cases. In particular, its assumptions are satisfied when
J is any multi-agent version of LP (F (i) = JT, i i for all i), or even any
combination of single-agent justification logics from J, J4, JT, LP – not JD,
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JD4 (F (i) 6= JD). Other interesting cases are logics with agents that form
a single V-class – we consider these logics a way of generalizing JD4. For
example, consider all agents in D such that i ⊂ j iff i < j and = {(n, i) |
i ∈ N}. Then, we can think of the agent i’s justifications as increasing in
reliability as i increases and thus can model a situation where the agents
are degrees of the belief of some other agent. Thus if the agent believes
something with degree n, then the agent is aware of their belief with degree
1. On the other hand, if they believe something with degree 1, then they
may not be aware of the fact that their belief is so reliable, so they are aware
only of their least reliable belief. It would also make sense that for some
iT < n, for every i < iT , F (i) = JT instead of JD, so the most reliable beliefs
could actually be knowledge. Furthermore, even if we have = {(n, 1)},
the complexity of satisfiability remains in Σp2.
6.2.2 More Hardness with Verification
In Chapter 5, we identified certain PSPACE-complete and EXP-complete log-
ics. We demonstrate that in certain cases we can substitute a Conversion
interaction or two by a Verification interaction. Specifically, let:2
2These logics have appeared again under different names in Chapter 4.
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• J1 = ({1, 2},⊂1, 1, F1)CS be such that for i = 1, 2, F1(i) = JD,
1 =⊃1= {(1, 2)} (see Figure 6.1);
Figure 6.1: The logic J1 graphically.
• J2 = ({1, 2, 3},⊂2, 2, F2)CS be such that for i = 1, 2, 3, F1(i) = JD,
⊂= ∅, and 2 = {(1, 2), (1, 3)}.3
Figure 6.2: The logic J2.
Proposition 6.2.4. For the logics J1, J2 as defined above, under an axiomat-
ically appropriate, schematic constant specification in P, J1-satisfiability and
J2-satisfiability are PSPACE-complete.
Proof. First we give tableau rules for each logic. These can be found in Table
6.7. To prove that for these logics the tableau for φ accepts iff φ is satisfiable,
3Actually, any combination of interactions such that 2∪ ⊃2= {(1, 2), (1, 3)} would
be the same.
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Tableau rules for J1:
σ T t :2ψ
σ T ∗2 (t, ψ)
σ.2 T ψ
σ T t :1ψ
σ.2 T t :1ψ
σ T ∗1 (t, ψ)
σ.2 T ψ
σ F t :iψ
σ F ∗i (t, ψ)
Tableau rules for J2:
σ T t :iψ
σ T ∗i (t, ψ)
σ.i T ψ
σ T t :1ψ
σ.i T t :1ψ
if i ∈ {1, 2} and
σ.i has appeared;
σ F t :iψ
σ F ∗i (t, ψ)
Table 6.7: Tableau rules for J1, J2.
we follow the usual procedure. Let M, u |= φ. If the tableau produces
prefixes of the form 0.α, where α ∈ A∗, A some set of agents, then for each
α ∈ A∗ let 0.α be assigned to a state ofM, where 0 is assigned to u and if α
is assigned to w, then α.i is assigned to some v such that wRiv. Then it is
not hard to verify that we can make sure that if the tableau produces σ T g
and σ is assigned to w, then M, w |= g and if the tableau produces σ F g
and σ is assigned to w, thenM, w 6|= g, so the branch accepts. On the other
hand, from an accepting branch we can follow the standard construction and
construct a model for φ (see the very similar proof of Proposition 6.1.4).
Notice that the tableau rules for J1 are exactly the resulting tableau rules
for J4 ×C JD from Chapter 5, so we can easily argue these have the same
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complexity.
That J2-satisfiability is in PSPACE is also simple and very similar to
the proof for Proposition 6.1.4. To prove that it is PSPACE-hard, we can
show that the corresponding modal logic is PSPACE-hard and the proposition
follows from Lemma 5.1.1. That is M2 = ({1, 2, 3},⊂2, ′2, F ′2), where for
i = 1, 2, 3, F1(i) = D and
′
2 = {(1, 3), (2, 3)} (we essentially renamed the
agents for convenience). To prove PSPACE-hardness for M2-satisfiability, we
use a translation from D2 ⊕⊆ D. To translate a formula φ, we replace 21 by
2123, 22 by 2223, and 23 by 23; the result is φ
′.





3,V) for φ′, by R1 := R′1R′3, R2 := R′2R′3, and R3 := R′3. For
the other direction, given a model (W,R1, R2, R3,V) for φ, let W ′ = W ∪
R1 ∪ R2 ∪ R3, R′1 = {(a, (a, b)) ∈ W × R1}, R′2 = {(a, (a, b)) ∈ W × R2},
and R′3 = R3 ∪ {((a, b), b) ∈ R3 × W}. Then, for a, b ∈ W , aR′1R′3b iff
aR′1(a, b)R
′




3b iff aR2b; aR
′
3b iff
aR3b by definition. Then, it is not hard to demonstrate by induction on
ψ that for every subformula ψ of φ and a ∈ W , M, a |= ψ if and only if
M′, a |= ψ′.
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Figure 6.3: Complexity characterizations for Multi-Agent Justification Logic
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6.3 A NEXP-complete Justification Logic
So far we have seen modal and justification logics that are in at most EXP-
complete. By now the reader may wonder whether the NEXP upper bound of
Proposition 4.4.3 can be improved. The answer, as this section demonstrates,
is that it cannot (assuming EXP 6= NEXP). The results of this section are
from [Ach15a].
The justification logic we prove to have a NEXP-complete satisfiability
problem is JH = ({1, 2, 3, 4},⊂, , F )CS , where
• ⊂= {(3, 4)},
• = {(1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 4)},
• F (1) = F (2) = J, F (3) = F (4) = JD, and4
• CS is any axiomatically appropriate and schematic constant specifica-
tion.
JH is a four-agent logic. Its agents are based on justification logics J
and JD – and essentially JD4, as agent 4 has Positive Introspection. Agent
3 has a significant variety of justifications. Since 1 2 3, 3 is aware
4Notice that for the first time when we prove a hardness result, we do not require that
all agents have serial accessibility relations. Nonetheless, agents 1 and 2 play important
roles in the following reduction.
CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION AND VERIFICATION 213
Figure 6.4: Graphical representation of EXP-hard logic JH .
of the justifications of 2, who in turn is aware of the justifications of 1.
Therefore, 3 can simulate the reasoning of 2 who can simulate the reasoning of
1. Additionally, 3 accepts two types of justifications: the ones 3 receives from
4, which come with Positive Introspection and the other ones 3 accepts, which
do not. As Theorem 6.3.1 demonstrates, this complex interaction among
agent 3’s justifications results in the significant hardness of JH-satisfiability.
Figure 6.4 gives a graphical representation of JH .
Theorem 6.3.1. JH-satisfiability is NEXP-hard.
The reduction we use is from the BINARY SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS
SAT problem, which is NEXP-complete (see Lemma 2.3.2). The reduction
for Theorem 6.3.1 is essentially an extended version of the reduction we used
to prove Theorem 3.4.2. Like then, consider a construction of a satisfying
model, only this time it is a Fitting model with several states and acces-
sibility relations for agents. Another difference is, of course, that now the
original formula is from the first-order language. However, in the BINARY
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SCHÖNFINKEL-BERNAYS SAT formulation, each (first-order) variable is
quantified over two possible values (the elements of the two-element model),
so they are essentially propositional variables. Since this is satisfiability we
must existentially quantify each relation symbol over all 2r+1 r-ary relations.
We can encode such a nondeterministic choice by forcing the existence of an
exponential number of states, each representing one r-tuple v = v1, . . . , vr
of the two possible values 0 and 1 (as mentioned above, we can do this
using agents 3 and 4) by having var :1 [pa]
va being true and then at each
such state enforce the choice between rel :1 [R]
> and rel :1 [R]
⊥, mean-
ing that v ∈ R or v /∈ R respectively – where R an actual relation. In
such a state conjunctions of the form gather :1 ([p1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pr]vr ∧ [R]4)
(where 4 = > or ⊥) encode this choice. Due to the particular interaction
among the agents and the logics they are based on, in the constructed model
gather :1 ([p1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pr]vr ∧ [R]4) is true in a state if and only if that
state represents v and 4 = > iff v ∈ R. Already this JH-model encodes a
first-order model. The trick now is to be able to gather in one state all these
formulas that encode the relations through the admissible evidence function
closure conditions (i.e. through the ∗-calculus), but making sure that indi-
vidual conjuncts (i.e. something of the form var :1 [p]
4 or rel :1 [R]
4) cannot
be also transfered to that state through the calculus – in that case we would
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be able to construct gather :1 ([p1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pr]vr ∧ [R]4) for additional, in-
valid combinations of (v,4). This is achieved by considering formulas of the
form !gather :2 gather :1 ([p1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pr]vr ∧ [R]4). The constructed model
has empty accessibility relations for agents 1 and 2, thus such formulas can
move freely through the accessibility relation of agent 3 (since 2 3 and be-
cause of Distribution), but this is not the case for anything of the form t :1χ
(since 1 6 3, 4). Using certain additional formulas we can make sure that
!gather :2 gather :1 ([p1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [pr]vr ∧ [R]4) → [R(x1, . . . , xr)]4 becomes
true if and only if x1, . . . , xr are interpreted as v1, . . . , vr. The remaining of
the formulas and methods we use are very similar to the ones we use for
Theorem 3.4.2.
By combining Corollary 4.4.3 and Theorem 6.3.1, we can claim the fol-
lowing:
Corollary 6.3.2. JH-satisfiability is NEXP-complete.
6.3.1 Proof of Theorem 6.3.1
Given a first-order formula φ as above, we construct a justification formula,
φJ , in polynomial time, such that φ is satisfiable by a two-element model if
and only if φ is satisfiable by a J-model. The reader will notice several simi-
larities to the proof of Theorem 3.4.2. In fact, we use some of the definitions
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from Section 3.4.
Let
φ = ∃x1 · · · ∃xk∀y1 · · · ∀yk′ψ
be such a formula, where ψ contains no quantifiers or function symbols.
Let R1, . . . , Rm be the relation symbols appearing in ψ, a1, . . . , am their
respective arities. Then, let α = {i ∈ N | ∃r ≤ m s.t. i ≤ ar}; then,
|α| = max{a1, . . . , am}. We also define: X = {x1, . . . , xk}; Y = {y1, . . . , yk′};
Z = X ∪ Y ; ρ0 = k + k′.
For this reduction, in addition to the terms introduced in Section 3.4,
we define the following justification terms. If we expect a term to justify a
tautological scheme of fixed length, then we can just assume the term exists
and has some constant size. Otherwise we construct the term in a way that
gives it size polynomial with respect to the formula it (provably) justifies.
Again we need certain terms to encode manipulations of long conjunctions
(which we can see as strings) and we start with these.
addhyp is such that ` addhyp :1 (φ→ (ψ → φ));
replaceleft is such that ` replaceleft :1 ((φ→ φ′)→ ((φ∧ψ)→ (φ′∧ψ))),
while
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replaceright is such that ` replaceright :1 ((ψ → ψ′) → ((φ ∧ ψ) → (φ ∧
ψ′)));
We define replacekl in the following way:
replacekk = replaceright,
while for l < k,
replacekl = trans · replacek−1l · replaceleft.
Then it is not hard to see by induction on k − l that
` replacekl :1 ((φl → φ′l)→
→ ((φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φl ∧ · · · ∧ φk)→ (φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φ′l ∧ · · · ∧ φk))).
We define mphypoth to be such that
` mphypoth :1 ((φ→ ψ)→ ((φ→ (ψ → χ))→ (φ→ χ))).
We use justification variables var1, . . . , varar , relr for every r ∈ [m].
For 1 ≤ r ≤ m we define gatherr in the following way:
gatherr = [append · [append · · · [append · var1] · · · varar ] · relr],
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For every 1 ≤ j ≤ ar + 1, let vj, v′j ∈ {>,⊥}. Then, for propositional




vj ∧ relr :1 [Rr]var+1 `
gatherr :1 ([p1]





if and only if for every 1 ≤ j ≤ ar + 1, vj = v′j (see the proof of Lemma









vj ∧ [Rr]var+1 ` χ :
operator ! does not appear in gatherr, so the right-hand side of a cor-
responding ∗-calculus derivation for ∗1(gatherr, χ) is a propositional
derivation of χ from [p1]
v1 , . . . , [par ]
var , [Rr]
var+1 and some propositional
tautologies.
To give some intuition, conjunction
∧ar
j=1 varj :1 [pj]
vj ∧ relr :1 [Rr]var+1
means that (v1, . . . , var) ∈ Rr in a corresponding first-order model.
We use justification variables valuez and match(z, pl) for every z ∈ Z,
l ∈ α. For every z ∈ X, we define Vz = valuez :1 [z]> ∨ valuez :1 [z]⊥;
for every z ∈ Y , Vz = valuez :1 [z]> ∧ valuez :1 [z]⊥.







match(z, pl) :1 ([z]
4 → ([pl]4 → okl))
For every Rr(~z) which appears in ψ and 0 ≤ b ≤ ar, we define term
match
Rr(~z)
b in the following way: match
Rr(~z)
0 = addhyp · gatherr and if
b > 0 and zb = xl or zb = yl−k, then match
Rr(~z)







We can see by induction on b that for every 0 ≤ b ≤ ar,
Match, gatherr :1 ([p1]
v′1 ∧ · · ·∧ [par ]v
′
ar ∧ [Rr]var+1) `
` matchRr(z1,...,zar )b :1
(
[x1]
v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [xk]vk ∧ [y1]vk+1 ∧ · · · ∧ [yk′ ]vk′+k →
→ (ok1 ∧ · · · ∧ okb ∧ [pb+1]v
′




if and only if for every j ∈ [ar] and j′ ∈ [k+k′], if zj = xj′ or zj = yj′−k,
then v′j = vj′ .
Match and term match
Rr(~z)
b are used to confirm that given an assign-
ment v for variables x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk′ , a tuple ~z ∈ Zar , and a tuple
(v′1, . . . , v
′
ar+1) ∈ {>,⊥}ar+1 , that (v(z1), . . . , v(zar)) = (v′1, . . . , v′ar),
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since this is a crucial condition to assert that [Rr(~z)]
var+1 must be true
(i.e. Rr(~z) is true iff var+1 = >).
T !(match
Rr(~z)
b ) is defined in the following way:
T !(match
Rr(~z)




c· · [c··!mphypoth · T !(matchRr(~z)b−1 )]·
·![tran · [tran · projectρ1l ·match(yl, b)] · replace
ar+1
b ]
We can see by induction on b that for every 0 ≤ b ≤ ar,
Match, !gatherr :2 gatherr :1 ([p1]
v′1∧· · ·∧[par ]v
′
ar∧[Rr]var+1) `









→ (ok1 ∧ · · · ∧ okb ∧ [pb+1]v
′




if and only if
Match, gatherr :1 ([p1]
v′1 ∧ · · · ∧ [par ]v
′
ar ∧ [Rr]var+1) `







→ (ok1 ∧ · · · ∧ okb ∧ [pb+1]v
′





which in turn, as we have seen above, is true if and only if for every
j ∈ [ar] and j′ ∈ [k + k′], if zj = xj′ or zj = yj′−k, then v′j = vj′ .
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Using the terms (and formulas) we have defined above, we can construct
terms T a, where 0 < a ≤ ρ1 and eventually tφ:
Let Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψl} be an ordering of all subformulas of ψ and of vari-
ables x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk′ , which extends the ordering x1, . . . , xk, y1, . . . , yk′ ,
such that if a < b, then |ψa| ≤ |ψb|.5 Furthermore, ρ0 = |{a ∈ [l] | |ψa| = 0}|
(= k + k′) and ρ1 = |{a ∈ [l] | |ψa| = 1}|.
Let T 1 = valuez1 and for every 1 < a ≤ ρ0, T a = [append ·T a−1 ·valueza ].
It is not hard to see that for v1, . . . , vk ∈ {>,⊥},
valuez1 :1 [z1]
v1 , . . . , valuezk :1 [zk]
vk ` T ρ0 :1 ([z1]v1 ∧ · · · ∧ [zk]vk). (6.1)
For every a ∈ [l],
if ψa = Rr(z
a
1 , . . . , z
a
ar), then
Evala = trutha :2 ([match
ψa
ar ·T
ρ0 ] :1 (ok1∧· · ·∧okar ∧ [Rr]>)→ [ψa]>)∧
∧trutha :2 ([matchψaar · T
ρ0 ] :1 (ok1 ∧ · · · ∧ okar ∧ [Rr]⊥)→ [ψa]⊥);
if ψa = ¬γ, then
Evala = trutha :2 ([γ]
> → [ψa]⊥) ∧ trutha :2 ([γ]⊥ → [ψa]>);
5assume a | · |, such that |xj | = |yj | = 0, |Rj(v1, . . . , vaj )| = 1 and if γ is a proper
subformula of δ, then |γ| < |δ|
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if ψa = γ ∨ δ, then
Evala = trutha :2 ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψa]>)∧ trutha :2 ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψa]>)
∧ trutha :2 ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]> → [ψa]>) ∧ trutha :2 ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψa]⊥);
if ψa = γ ∧ δ, then
Evala = trutha :2 ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψa]>)∧ trutha :2 ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψa]⊥)
∧ trutha :2 ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]> → [ψa]⊥) ∧ trutha :2 ([γ]⊥ ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψa]⊥);
if ψa = γ → δ, then
Evala = trutha :2 ([γ]
> ∧ [δ]> → [ψa]>)∧ trutha :2 ([γ]> ∧ [δ]⊥ → [ψa]⊥)





For ρ0 < a ≤ ρ1, we define gathrela in the following way:
gathrelρ0+1 = c· · T !(matchψaara )
and for ρ0 + 1 < a ≤ ρ1,
gathrelρ0+1 = appendconc · gathrela−1 · [c· · T !(matchψaara )].
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Then,
T ρ0+1 = replaceρ1−ρ01 · truthρ0+1 · [gathrelρ1 ·!T ρ0 ]
and for ρ0 + 1 < a ≤ ρ1,
T a = replaceρ1−ρ0a · truthρ0+1 · T a−1.
if ψa = ¬ψ2, then
T a = hypappend · [trans · proja−ρ0−1j · trutha] · T a−1 and
if ψa = ψb ◦ ψc, then
T a = hypappend · [trans · [appendconc · proja−ρ0−1b · proj
a−1
c ] · trutha] · T a−1.
We then define tφ = [right · T l].
Lemma 6.3.3. For every b ∈ [ρ1], j ∈ [arb ], let ~lb = (lb1, . . . , lbarb ) ∈
{pj,¬pj}arb and vb ∈ {>,⊥}. Assume that for every b1, b2 ∈ [ρ1], if rb1 = rb2
and ~lb1 = ~lb2, then it must also be the case that vb1 = vb2. Then,6
ρ1∧
b=1
!gatherrb :2 gatherrb :1
(






vz ` tφ :2 [φ]>
if and only if M |= φ for every model M with universe {>,⊥} and interpre-
tation I such that
6For convenience and to keep the notation tidy, we identify ~lb with lb1 ∧ · · · ∧ lbarb and
~ok with ok1 ∧ · · · ∧ okarb .
CHAPTER 6. CONVERSION AND VERIFICATION 224
• for every z ∈ Z, vz = I(z),
• for every b ∈ [ρ1], M |= Rrb(f(lb1), . . . , f(lbarb )) iff v
b = >,
where for all j ∈ α, f(pj) = > and f(¬pj) = ⊥.
Proof. The if direction is not hard to see by (induction on) the construction
of the terms T a, tφ. For the other direction, notice that a ∗-calculus derivation
for ∧
b∈[ρ1]
!gatherrb :2 gatherrb :1
(








vz ` tφ :2 [φ]>


















r ) = ψa, a subformula of φ, can be derived
from the assumptions above only if [matchψaara · T
ρ0 ] :1 ( ~ok ∧ [Rra ]4) can be
derived as well – notice that the assumptions cannot be inconsistent and we
can easily adjust a model that does not satisfy [matchψaara ·T
ρ0 ] :1 ( ~ok∧ [Rra ]4)
so that it does not satisfy χ either, by simply changing the truth value of χ.
The derivation of matchψaara :1 (
~ok ∧ [Rra ]4) is not affected by Eval#2 : if
there is a model that satisfies all assumptions except for Eval#2 and not
matchψaara :1 (
~ok ∧ [Rra ]4), we can assume the strong evidence property and
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change the truth-values of every [ψb]
4′ to true, so the new model satisfies all
the assumptions and not [matchψaara · T
ρ0 ] :1 ( ~ok ∧ [Rra ]4).
Therefore we have a ∗-calculus derivation of [matchψaara ·T
ρ0 ] :1 ( ~ok∧[Rra ]4)
and since gatherr only appears once in match
ψa
ara
, there is some b ∈ [ρ1] such
that (see Lemma 3.4.3)
gatherrb :1
(








` [matchψaara · T
ρ0 ] :1 ( ~ok ∧ [Rra ]4)





[z]vz ` ~ok ∧ [Rra ]4
From which it is not hard to see that for all z ∈ Z, vb = 4, so every first-
order model as described in the Lemma satisfies χ. Then it is not hard to
see by induction that all such models satisfy all [ψa]
4 derivable from these
same assumptions.
Now to construct the actual formula the reduction gives. For this let ρ
be a fixed justification variable. We define the following formulas.
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forwardA = ρ :4
∨
a∈[α]
vara :1¬pa ∧ [active]→ ρ :3 [active]










varb :1¬pb ∧ vara :1 pa






varb :1¬pb ∧ vara :1¬pa ∧ [active]
→ ρ :3 vara :1¬pa)





varb :1¬pb ∧ vara :1 pa ∧ [active]
→ ρ :3 vara :1 pa)
end = ρ :4
(∧
a∈α
var :1 pa ∧ [active]→ ρ :4¬[active]
)
choiceR = ρ :4
(
[active]→ relr :1 [Rr]> ∨ relr :1 [Rr]⊥
)














> ∧ valuez :1 [z]⊥
))
test = ρ :4
(
¬[active]→Match ∧ Eval ∧ ¬tφ :2 [¬φ]T
)
Then, φJFO, the formula constructed by the reduction is the conjunction of
these formulas above:
start ∧ forwardA ∧ forwardB ∧ forwardC∧
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∧forwardD ∧ end ∧ choiceR ∧ choiceV ∧ test.
Theorem 6.3.4. φJFO is J-satisfiable if and only if φ is satisfiable by a two-
element first-order model.
Proof. First, assume φ is satisfiable by two-element first-order model, say
M with interpretation I, and assume that for every 1 ≤ a ≤ k, I(xa) is
such that M |= ∀y1, . . . ,∀yk′ψ. For a m ∈ N, let [m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m}. We
construct a J-model for φJFO:
MJ = (W,R1, R2, R3, R4, E ,V), where:
• W = {σ ∈ N | σ + 2 ∈ [2α + 2]} (i.e. σ ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2, . . . 2α});
• R1 = R2 = ∅, R3 = {(σ, σ + 1) | σ < 2α} ∪ {(2α, 2α)}, and
R4 = {(σ, σ′) | σ < σ′} ∪ {(2α, 2α)};
• E is minimal such that
– E3(ρ, χ) = E4(ρ, χ) = W for any formula χ,
– E1(vara, pa) = {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(σ) = 1},
– E1(vara,¬pa) = {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(σ) = 0},
– E1(relr, [Rr]>) = {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and
M |= Rr(bin0(σ), . . . , binar(σ))},
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– E1(relr, [Rr]⊥) = {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and
M 6|= Rr(bin0(σ), . . . , binar(σ))},
– for every a ∈ [k], E1(valuexa , [xa]>) = {2α}, if I(xa) = > and ∅
otherwise,
– for every a ∈ [k], E1(valuexa , [xa]⊥) = {2α}, if I(xa) = ⊥ and ∅
otherwise,
– for every a ∈ [k′], E1(valueya , [ya]>) = Ei(valueya , [ya]⊥) = {2α},
and
– MJ , 2α |= Match,Eval;
• V([active]) = {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α]} and for any other propositional
variable q, V(q) = ∅.
It is not hard to verify that MJ ,−1 |= φJFO, as long as we establish that
MJ , 2α 6|= tφ :2 [¬φ]T , for which it is enough that 2α /∈ Ej(tφ, [¬φ]>).
The definition of E is equivalent to σ ∈ Eg(s, χ)⇔ S `∗ σ ∗g (s, χ), where
S =
{w ∗3 (ρ, F ) | w ∈ W,F a formula} ∪ {w ∗4 (ρ, F ) | w ∈ W,F a formula} ∪
{w ∗1 (vara, pa) | w + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(w) = 1} ∪
{w ∗1 (vara,¬pa) | w + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(w) = 0} ∪
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{w ∗1 (relr, [Rr]>) | w + 1 ∈ [2α] and M |= Rr(bin0(w), . . . , binar(w))} ∪
{w ∗1 (relr, [Rr]⊥) | w + 1 ∈ [2α] and M 6|= Rr(bin0(w), . . . , binar(w))} ∪
{2α ∗1 (valuexa , [xa]>) | a ∈ [k], I(xa) = >} ∪
{2α ∗1 (valuexa , [xa]⊥) | a ∈ [k], I(xa) = ⊥} ∪
{2α ∗1 (valueya , [ya]>) | a ∈ [k′]} ∪ {2α ∗1 (valueya , [ya]⊥) | a ∈ [k′]} ∪
{2α e | e ∈ ∗Eval ∪ ∗Match}
Then, 2α ∈ E2(tφ, [¬φ]>) iff S `∗ 2α ∗2 (tφ, [¬φ]>). Notice the following: since
tφ does not have ρ as a subterm, the ∗-expressions in
{w ∗3 (ρ, F ) | w ∈ W,F a formula} ∪ {w ∗4 (ρ, F ) | w ∈ W,F a formula}
cannot be a part of a derivation for S `∗ 2α ∗2 (tφ, [¬φ]>).
Since 1 2 3 and 1, 2 do not interact with any agents in any other
way, for any term s with no !, if for some a or r, vara or relr are subterms
os s, if S `∗ w s :aχ, then a = 1, 0 ≤ w < 2α, and {w e ∈ S} `∗ w s :1χ. tφ
includes exactly one !gatherrb for every b and one of valuez for every z ∈ Z.
Therefore, if S `∗ 2α ∗2 (tφ, [¬φ]>), then there are
∧
b∈[ρ1]




vz ` tφ :2 [¬φ]>
and by Lemma 6.3.3, M |= ¬φ, a contradiction.
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On the other hand, let there be someM′J where φJ is satisfied. Then, we
name −1 a state where M′J ,−1 |= φJ and let −1R30R31R3 · · ·R32α. Then,
• E1(vara, pa) ⊆ {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(σ) = 1},
• E1(vara,¬pa) ⊆ {σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and bina(σ) = 0},
• MJ , 2α |= Match,Eval and for every a ∈ [k′],
MJ , 2α |= valueya :1 [ya]>, valueya :1 [ya]⊥;
as we can see by induction on σ - the conditions on A1(vara, pa), A1(vara,¬pa)
as imposed by forwardB, forwardC , forwardD are positive. Notice here
that if for some 0 ≤ w < 2α − 1, w ∈
⋂
a∈α E1(vara, pa), then we have a
contradiction: w+1 |= ¬[active] and if w is minimal for this to happen, then
w |= [active], so since there is some a s.t. w ∈ E1(vara,¬pa), w+1 |= [active]
(by forwardA).
Then, {w | w + 1 ∈ [2α]} ⊆ E1(relr, [Rr]>) ∪ E1(relr, [Rr]⊥) and then we
can define a first-order model M such that:
• E1(relr, [Rr]>) ⊆
{σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and M |= Rr(bin0(σ), . . . , binar(σ))},
• E1(relr, [Rr]⊥) ⊆
{σ ∈ W | σ + 1 ∈ [2α] and M 6|= Rr(bin0(σ), . . . , binar(σ))},
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• for every a ∈ [k], E1(valuexa , [xa]>) ⊆ {2α}, if I(xa) = > and ∅ other-
wise,
• for every a ∈ [k], E1(valuexa , [xa]⊥) ⊆ {2α}, if I(xa) = ⊥ and ∅ other-
wise,
Since it must be the case thatMJ , 2α 6|= tφ :2 [¬φ], it cannot be the case that
∧
b∈[ρ1]




vz ` tφ :2 [¬φ]>
and since M satisfies the conditions from Lemma 6.3.3, M 6|= ¬φ.
Theorem 6.3.1 is then a direct consequence.
6.3.2 Justification Logic is harder than Modal Logic
The NEXP-hardness result we presented in this chapter makes JH the first
justification logic with known complexity having a harder satisfiability prob-
lem (assuming EXP 6= NEXP) than its corresponding modal logic. In fact,
as Proposition 6.3.5 demonstrates, if MH is the modal logic which corre-
sponds to JH (the modal logic with the same frame restrictions as JH), then
MH-satisfiability is in EXP: we can simulate the tableau procedure from
Table 6.8 using an exponential time algorithm – an alternating polynomial
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space one actually, where we use nondeterministic existential choices to ap-
ply the tableau rules and universal choices to select exactly one prefix σ.(g, i)
from σ to explore. While Modal Satisfiability has been studied extensively,
we are not aware of anyone investigating specifically the complexity of MH-
satisfiability; furthermore, there are additional conclusions we can reach from
the following analysis; therefore we provide a brief proof.
Proposition 6.3.5. Let MH be the four-modalities modal logic associated
with the class of frames (W,R1, R2, R3, R4) where R3, R4 are serial, R3 ⊆ R4,
and for (i, j) ∈ {(1, 2), (2, 3), (4, 4)}, if aRjbRic, then aRic. Then, MH-
satisfiability is in EXP.
Proof. We first prove that the tableau procedure from Table 6.8 is sound
and complete. From an accepting branch for φ we can construct a model
for φ: let W be the set of prefixes that have appeared in the branch; let
a ∈ V(p) iff a T p has appeared in the branch, let for i = 1, 2, 3, 4, ri =
{(a, a.(g, i)) ∈ W ×W}, for i = 1, 2, Ri = ri, R3 is the transitive closure of
r3, and R4 is the transitive closure of r3 ∪ r4. It is not hard to verify that
model M = (W,R1, R2, R3, R4) satisfies all necessary conditions and that
M, (0, 0) |= φ – by inductively proving that if a T ψ in the branch then
M, a |= ψ and if a F ψ in the branch then M, a 6|= ψ.
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σ T 3iψ
σ.(g, i) T ψ
where (g, i) is new;
σ F 3iψ
σ.(g, i) F ψ
where (g, i) has already
appeared and i < 4;
σ T 2iψ
σ.(g, i) T ψ
where (g, i) has already
appeared and i < 4;
σ F 2iψ
σ.(g, i) F ψ
where (g, i) is new;
σ T 2iψ
σ T 3iψ





where 0 < i < j < 4;
σ F 34ψ
σ.(g, 4) F ψ
σ.(g, 4)F 34ψ
where (g, i) has already
appeared and i ∈
{3, 4};
σ T 24ψ
σ.(g, i) T ψ
σ.(g, i) T 24ψ
where (g, i) has already
appeared and i ∈
{3, 4};
To test φ for MH-satisfiability, start from a branch which only contains
(0, 0) T φ and keep expanding according to the rules above. A branch with
σ T ψ and σ F ψ is propositionally closed. A (possibly infinite) branch
which is not propositionally closed, but is closed under the rules is an ac-
cepting branch.
Table 6.8: Tableau rules for MH .
On the other hand, from a model M = (W,R1, R2, R3, R4) for φ we can
make appropriate nondeterministic choices to construct an accepting branch
for φ. We map (0, 0) to a state w(0,0) such that M, w(0,0) |= φ; then, when
σ.(g, i) appears first, it must be because of a formula of the form σ T 3iψ
(or σ F 2iψ, but it is essentially the same case). If M, wσ |= 3iψ, then
there must be some state wσRiw, such that M |= ψ and thus we name
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w = wσ.(g,i). It is not hard to see that we can make such choices when
applying the rules, so that if a T ψ in the branch then M, wa |= ψ if a F ψ
in the branch then M, wa 6|= ψ. In fact the rules of Table 6.8 preserve this
condition right away; we just need to make sure that the same thing happens
with the propositional rules – for instance, rule σ T ψ∨χ
σ T ψ | σ T χ can make an
appropriate choice depending on whether M, wσ |= ψ or M, wσ |= χ. Thus
the constructed branch cannot be propositionally closed.
What remains is to show that this tableau procedure can be simulated by
an alternating algorithm which uses polynomial space – thusMH-satisfiability
is in APSPACE = EXP. This can be done by applying the following method:
always keep the formulas prefixed by a certain prefix σ in memory (at first
σ = (0, 0)). First apply all the tableau rules you can on the formulas prefixed
by σ – possibly use existential nondeterministic choices for this. Then, using
a universal choice, pick one of the prefixes σ′ = σ.(g, i) that were just con-
structed and replace the formulas you have in memory by the ones prefixed
by σ′. Repeat these steps until we either have σ T ψ and σ F ψ in memory
or we see “enough” prefixes. In this case, “enough” would mean “more than
26|φ|”, as φ has up to |φ| subformulas, so in a branch there can only be up
to 6|φ| formulas prefixed by some fixed σ – thus the algorithm only needs to
use O(|φ|) memory and if it goes through 6|φ|+ 1 prefixes, then two of these
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have prefixed exactly the same set of formulas. If the algorithm accepts φ,
then we can easily reconstruct an accepting branch by just taking the union
of the constructed formulas, while if there is an accepting branch, then the
algorithm can explore only parts of that branch.
As for the diamond-free fragment of MH , we observe the following. For a
formula φ ∈ L4M in NNF and without any 3, let the translation to a φ′ ∈ L2M ,
be such that in φ′, every (maximal subformula of the form) 21ψ or 22ψ is
replaced by >, 23 by 21, and 24 by 22. Then, it is not hard to see that φ is
MH-satisfiable if and only if φ
′ is D⊕⊆D4-satisfiable: if (W,R1, R2, R3, R4,V)
is a model for φ, then (W,R3, R4,V) is a model for φ′ (by induction on φ); if
(W,R1, R2,V) is a model for φ′, then (W, ∅, ∅, R1, R2) is a model for φ′. This
brings us to the following proposition.
Proposition 6.3.6. The diamond-free fragment of MH is in PSPACE.
Notice that Proposition 6.3.6 is a counterexample for the generalization of
Proposition 5.2.2 for logics with Verification: diamond-free MH is in PSPACE,
but JH is NEXP-complete – a even more remarkable gap in complexity.
Chapter 7
Ending Remarks
What we did: By extending and generalizing Yavorskaya’s two-agent LP
[Yav08], we introduced a family of multi-agent justification logics with two
types of interactions among the agents. Our purpose was to provide a gen-
eral framework capable of modeling situations of multiple agents of different
cognitive abilities and interdependencies, in a setting where we are also in-
terested in the agents’ justifications.
We examined the complexity of the resulting logics; we discovered that
when no agent is based on a logic of consistent beliefs (JD and JD4), there
is not much difference in the complexity of the logic (or the methods to
determine it). On the other hand, for the remaining cases we discovered that
we can achieve diverse levels of complexity, a surprising phenomenon, as all
known single-agent logics are Σp2-complete.
We were able to completely determine the complexity of the logics for
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the case of exactly two agents and for the case where we only consider one
interaction, Conversion. We gave a general upper bound by proving that
all logics in the system are in NEXP and we proved it tight by providing a
NEXP-complete justification logic – perhaps the most surprising result of this
thesis.
We observed a close connection between these logics and the diamond-
free fragments of their corresponding modal logics. On the other hand, the
NEXP-complete justification logic has a higher complexity than any modal
logic that uses these interactions (and many more).
At the same time we made observations about the complexity of single-
agent Justification Logic. We were able to determine the complexity of JD4
and to improve on the required conditions for the general lower bound of
Σp2-hardness by Milnikel [Mil07] and Buss and Kuznets [BK12]. At the same
time we observed the need of tableau procedures based on Fitting semantics
instead of Mkrtychev semantics when we have agents of consistent beliefs.
Figure 7.1 presents the whole picture.
What must be done: The class of logics we have identified to remain
in the second level of the Polynomial Hierarchy is wide, but by no means
complete. It would be good to have a characterization in the form of eas-
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ily identifiable properties or an efficient algorithm to help us identify the
complexity of a justification logic.
Another important open question is the complexity of justification logics
with Negative Introspection (see [Art08, Pac05, Rub06a, Rub06b, Rub06d,
Rub06c]); the Justification Logic version of Negative Introspection uses an
extra operator (?) and is ¬t :φ→?t : t :φ. As Chapter 2 demonstrates, Neg-
ative Introspection plays an important role for Modal Logic, characterizing
its computationally more tractable cases. On the other hand, in Justification
Logic we do not know anything about the satisfiability problem of logics with
Negative Introspection, with the exception of Studer’s decidability result for
J5, J45, JT5, and JT45 under a finite constant specification [Stu13]. The
problem here lies with the justifications and not the constructed frames as in
many cases1 we have seen. In short, the ∗-calculus does not help us as much
as for the other logics, as the closure conditions for the admissible evidence
functions are nondeterministic; i.e. they force a choice between t : φ and
?t :¬t :φ.
1It is interesting to note that Positive and Negative Introspection are equivalent in
Modal Logic with respect to their diamond-free fragments: simply compare the class of
frames for the diamond-free fragments of each logic.
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What can be done: It would be plausible to consider logics with other
kinds of interactions as well. For example, a generalization of negative intro-
spection would be interesting from a technical point of view. As Modal Logic
is a vast field, Justification Logic has many options as to how to expand. It
would be good to identify those areas that can benefit from Justification
Logic and especially from the study of its complexity.
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Figure 7.1: The complexity of Multi-Agent Justification Logic.
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